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ABSTRACT  
The global economic system has been undergoing fundamental changes since the 1980s. 
Many emerging countries drastically increased their openness to trade and foreign 
investments. Formerly socialist countries entered a transition towards a market-based 
model and deepened their integration into the global economy. As a result, the 
geography of trade, investment flows, and innovation is becoming more multipolar. 
This thesis seeks to improve our understanding of the links between these macro-level 
shifts and the geography of innovation, spatial patterns of economic deprivation, as well 
as firm-level outcomes in emerging countries.  
This thesis is structured into an introductory chapter and four analytical papers. The 
introductory chapter outlines three themes corresponding to the areas to which this 
thesis makes a contribution: (1) the interplay of the local and the global dimension in 
shaping regional patterns of knowledge creation, (2) the link between the relative 
weight of the private sector and spatial patterns of economic deprivation, and (3) the 
role of global production networks and the changing geography of trade in shaping 
regional patterns of innovative performance and heterogeneous firm-level outcomes. 
The first paper examines the geography of innovation in Russia, adopting a perspective 
that combines Soviet-era legacies, contemporaneous regional conditions, and global 
linkages. The results shed light on multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) role as key agents 
providing Russian regions with knowledge from distant places. The findings 
simultaneously point to the importance of path dependencies in regional patterns of 
knowledge generation. 
The second paper investigates the link between regional innovative performance in 
Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia and investments of MNEs categorized by entry mode and 
business function. The analysis suggests that the relationship between global linkages 
established by MNEs and regional knowledge creation is jointly shaped by the 
heterogeneity of MNEs’ investments and the heterogeneity of region-specific conditions 
in Latin American economies at different stages of technological development. 
The third paper focuses on Vietnam, a country that has seen some provinces act as 
pioneers and others as laggards in the journey towards an outward-oriented market-
based economy. The link between the private sector’s weight in the economy and 
economic deprivation is a topic of considerable policy interest, but its subnational 
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dimension remains underexplored. The analysis considers the relationship between 
provincial differences in the change of private firms’ formal employment share and 
changes in the geography of economic deprivation. The findings reveal that increases in 
private firms’ employment share are associated with reductions in poverty. MNEs 
appear to be a key driver of this association. 
Finally, the fourth paper concerns Vietnam’s growing trade with China. It looks at the 
link between imports from China and firm-level outcomes in Vietnam’s manufacturing 
sector. The results show that, contrary to previous findings for advanced economies, 
exposure to imports from China is positively linked with firm-level employment. 
Information on trade in intermediates suggests that inputs imported from China may 
support Vietnam’s export growth. The findings cast light on the necessity to consider 
the role of global production networks and trade in intermediates when assessing the 
developmental implications of changing trade patterns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I. Overview 
 
The global economic system has been undergoing fundamental changes since the 1980s. 
Countries that were previously pursuing import substitution policies, such as Brazil, 
drastically increased their openness to trade and foreign investments. Most formerly 
socialist countries, including China, Russia, and Vietnam, entered a transition towards a 
market-based model and deepened their integration into the global economy. As a 
consequence, the geography of global trade, investment flows, and knowledge 
production is becoming more multipolar (Athreye and Cantwell, 2007; Evans et al., 
2007; Quah, 2011; Kaplinsky, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013). Trade between developing 
countries as a proportion of world trade grew from 7% to 17% during 1999 to 2009 
(ADB, 2011: 6) and China’s share of global merchandise exports has grown from less 
than two percent in 1990 to nearly 14 percent in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2016). A set of 
emerging countries manages to attract a growing share of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in knowledge-intensive activities (UNCTAD, 2005; Iammarino and McCann, 
2013). In addition, firms from emerging countries increasingly invest abroad (Cozza et 
al., 2015; Crescenzi et al., 2016), with outward FDI flows from developing economies 
accounting for an unprecedented 35% of global FDI in 2014 (UNCTAD, 2015). 
The ramifications of these macro-level trends differ vastly across emerging economies 
and within countries. While China’s rise as a manufacturing powerhouse has 
contributed to substantial progress in the reduction of poverty (Chen and Ravallion, 
2012), it is often argued that China’s resurgence as a trading power has come at the 
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expense of manufacturing industries in other emerging countries, such as Mexico 
(Coxhead, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2008; Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010). At the 
subnational level, a set of closely connected elite regions have seen their innovative 
performance boosted by the growing presence of multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
while many peripheral regions remain poorly connected to global flows of knowledge 
and capital or only attract investments of limited technology content (Huggins et al., 
2007; Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008). Reforms altering the conditions for firms 
are often implemented in diverse ways across the regions of countries like Vietnam, 
Russia, or China (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2011; Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2013; 
Malesky and London, 2014; Schmitz et al., 2015), contributing to pronounced regional 
differences in private sector development and international connectivity. In addition to 
heterogeneous contemporaneous factors, diverse starting positions and historical 
legacies, as in the case of Russia’s innovation system (Cooper, 2006; Klochikhin, 
2012), shape diverse present-day outcomes in terms of knowledge creation and 
development (Rigby and Essletzbichler, 1997; Iammarino, 2005). 
This thesis explores the implications of the fundamental changes outlined above 
regarding the geography of innovation and development as well as firm-level outcomes. 
Applied econometric techniques are employed to analyse data from five emerging 
countries: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Russia, and Vietnam. Three themes correspond to 
the areas to which this thesis seeks to make a contribution: 
 the interplay of the local and the global dimension in shaping regional patterns 
of knowledge creation 
 the link between the relative weight of the private sector and regional patterns of 
economic deprivation 
 the role of global production networks and the changing geography of trade in 
shaping diverse regional patterns of innovative performance and heterogeneous 
firm-level outcomes 
These three areas are related and, to varying degrees, they appear as crosscutting themes 
throughout this thesis. 
This thesis cross-fertilizes elements from several disciplines. It cuts across economic 
geography, international economics, international business studies, and development 
studies. The three themes of this thesis, whose conceptual foundations are explained in 
more detail below, link phenomena and agents that have been the subject of the work of 
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scholars in these disciplines. In connecting these bodies of literature, this thesis follows 
the appeal of several scholars to think beyond the narrow boundaries of academic 
disciplines (e.g. Sjöberg and   Sjöholm, 2002; Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; Pike et al., 
2014).  
Regarding the relationship between economic geography and economics, both 
disciplines share the interest in the uneven distribution of economic activity across 
space. While economic geographers typically prefer qualitative case studies embedded 
in conceptually rich discussions of context-specific and historical factors, economists 
tend to prioritize quantitative methods and tests of universally applicable rules that can 
be expressed in mathematical terms. Notwithstanding remaining misunderstandings and 
distrust on both sides, several authors have suggested that a combination of insights 
from these two neighbouring disciplines can improve our understanding of the 
economic geography of the contemporary world (e.g. Sjöberg   and   Sjöholm, 2002; 
Duranton and Rodríguez-Pose, 2005).
1
 
With respect to the dialogue between economic geographers and international business 
scholars, the activities of multinational enterprises are the principal point where these 
two disciplines meet. These two groups share a willingness to use qualitative as well as 
quantitative methods. They also share a certain degree of scepticism about the 
neoclassical conceptualisation of the firm as a representative firm operating in a perfect 
market and in a world where countries are primarily characterized by their factor 
endowments. Traditionally, international business scholars have prioritized the analysis 
of MNEs’ strategies, paying less attention to location characteristics at the subnational 
                                                 
1
 The success of scholars who contribute to journals of both disciplines (e.g. Phil McCann, Peter 
Nijkamp, Henry Overman), journals with editorial boards representing both disciplines (e.g. Journal of 
Economic Geography, Papers in Regional Science), and well-cited papers authored by scholars from both 
disciplines (e.g. Cheshire and Gordon, 1998; Leamer and Storper, 2001; Storper and Venables, 2004; 
Duranton and Storper, 2008) appear to confirm the potential benefits from a cross-fertilization of the 
perspectives of economic geography and economics. Notwithstanding these examples, tensions and 
scepticism often characterize the relationship between economic geographers and economists. Especially  
since  the  early  1990s, economists  have  made inroads  into  core  questions  of  economic  geography, 
giving rise to fears that geographers have to “fight off external threats of assimilation from mainstream 
economics” (Yeung, 2001: 174). Among geographers, “few  appear  willing  to  concede  that  economists  
may have something  to contribute to economic geography” (Sjöberg and Sjöholm, 2002: 467). 
Conversely, economists display scepticism regarding the methods employed by geographers. Yet, several 
authors have acknowledged the potential benefits of a cross-fertilization of both disciplines. Garretsen 
and Martin (2010: 155) see “scope for a fruitful dialogue”. Focusing on the way economic geography 
should be taught, Coe and Yeung (2006) argue in favour of a combination of elements from both fields. 
Overman (2004) reiterates economists’ scepticism of geographers’ methods but simultaneously identifies 
areas where geographers’ work can act as a source of inspiration for economists.   
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level. Conversely, economic geographers have typically placed the emphasis on the in-
depth investigation of the locational context, while attributing less importance to a 
comprehensive view of the way MNEs strategically coordinate their activities (McCann 
and Mudambi, 2005).
2
   
As far as links between scholars in economic geography and development studies are 
concerned, several recent contributions highlight opportunities for fruitful exchanges. 
Showing that economic geographers’ work tends to prioritize regions in advanced 
economies, Murphy (2008) encourages economic geographers to learn from and 
contribute to research in development studies in order to create a basis for a more 
holistic understanding of globalization. Against the backdrop of a world increasingly 
characterized by economic integration and interdependencies, Pike et al. (2014: 22) 
warn that the disconnect between both groups of scholars is “creating gaps in our 
understanding and fragmenting our collective knowledge”. In terms of methods as well 
as conceptual aspects, there is substantial overlap between both groups, e.g. regarding 
the scepticism of neoclassical thinking and the limited enthusiasm for top-down 
approaches. Conversely, the difficulty of defining the extent to which existing theories 
can be applied at different levels of development complicates efforts to bridge 
boundaries between economic geography and development studies (Pike et al., 2014).  
Due to discipline-specific, historically shaped priorities in terms of research questions 
and methods, the contributions of scholars from different disciplines shed light on 
different aspects. An interdisciplinary approach therefore constitutes an opportunity: It 
can help us to obtain a more complete picture, since it incorporates elements that might 
not be taken into account if one adopted a conceptual lens fully relying on only one 
discipline. At the same time, an eclectic approach may also entail challenges, as 
different disciplines may diverge in their interpretations of empirical findings; 
theoretical and terminological variation can hamper the discussion of research results 
across disciplinary boundaries. Differences regarding the preferred methodological 
                                                 
2
 Despite these differences in their viewpoints, there is undoubtedly great scope for cross-disciplinary 
fertilization between these two neighbouring disciplines. For example, international business scholars 
display growing interest in subnational location characteristics and the way MNEs tap into place-specific 
knowledge pools by creating “location portfolios” (Cantwell, 2009; Meyer et al., 2011). Partially inspired 
by the work of business scholars, an increasing number of contributions in economic geography is 
dedicated to the evolution of subsidiary-level capabilities and to interactions between regional 
characteristics and MNEs’ decisions to locate specific activities in a region (Phelps and Fuller, 2000; 
Malecki, 2010; Crescenzi et al., 2014; Phelps and Fuller, 2016). 
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approach can make it difficult to interpret empirical results in a way that would be 
accepted by members of multiple disciplines. Similarly, fundamentally diverging views 
of the relationship between empirical evidence and theory can lead to different 
approaches to research design. Moreover, specific concepts might be associated with 
different meanings and diverging bundles of features in different disciplines – 
potentially undermining the conceptual clarity of an eclectic framework. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, this PhD thesis adopts a multidisciplinary approach. 
The decision to choose such a framework for this thesis is grounded on the conviction 
that the benefits associated with the additional insight to be gained from this 
combination of several disciplines outweigh the potential “costs” of an eclectic 
framework.  
Rather than focusing on one specific place, this PhD thesis combines empirical analyses 
drawing on data from five emerging countries. In doing so, it seeks to uncover 
complementary insights into the factors shaping the geography of development in a 
world characterized by interdependencies. By covering three different parts of the 
world, this thesis aims to broaden and enhance our understanding of the multifaceted 
phenomena associated with the three core themes of the thesis (discussed in more detail 
below). The thesis’ design does not follow the structure of a comparative study, though: 
the research questions and foci vary across the different contexts studied in this thesis. 
Accordingly, the approach chosen here does not aim to provide a basis for an in-depth 
comparison of the role of a specific factor in different contexts. Instead, it examines 
related questions in five emerging countries to provide a more comprehensive view of 
the challenges and dynamics to be considered by scholars and policy-makers when 
trying to understand changes in spatial patterns of development and technological 
capabilities in different parts of an increasingly globalized world.  
A related question concerns the weight attributed to contextual factors in this thesis. In 
economic geography and related disciplines, there is a debate about the extent to which 
an in-depth understanding of context-specific differentiation or an emphasis on 
universalising logics should dominate our way of conducting research. This thesis’ 
approach is characterized by scepticism with respect to both extremes on the range of 
“context-specificity”. When assuming that everything has to be explained by place-
specific aspects, one runs the risk of losing sight of patterns that characterize places 
with broadly similar characteristics. As stressed by Pike et al. (2014: 26), if “‘it is all 
different everywhere’ each situation ends up with a bespoke, idiosyncratic and 
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contingent account of little explanatory use in different contexts”. Conversely, the other 
extreme, i.e. “the hunt for general rules or tendencies” (Overman, 2004: 513), is likely 
to be associated with an insufficient consideration of context-specific aspects. The quest 
for universally applicable, abstract models may therefore similarly limit our 
understanding of crucial processes if relevant characteristics of places are disregarded as 
unexplained residuals.    
Situated between those two extremes, this thesis acknowledges the importance of 
context-specific factors. Every chapter of this thesis provides a detailed discussion of 
the context of the empirical analysis. To the extent that this is econometrically feasible, 
context-specific variables – such as the share of ethnic Russians in the analysis 
presented in chapter 1 – are included in the empirical analysis. Moreover, the 
interpretation of the results always refers back to context-specific aspects, e.g. regarding 
differences across the three Latin American countries included in the analysis presented 
in chapter 2. At the same time, the methodological approach adopted in this thesis aims 
to uncover empirical patterns based on a relatively large number of observations. A 
nuanced discussion of the results is meant to help the reader to assess the extent to 
which the findings may have implications for places that share general features with the 
regions included in the analysis.  
Rather than assuming that ‘it is all different everywhere’, this thesis starts form the 
assumption that the findings gained based on data for a set of regions in a specific part 
of the world can be carefully used to improve our understanding of the situation in 
places sharing similar characteristics, e.g. regarding recent economic history or level of 
technological development. The type of characteristics that define the degree of 
transferability depends on the precise research question and the empirical finding that 
one is considering. For example, for a question focused on trade and cross-border 
production networks, one could identify similar places in terms of sectoral composition, 
trade orientation, and degree of integration in cross-border production networks. 
Similarly, for a finding regarding the diffusion of knowledge in sparsely populated areas 
in Russia, the geographical distribution of the population should be a major indicator to 
consider when choosing the set of places for which one may prudently consider 
implications of the findings based on Russian data. However, attempts to generalize 
findings to places sharing similar characteristics still have to be accompanied by a 
careful consideration of nuances and complexities. Such cautious generalizations are 
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likely to provide valuable first suggestions regarding hitherto underexplored areas and 
may therefore point towards promising direction for future research. 
The next part of this introductory chapter provides a discussion of the three themes of 
this thesis.  This will be followed by a section that briefly summarizes each paper’s 
methodological approach, findings, and contribution. The concluding section addresses 
policy implications and outlines directions for future research. 
II. Themes of this thesis 
 
The interplay of the local and the global dimension in shaping regional patterns of 
knowledge creation 
The first theme of this thesis is the interplay of the local and the global dimension in 
shaping regional patterns of knowledge creation. The ability to absorb and create 
economically valuable knowledge is widely considered as a crucial factor in 
determining the growth prospects of national and regional economies (Dosi et al., 1988; 
Storper, 1997; Archibugi and Lundvall, 2001; Simmie, 2004). Numerous empirical 
studies have highlighted regional differences in innovative activity in developed (e.g. 
Feldman, 1994; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Moreno et al., 2005; Fagerberg et al., 
2014) as well as emerging countries (e.g. Cassiolato and Lastres, 2000; Sun, 2003; 
Goncalves and Almeida, 2009; Crescenzi et al., 2012). 
Explanations regarding the drivers of these disparities can be found in several streams 
of literature. In endogenous growth models (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990) externalities 
associated with human capital accumulation and R&D activities act as drivers of 
productivity and can explain persistent spatial disparities. In contrast to the way early 
neoclassical literature conceptualized knowledge as a pure public good (Solow 1957), 
empirical studies focused on the identification of knowledge flows in space show that 
knowledge does not diffuse evenly across space. Distance decay effects seem to limit 
knowledge spillovers to a radius of several hundred kilometres from their origin (e.g. 
Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; Moreno et al., 2005; Sonn and Storper, 2008). This spatial 
“stickiness” of knowledge appears rooted in the difficulty of transferring tacit – i.e. 
complex, non-codifiable – knowledge across large distances (Leamer and Storper, 
2001). As shown by Storper and Venables (2004), face-to-face contact is an 
economically efficient way of transferring tacit knowledge. Since face-to-face contact 
 21 
requires geographical proximity, places located outside of the driving range of major 
innovation hubs may face strategic disadvantages in the form of limited exposure to 
knowledge spillovers (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008).   
These considerations point to the importance of the local dimension in shaping regional 
patterns of innovative performance. Aspects such as a region’s human capital 
endowment, R&D efforts, and geographic location are likely to influence its level of 
innovative output. The local dimension also takes centre stage in the regional systems of 
innovation (RSI) literature that conceives innovation as an interactive process embedded 
in a social and institutional context (e.g. Cooke et al., 1997; Braczyk et al., 1998; 
Iammarino, 2005; Uyarra, 2010). Drawing on the national systems of innovation 
literature (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997), the RSI approach considers 
region-specific modes of learning and technological trajectories as significant causes of 
regional disparities in innovative performance (Asheim and Gertler, 2011).  
This view incorporates elements from evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Dosi et al., 1988). Technological change can be considered as a path-dependent 
process (Nelson, 1987; Dosi and Nelson, 2010); a perspective which has increasingly 
served as the starting point for economic geographers’ investigations of regional 
patterns of knowledge creation and economic restructuring (e.g. Boschma and 
Lambooy, 1999; Frenken et al., 2007; Iammarino et al., 2009; Boschma and Martin, 
2010; Essletzbichler, 2015). Knowledge creation does not occur in an atemporal 
vacuum, as highlighted by Iammarino (2005) in the case of Italian regions. In addition 
to contemporaneous region-specific factors, one has to take into account the role of 
historically shaped knowledge bases. As synthesized by Kogler (2015: 705), 
“competencies acquired over time by individuals and entities in particular localities to a 
large degree determine present conﬁgurations as well as future regional trajectories”. 
Yet, this path-dependency still leaves room for windows of opportunity which may 
allow regions to substantially deviate from their historical trajectory (Storper and Scott, 
2003), e.g. when multinational enterprises (MNEs) introduce new economic activities 
and technologies to the region (Nguyen and Revilla Diez, 2016). The relevance of 
historically shaped knowledge bases is an important aspect of the first paper of this 
thesis. It explores the geography of innovation of Russia. 
MNEs are part of the global dimension of the processes that shape regional levels of 
innovative performance. While local aspects have often taken centre stage in economic 
geographers’ work on spatial patterns of knowledge creation, especially since the late 
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1990s a nuanced approach emphasizing the complementarity of local and global inputs 
to knowledge creation has gained influence (Rallet and Torre, 1999; Oinas, 1999; 
Guerrieri et al., 2001; Simmie, 2003; Gallié, 2009; Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; 
Bathelt and Cohendet, 2014). Even places with innovation-prone local conditions 
cannot sustain high levels of knowledge creation without access to inputs from external 
sources (Maskell, 2014). Highly innovative locations often rely on a combination of 
high-density localized knowledge flows and new elements of knowledge obtained via 
so-called global pipelines (Bathelt et al., 2004). The latter are conduits for knowledge 
flows across large distances that do not depend on permanent geographical proximity. 
Alternative types of proximity (Boschma, 2005) – e.g. via social linkages – play an 
important role in their formation.  
Global pipelines reduce a region’s risk of entering a lock-in, or, simply put, of running 
out of ideas. They may simultaneously help to mitigate disadvantages associated with 
geographical remoteness relative to major innovation centres. In practice, global 
pipelines can take various forms, including diaspora networks (Saxenian and Sabel, 
2008; Ganguli, 2015) and business connections established through temporary 
encounters at trade fairs (Li, 2014). Yet, it is MNEs that act as the principal vehicle for 
knowledge flows across national and regional borders (Iammarino and McCann, 2013).  
MNEs’ investments increasingly target destinations outside developed countries. In 
2012 FDI flows to developing countries, for the first time ever, exceed flows to 
developed countries (UNCTAD, 2013). Yet, MNEs’ investment are characterized by a 
pattern of “concentrated dispersion” (Iammarino and McCann, 2013), with MNE 
activities typically displaying high levels of concentration within countries. Although 
empirical contributions show that MNEs influence regional levels of knowledge 
creation (Fu, 2008; Crescenzi et al., 2012), the mixed picture emerging from the broader 
literature on knowledge spillovers from FDI (Crespo and Fontura, 2007; Keller, 2010) 
suggests that positive effects on local technological capabilities are far from being 
guaranteed. One crucial aspect concerns the integration of MNE subsidiaries into the 
regional economy (Phelps et al., 2003), as foreign-owned plants operating in “enclave 
economies” (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007; Phelps et al., 2015) are unlikely to generate 
knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, local firms with low levels of absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) are unlikely to benefit from exposure to MNEs’ 
technology. In addition, sufficient cognitive proximity (Boschma, 2005) between local 
agents and MNE subsidiaries is needed for knowledge exchanges to take place.  
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Increasingly, scholars take into account the subsidiary’s mandate as a factor shaping 
MNE activities’ influence on regional economies (Fuller and Phelps, 2004; Jindra et al., 
2009). More knowledge-intensive activities are generally expected to provide greater 
potential for positive effects on local technological capabilities (Keller, 2010). As 
highlighted early on by Hymer (1972), MNEs choose different locations for different 
functions. Only a small set of regions attract MNE investments dedicated to research 
and development (R&D) (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001, 2003; Crescenzi et al., 2014). 
The type of MNE activities that a region attracts simultaneously reflects its main 
characteristics, including market size, labour market conditions, and socio-institutional 
and systemic features, and its position in global production networks (Crescenzi et al., 
2014). MNEs increasingly divide the value chain into functions and locate each of them 
where it can be carried out in the most effective way (Iammarino and McCann, 2013). 
They act as key agents linking firms and regions involved in geographically fragmented 
production processes in networks shaped by diverse forms of governance and 
knowledge flows (e.g. Gereffi, 1994; Giuliani et al., 2005; Morrison et al., 2008). The 
heterogeneity of the mandates that MNEs assign to their subsidiaries in different regions 
takes centre stage in the second paper of this thesis. It examines the geography of 
innovation of three Latin American countries. The geographical fragmentation of 
production processes will be explored further in the discussion of the third theme of this 
thesis. 
 
The link between the relative weight of the private sector and regional patterns of 
economic deprivation 
The second theme of this thesis is the link between the relative weight of the private 
sector in the economy and regional patterns of economic deprivation. Differences across 
and within countries in the incidence of absolute poverty, i.e. deprivation of the 
resources needed to cover basic human needs, can be considered as the most 
fundamental manifestation of uneven development. A pivotal role in the alleviation of 
economic deprivation is often attributed to private firms (Hasan et al., 2007; Pietrobelli, 
2007). Particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, state interventions in the economy 
were met with scepticism in a period shaped by the Washington Consensus, while 
improvements of private firms’ business environment were regarded as an important 
step towards poverty reduction (Psacharopoulos and Nguyen, 1997; UNDP, 2004). In 
formerly socialist economies like China, Russia, or Vietnam, reforms changing the 
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conditions of private firms and state-owned enterprises often proceed at varying speeds 
in different regions, contributing to regional variation in private firms’ relative weight in 
the economy. 
Contributions emphasizing private firms as the principal agents driving poverty 
reduction frequently combine an optimistic stance on the private sector’s growth 
potential in developing countries with great scepticism regarding state interventions in 
the economy (Psacharopoulos and Nguyen, 1997; Klein and Hadjimichael, 2003).
3 
The 
private entrepreneur, motivated by incentives to maximize profits, is regarded as a 
powerful force for the continuous re-allocation of resources in an efficiency-enhancing 
way (Casson, 1982), generating new economic opportunities that help to reduce 
poverty. Failures and successes of individual private firms provide important signals for 
other private firms, further contributing to an efficient allocation of resources (Acs and 
Storey, 2004).  
In order to unleash the poverty-reducing potential of private firms, a set of measures 
related to the overall legal and regulatory framework are often highlighted as decisive 
by international development organizations (Altenburg and Drachenfels, 2006).
4
 These 
measures include the protection of property rights (de Soto, 1989), lowering of barriers 
to entry and exit through the facilitation of business registration procedures (Beck and 
Demirgüc-Kunt, 2004; Djankov et al., 2009), and the creation of a “level playing field” 
characterized by equal regulatory treatment and access to factors of production applying 
to all firms, irrespective of ownership (Hakkala and Kokko, 2007). The last point 
implies that this view leaves little room for strong state-owned enterprises.
5
  
Particularly in transition economies, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often assumed 
to be afflicted by agency problems, ill-defined property rights, and soft budget 
                                                 
3 This perspective is based on the assumption that “the savings, investment and innovation that lead to 
development are undertaken largely by private individuals, corporations and communities” (UNDP, 2004: 
1). 
4
 A comprehensive discussion of approaches to private sector development and industrial policies is 
beyond the scope of this introductory chapter. This subsection focuses on a concise summary of the 
influential view that prioritizes measures related to the overall regulatory framework; this subsection does 
not suggest that these measures are a sufficient condition for successful private sector development. The 
corresponding approach has been labelled as “minimalist” by Altenburg and Drachenfels (2006). Note 
that numerous authors call for more pro-active SME support policies including measures at the firm-level 
(e.g. Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006; Pietrobelli, 2007; Navarro et al., 2016).  
5 
This view is summarized by the ADB (2000: 12): “The government must reduce its presence as owner-
producer and concentrate more on facilitating and regulating private sector activities to ensure markets 
work”. 
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constraints, creating incentives that undermine profit maximization and may allow SOE 
managers to appropriate rents (Kornai, et al. 2003; Estrin et al., 2009). Kornai (1992) 
argues that SOEs are likely to use their political connections to preserve their 
preferential access to factors of production and slow down necessary economic reforms 
in formerly socialist countries. Via several channels, especially access to factors of 
production, SOEs are therefore assumed to hamper private firms’ growth (Hakkala and 
Kokko, 2007), thereby slowing down progress in the reduction of economic deprivation. 
Yet, the perspective of “market fundamentalists” (Rodrik, 2006a), optimistic about 
private firms’ potential to alleviate poverty and pessimistic regarding state interventions 
in the economy, competes with a view that is more open to an active, strategic role of 
the state in the economy. Several authors have highlighted SOEs’ potentially important 
role as anchors of social stability during times of rapid structural change in transition 
economies (Beresford, 2008; Vu Thanh, 2014). Rather than fearing possibly market-
distorting effects associated with state interventions, these voices worry about the 
private market’s failure to provide social services to the poor. Referring to the Chinese 
case, Bai et al. (2000: 736) consider it as “inevitable that SOEs continue to play their 
multitask role during the transition” to guarantee social stability in a context where 
social safety institutions are not developed yet and private firms have little incentives to 
provide public goods. By providing social services and keeping surplus labour on their 
payroll, SOEs are assumed to safeguard social stability, thereby protecting all firms’ 
business environment (Bai et al., 2006).  
A related argument, going beyond the necessity to support the poor during times of 
rapid change, points to the strategic use of industrial policy to influence an economy’s 
trajectory in terms of sectoral composition and technological capabilities. The success 
of the developmental state in East Asian economies, especially Taiwan and South 
Korea, acts as a source of inspiration for supporters of a strong role for SOEs. From this 
point of view, the state may help to re-allocate resources from unproductive to more 
productive activities, mobilize resources, and stimulate public and private investment 
(Wade, 1990). A balanced set of fiscal incentives, selective subsidies, and strong SOEs 
may help to overcome market failures and promote, rather than obstruct, the growth of 
private firms (Chang, 2011). Control mechanisms, including performance targets for 
firms, are meant to ensure that these deliberate distortions of the market do not produce 
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adverse effects (Amsden, 2001).
6
 Advocates of this view argue that strong SOEs can 
make an important contribution to the alleviation of economic deprivation and to the 
modernization of the economy in a symbiotic relationship with private firms (Beresford, 
2004).
7
 
The debate about private firms’ relative weight in the economy has largely focused on 
the national level and comparisons across countries. A limited number of studies have 
instead shed light on differences in private sector development and government attitudes 
towards firms of different ownership categories at the regional level. Particularly in 
transition economies, reforms characterizing the path from socialism towards a market-
based economy with favourable conditions for private enterprises and openness to FDI 
did not always proceed at the same speed in all parts of the respective countries. 
Regional governments often developed their own approach to reforms.  
Several empirical studies suggest that subnational heterogeneity in the changes of the 
private sector’s relative weight can contribute to shape the geography of development 
and economic deprivation in these countries. In Russia, the central government lost 
influence on regional governments in the 1990s, allowing regions to diverge from 
national economic policies (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2001; Berkowitz and DeJong, 
2011). Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) identify a “Red Belt” of regions that opposed pro-
market reforms in the 1990s and maintained Soviet-style economic policies. The 
authors document slower income growth and slower creation of new private firms in 
these regions. Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2013) study the regional dimension of a set 
of reforms launched by Russia’s central government during 2001-2004 to reduce the 
regulatory burden on firms and facilitate the registration of new firms. They find 
evidence that the reforms were enforced unevenly across regions. Whereas positive 
effects on private firms were identified in regions that fully implemented the measures, 
regions which incompletely removed regulatory obstacles targeted by the reforms did 
not display increases in small private enterprises’ employment share. 
                                                 
6
 For a comprehensive discussion of the types of policies associated with developmental states in East 
Asia, see Wade (1990) and Chang (2011). 
7
 For recent discussions of industrial policy, modern interpretations of the developmental state, and the 
role of the state in promoting technological progress, see UNCTAD (2012), Padilla-Pérez (2014), 
Altenburg and Lütkenhorst (2015), and Mazzucato (2015). 
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In China, subnational governments played a central role in the economic liberalization 
process, “pioneering new policies with varying degrees of national endorsement or 
tolerance” (Chien and Gordon, 2008: 40). The central government deliberately allowed 
some coastal regions to act as pioneers leading the country’s economic liberalization 
(Yao, 2009). This contributed, particularly in the early years of liberalization, to a 
highly uneven distribution of MNE activities and diverse conditions for private 
enterprises across provinces. Even when the “open-door policy” was applied to the 
entire country, province-level experimentation in economic policies remained a key 
characteristic of China’s development model (Coase and Wang, 2012; Malesky and 
London, 2014). Fiscal decentralization, cadre promotion rules linked to province-level 
growth performance, and transfers of powers, including land use and control of most 
SOEs, encouraged subnational variation in economic development initiatives 
(Montinola et al., 1995; Chien and Gordon, 2008). Fujita and Hu (2001) highlight 
differential growth rates of private firms’ employment share as one factor likely to have 
contributed to widening spatial disparities in China’s reform period.  
With a history of relative decentralization dating back to pre-socialist times (Probert and 
Young, 1995), Vietnam has seen some provinces act as pioneers and others as laggards 
in the journey towards a market-based economy integrated in global production 
networks (Malesky, 2004; Schmitz et al., 2015). In contrast to China, where autonomy 
was frequently encouraged and rewarded, reform-oriented provincial governments in 
Vietnam were often violating the central policy line and faced, particularly in the early 
reform period, punishments if their experiments were deemed unsuitable for replication 
at a bigger scale (Malesky and London, 2014). Successful province-level initiatives 
influenced national-level policy changes related to agricultural liberalization (Kerkvliet, 
2005), SOE reforms (Fforde, 2007), and opening to trade and FDI (Van Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003; Malesky, 2008). Heterogeneity regarding the relative weight of private 
firms has been mentioned repeatedly (Beresford, 2008; Ishizuka, 2011) as a factor that 
may help to explain spatial patterns of development and economic deprivation in 
Vietnam. This link is the focus of the third paper of this thesis. 
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The role of global production networks and the changing geography of trade in shaping 
diverse regional patterns of innovative performance and heterogeneous firm-level 
outcomes 
The third theme of this thesis is the role of global production networks and the changing 
geography of trade in shaping diverse regional patterns of innovative performance and 
heterogeneous firm-level outcomes. Production used to be functionally integrated and 
geographically concentrated. Most items were produced in a single location
8
 and trade 
was predominantly seen as the exchange of complete goods, e.g. wine for cloth 
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Technological progress, especially in transport 
and communications, has enabled firms to slice production processes into stages 
allocated to those places where the corresponding tasks can be carried out most 
effectively (Iammarino and McCann, 2013). The resulting linkages between 
geographically separate stages form global production networks
9
 (GPNs) that transcend 
national borders and firm boundaries (Ernst and Kim, 2002; Coe and Yeung, 2015).
10
  
While countries and regions used to specialize in industries, the “great unbundling” 
(Baldwin, 2006) of production stages has given rise to a scenario where countries and 
regions may specialize predominantly in a specific task without necessarily focusing on 
a narrow industry. As firms increasingly source components from multiple countries, 
the growing number of border-crossings of components and semi-finished products is 
reflected in the composition of trade flows.  About 60 percent of global trade consisted 
                                                 
8
 As described by Krugman (1995: 333), a car factory in the 1930s was “a facility that ingested coke and 
iron ore at one end and extruded passenger cars from the other”. 
9
 Different authors and different streams of literature employ a large number of concepts to describe 
aspects linked to the geographical fragmentation of production and MNEs’ role in coordinating cross-
border flows of know-how, components, and final goods. The notion of global value chains figures 
prominently in the work of economic geographers and development scholars interested in governance 
structures within these networks as well as prospects for the upgrading of capabilities at the local level 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Gereffi et al., 2005; Morrison et al., 2008). Adopting a different 
perspective, trade economists (Antràs and Chor, 2013) modelling contractual relations within these 
networks also refer to global value chains. Related concepts in the work of trade economists interested in 
comparisons with the traditional Ricardian view of trade include vertical specialization (Hummels et al., 
2001), trade in tasks (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2014), offshoring (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 
2006), global supply-chain trade (Baldwin, 2014), global production sharing (Feenstra and Hanson, 2003) 
and trade in value added (Johnson and Noguera, 2012).  
10 
The consequences of the eruption of an Icelandic volcano in April 2010 illustrate that, in contrast to the 
geographical concentration described by Krugman (1995) with respect to a U.S. car factory in the 1930s, 
manufacturing processes today often draw on complex international networks of suppliers of components 
and services. The eruption of Eyjafjallajökull created an ash cloud which disrupted air travel in April 
2010 – with knock-on effects on global production networks. Car production in countries as 
geographically far away as Japan and the U.S. was affected through temporary component shortages 
(Miller, 2010). 
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of intermediate goods and services in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013). Particularly since the 
1980s, the international dispersion of tasks dedicated to different stages of the 
production of a final good has led to growing trade between technologically advanced 
economies (e.g. Japan, U.S.) and low-wage economies (e.g. China, Costa Rica) 
(Baldwin, 2014).
11
 MNEs are of pivotal importance to these trade linkages; they act as 
the central agents orchestrating the flow of knowledge, components, and final products 
between locations (Ernst, 2004; Iammarino and McCann, 2013).
12
 MNEs’ role is 
particularly relevant in emerging countries with large export-oriented manufacturing 
activities.
13
  
What are the implications of these patterns of production and trade for the development 
prospects of emerging economies? Trade is generally considered an important channel 
for international technology transfers (Keller, 2010; Mendoza, 2010; Fu et al., 2011; 
Park and Douglas, 2014). Frequently starting from the endogenous growth literature 
(Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990), several trade models suggest that innovations embodied in 
imports help to diffuse the benefits of technological innovations across national borders 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Eaton and Kortum, 1996; Keller, 2000; Eaton and 
Kortum, 2002). The extent of R&D spillovers from country A to country B is often 
assumed to depend on the share of A’s products in B’s total imports (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1990; Coe and Helpman, 1995).
14
 Especially imports used in domestic 
production processes are assumed to provide potential for technological spillovers (Xu 
and Wang, 1999; Keller, 2000; Acharya and Keller, 2009). Imports of intermediates 
embodying technologies new to the local context may enable firms in the importing 
country to extend their product portfolio and improve productivity and technological 
capabilities through reverse-engineering and experimenting (Keller, 2000; Mendoza, 
2010). Contact with MNE subsidiaries is likely to facilitate this technology diffusion via 
trade (Keller, 2004).  
                                                 
11
 Developing countries’ share in global value added trade increased from 20% in 1990 to over 40% in 
2012 (UNCTAD, 2013). Value added corresponds to the difference between the value of an industry’s 
total output and the value of all intermediate inputs used in its production (Montalbano et al., 2016). 
12
 Trade flows linked to MNEs via global production networks are estimated to account for approximately 
80% of global trade (UNCTAD, 2013). 
13
 Export-oriented (vertical) investments by MNEs account for a particularly large share of total MNE 
investments in Southeast Asia (OECD, 2013a). For example, in 2009 MNEs accounted for more than half 
of all Vietnamese exports (GSO, 2016). 
14
 Such technology diffusion via trade may also occur indirectly: Country C may benefit from knowledge 
creation in country A without directly trading with country A if it there is an indirect link via trade with 
country B which, in turn, directly trades with country A (Lumenga-Neso et al., 2005; Keller, 2010). 
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From this perspective, the growth of global production networks may generate new 
opportunities for emerging economies. Rather than slowly building a broad industrial 
base by “mastering” labour-intensive light industries (such as textiles) before shifting 
into more capital-intensive (e.g. shipbuilding) and eventually knowledge-intensive (e.g. 
biotech) industries as often assumed in traditional conceptualizations of industrialization 
(e.g. Kojima, 2000), emerging countries may join GPNs and perform a narrow set of 
tasks contributing to the production of final goods requiring advanced technology and 
sophisticated supply chains (Baldwin, 2011).
15
 With access to technologically advanced 
inputs, foreign capital, and the transfer of complementary know-how from MNEs
16
, 
emerging countries and regions embedded in GPNs may, in an ideal scenario, gradually 
upgrade local capabilities and increase the level of complexity of the tasks that they 
perform.  
However, many caveats must be taken into account. The ability to successfully use 
advanced foreign-made inputs can be considered as a “shallow” spillover, as it does not 
necessarily entail the capabilities to develop technology of the type embodied in the 
components (Stiglitz, 1996; Keller, 2004; Fu et al., 2011).
17
 Exports of relatively 
sophisticated manufactures are therefore a noisier indicator of a country’s and region’s 
technological capabilities than before the rapid expansion of GPNs: “Hollow” assembly 
activities of sophisticated foreign-made inputs may conceal limitations of the local 
                                                 
15
 China’s exports, which are more technologically advanced than one might assume based on its level of 
income (Wang and Wei, 2010), demonstrate that the integration into global production networks GPNs 
can help to “jump-start” production activities in areas that required decades of gradual built-up of 
domestic supply-chains and capabilities in countries like Japan or Korea (Baldwin, 2011). In the Mexican 
case, González (2014) states that a major investment by Canadian aircraft manufacturer Bombardier and 
the establishment of subsidiaries of aerospace suppliers linked to large MNEs including Boeing has 
driven the rapid rise “of an aerospace industry that was close to non-existent one and half decades ago” in 
Mexico (González, 2014: 300). 
16  
MNEs have strong incentives to prevent the diffusion of knowledge related to core design and 
development activities (McCann and Mudambi, 2005; Phelps, 2008), but they simultaneously have to 
provide subsidiaries and suppliers in emerging countries with instructions regarding management 
practices, use of machinery, etc. to ensure that inputs seamlessly fit into the overall production network 
(Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015). Compared to a situation where a country receives modern inputs 
but does not host foreign-owned subsidiaries in related activities, the presence of MNE subsidiaries is 
likely to facilitate spillovers and learning associated with the imports of technologically advanced 
intermediates (Keller, 2004). 
17
 This caveat is likely to similarly apply to trade in services, which may involve access to advanced 
software, management practices, etc. Examples such as India’s large ICT firms show that performing 
standardized tasks for MNEs from advanced economies can serve as the starting point for a phase of rapid 
upgrading. At the same time, the case of India’s IT giants also demonstrates the challenges of moving 
beyond intermediate levels of complexity, with even the most advanced Indian firms struggling to 
overcome difficulties in breaking through to the technology frontier (Lorenzen and Mudambi, 2013). 
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knowledge base that may resurface if MNEs decide to relocate production (Baldwin, 
2011).  
Export-oriented manufacturing via integration in GPNs is therefore by no means a 
smooth “auto pilot” journey towards industrialization and upgrading of technological 
capabilities (Morrison et al., 2008). Examples of relative stagnation, e.g. in the 
Malaysian case, illustrate the difficulty of moving from tasks of intermediate 
complexity levels based on the absorption of foreign technologies to highly knowledge 
intensive and creative activities (Ernst, 2004; Ohno, 2009). This points to a strong role 
for proactive policies to support local agents’ absorptive capacity, enhance linkages 
between domestic firms and MNEs, and develop a long-term strategy to encourage 
indigenous innovation (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006; Phelps, 2008; Padilla-Pérez and 
Martínez-Piva, 2009; Fu et al., 2011). 
It is also important to bear in mind that the shape and depth of linkages to GPNs vary 
vastly across developing countries and within countries. A considerable number of 
regions, especially in the poorer countries, remain largely disconnected from GPNs 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008). Among those regions that manage to establish 
connections to GPNs, there are pronounced differences in the type of tasks they perform 
within GPNs. A small set of well-connected elite regions are engaged in the most 
knowledge-intensive activities (Huggins et al., 2007); they are likely to obtain access to 
technological innovations earlier than peripheral regions. This may give rise to a 
virtuous circle of innovation and growth in these key nodes (Simmie, 2003; Athreye and 
Cantwell, 2005). The outlook is less clear for regions performing less knowledge-
intensive functions in GPNs. The potential for knowledge spillovers associated with 
basic assembly activities has been questioned in the literature (e.g. Gallagher and 
Zarsky, 2007; Keller, 2010).  
At the country level, many developing countries are still struggling to establish GPN 
linkages beyond natural resource exports (UNCTAD, 2013). Particularly regarding 
manufacturing, proximity to a technologically advanced nation with a large 
manufacturing sector (especially U.S., Germany, Japan) facilitates integration into 
GPNs (Baldwin, 2011). Notwithstanding experiences of successful upgrading in 
agriculture (Giuliani et al., 2011), a central role in the development process is still 
attributed to manufacturing (Rodrik, 2013; Felipe et al., 2015). Rodrik (2006b) argues 
that the current phase of globalization, with relatively easy access to large markets, has 
increased the returns to export-oriented manufacturing.  
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China’s economic success in recent years can be regarded as an example of the benefits 
of export-oriented manufacturing (Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 2004). Yet, the rapid 
growth of Chinese manufacturing exports is simultaneously considered as a potential 
obstacle to developing countries intending to pursue a manufacturing-based 
development strategy (Jenkins et al., 2008). There are fears that China’s economies of 
scale, relatively low wages, and growing use of technology may hamper the growth 
prospects of manufacturing firms in other developing countries (Arroba et al., 2008; 
Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010). Coxhead (2007) argues that the combination of 
China’s comparative advantage in manufacturing and its huge demand for commodities 
may cause other developing countries to undergo a process of structural change, away 
from manufacturing and towards greater specialization in exports of commodities.  
Yet, the implications of China’s rise are likely to differ across countries and macro 
regions. Proximity to one of the three key foci of GPNs – ‘factory North America’, 
‘factory Europe’, and ‘factory Asia’ (Baldwin (2011) – must be taken into account.18 
With respect to East Asia, one of the major centres of gravity of GPNs (Lall et al., 2004; 
Athukorala, 2011) where industrialization has often been described as a process of 
diffusion from leader countries to follower countries within the macro region (Puga and 
Venables, 1996; Kojima, 2000), warnings that Chinese competition could adversely 
affect lower-income countries’ manufacturing activities (Eichengreen et al., 2007; 
Wood and Mayer, 2011) as well as optimistic perspectives can be found in the 
literature. Arguing that scenarios depicting crowding out through Chinese exports fail to 
take into account the role of GPNs, Athukorala (2009) underscores potential 
complementarities between China’s growing exports and supply chains involving 
neighbouring countries. Similarly, Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez’ (2015) contribution 
suggests that proximity to China might facilitate a country’s integration into GPNs. In 
Latin America, countries (e.g. Chile) and regions (e.g. Macaé, Brazil) relying on 
commodity exports, are often considered as beneficiaries of China’s resurgence, 
whereas exporters of manufactures (e.g. Mexico) are regarded as “losers” (Dimaranan et 
al., 2007; Costa et al., 2016). Yet, the resource curse literature (van der Ploeg and 
                                                 
18
 This view mostly relies on the assumption that temporary co-location and face-to-face contact are still 
crucial for the transfer of tacit knowledge (Leamer and Storper, 2001). Locations within a relatively short 
flying distance of major manufacturing locations may therefore enjoy strategic advantages regarding the 
integration into GPNs, as it is easier for MNEs to send engineers and technicians to assist, for example, in 
the search for solutions to production-related problems (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015). 
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Poelhekke , 2009; Gaddy and Ickes, 2013) indicates that growth fuelled by commodity 
exports can be a double-edged sword. Conversely, there are tentative signs that 
competitive pressure from China may have led to greater efforts for technological 
upgrading in Mexico’s manufacturing sector (Utar and Ruiz, 2013). 
Partly because of difficulties in measuring trade in GPNs (Baldwin and Lopez-
Gonzalez, 2015; Amador and Cabral, 2016) and due to an emphasis on the perspective 
of relatively advanced economies in many recent contributions in the mainstream trade 
literature (e.g. Mion and Zhu, 2013; Bloom et al., 2016), the implications of the 
expansion of GPNs and China’s growing share of global trade with respect to regional 
development and firm-level dynamics in emerging countries remain imperfectly 
understood – this is the gap addressed by the fourth paper of this thesis. Changes in the 
production stage position and technological capabilities of China (Swenson, 2014; Fu, 
2015) are further factors that contribute to an opaque picture characterized by diverse 
and often seemingly divergent
19
 interpretations of recent changes in trade patterns. 
III. Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of four papers.  
Paper 1:   Innovation in Russia: The Territorial Dimension 
 
Paper 2: Multinational Enterprises and the Geography of Innovation in Latin 
America: evidence from Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia 
 
Paper 3: Private sector development and provincial patterns of economic deprivation 
in Vietnam 
 
Paper 4: Threat or opportunity? Sino-Vietnamese trade and firm-level dynamics in 
Vietnam 
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 For example, Athukorala (2009) highlights China’s role as a hub for the assembly of imported 
components, stressing its dependence on intermediate inputs from neighbouring countries, while Baldwin 
and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015: 1703) find evidence that China itself has become a major source of 
intermediates: “By 2009, China is as dominant a supplier of intermediates as the US”. The authors argue 
that China might provide low-tech, labour-intensive intermediates to advanced economies which integrate 
them into more sophisticated components which are then sent back to China for assembly.  
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In the following I provide brief summaries of each paper’s context, contribution, 
method, and results. 
 
Paper 1: Innovation in Russia: The Territorial Dimension 
My first paper (co-authored with Riccardo Crescenzi and accepted for publication in 
Economic Geography) examines regional patterns of knowledge creation in Russian 
regions during 1997-2011 and their links to contemporaneous regional characteristics as 
well as historic variables.  
A large body of literature discusses Russia’s low innovative performance (Narula and 
Jormanainen, 2008; Klochikhin, 2012). Yet, this debate has focused on the national 
level and comparisons with other countries, paying limited attention to subnational 
heterogeneity within this vast country. This paper addresses this lacuna. It develops 
adopts a comprehensive regional-level approach that combines contemporary regional 
inputs to knowledge creation, access to global pipelines, and long-term historic 
geographies from the Soviet era as factors jointly shaping regional technological 
trajectories. The analysis relies on a new regional-level dataset covering regional inputs 
to knowledge production, exposure to localized knowledge flows, a measure of access 
to foreign knowledge via MNEs, and legacies from the Soviet era. As emphasized in the 
discussion of the first theme of this thesis, the notion that knowledge creation does not 
occur in an atemporal vacuum increasingly serves as the starting point for economic 
geographers’ investigations of regional patterns of knowledge creation. The dataset 
assembled for this analysis enables us to incorporate an evolutionary dimension in an 
augmented regional knowledge production function framework, allowing us to test 
factors that have been rarely verified empirically in the evolutionary economic 
geography literature. 
The empirical analysis uses data from several sources. The dependent variable – the 
number of PCT patent applications
20
 – comes from the OECD REGPAT database, while 
most other data come from Russia’s statistical agency Rosstat. Variables on regional 
R&D expenditure and human capital, MNE activities, as well as socio-economic 
controls are combined to run fixed effects panel regressions inspired by the knowledge 
                                                 
20
 The advantages and disadvantages of this measure of knowledge creation are discussed extensively in 
the paper.  
 35 
production function literature (e.g. O’hUallachain and Leslie, 2007; Charlot et al., 
2015). The second step of the analysis uses spatially lagged variables to investigate the 
role of localized knowledge spillovers and also examines differences between the 
European and the Asian part of Russia. In an ancillary, cross-sectional regression based 
on average values for the entire period (1997-2011), proxies for endowments with 
Soviet-era science infrastructure and military production facilities are used to add a 
historical perspective to the analysis. 
The results reveal a strong link between regional R&D expenditure and patenting 
performance. Yet, R&D efforts appear to be inadequately connected to regional human 
capital. In line with conceptual contributions emphasizing the importance of access to 
extra-local knowledge (Bathelt et al., 2004), MNEs emerge from the analysis as crucial 
agents enhancing knowledge production in Russian regions. Different territorial 
dynamics are at play in the European and the Asian part of Russia: regions to the East of 
the Urals are less likely to benefit from interregional knowledge flows. The inclusion of 
historic variables shows that the Russian case is an example of long-term path 
dependency in regional patterns of knowledge generation. Even after controlling for 
contemporaneous regional characteristics, endowment with Soviet-founded science 
cities remains a strong predictor of current patenting. This finding confirms the 
importance of path dependencies in regional patterns of knowledge generation 
highlighted by evolutionary contributions (Rigby and Essletzbichler, 1997). 
 
Paper 2: Multinational Enterprises and the Geography of Innovation in Latin 
America: evidence from Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia 
The second paper of this thesis (with Riccardo Crescenzi) investigates regional patterns 
of knowledge creation in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia during 2003-2012 and their 
connection to MNE investments categorized by entry modes and business functions.   
Relative to most Asian and European countries at similar income levels, the innovative 
performance of Latin American countries (LACs) has been disappointing in the last 
decades (e.g. Velho, 2005; Meller and Gana, 2016). Increasingly, the regional level is 
seen as crucial in the design of development policies in LACs (CAF, 2010). 
Simultaneously, there is a renewed interest in MNEs’ role in addressing LACs’ low 
levels of knowledge creation (Penfold and Curbelo, 2013). Notwithstanding 
encouraging insights from a set of studies examining MNEs’ significance to  
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technological upgrading in LACs (Iammarino et al., 2008; Lema et al., 2015), 
descriptions of MNE subsidiaries’ limited embeddedness and focus on low-skilled tasks 
have cast doubt on their contribution to regional innovative capabilities in LACs 
(Gallgher and Zarsky, 2007; Koeller and Cassiolato, 2009). The scarcity of regional-
level longitudinal data has until recently hindered quantitative analyses of LACs’ 
territorial dynamics of innovation. With respect to the link between MNEs and patterns 
of patenting, little is known about the relevance of MNEs’ entry mode and subsidiaries’ 
functions. 
To address these gaps, this paper uses a comprehensive dataset encompassing regional 
conditions and virtually all MNE investments – greenfield and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) – in these three economies. The period of analysis coincides with a deepening 
of many Latin American regions’ integration in GPNs. In addition to illuminating the 
roles of greenfield investments and M&A projects, we categorize MNEs’ investments 
by business functions to identify those activities that are most likely to enhance 
patenting performance. This paper therefore takes into account the heterogeneity of the 
mandates MNEs assign to their subsidiaries – an aspect highlighted in the discussion the 
first and third theme of this thesis. Micro-level information on inventors’ nationality is 
exploited to guarantee that patents capture knowledge creation processes involving 
domestic citizens.  
The panel analysis relies on the OECD REGPAT dataset, details regarding inventors’ 
nationality (Miguélez and Fink, 2013), information on greenfield investments from fDi 
markets, Bureau van Diijk’s Zephyr database covering M&A projects, and the OECD 
regional database as well as national statistical agencies. Adopting a knowledge 
production function approach, the analysis reveals that regional knowledge creation in 
these three LACs is shaped by the interplay of regional factors and inputs from global 
pipelines via MNEs. The results shed light on the relevance of subsidiaries’ 
heterogeneity: While in Mexico and Brazil the aggregate count of investment projects 
strongly predicts patenting performance, in Colombia a clear link is only identified for 
the most knowledge-intensive subsidiaries. Comparing greenfield and M&A projects, 
we find that the association with patenting is stronger for M&A, suggesting that M&A 
projects’ higher embeddedness may facilitate knowledge spillovers to local agents. 
Inter-regional knowledge flows operate predominantly within macro regions in Brazil 
and Colombia. Mexico’s innovation system appears highly fragmented, with no 
evidence of inter-regional knowledge spillovers. Both regional R&D and human capital 
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appear to shape a region’s capacity to technologically benefit from access to extra-local 
knowledge via MNEs. 
 
Paper 3: Private sector development and provincial patterns of economic 
deprivation in Vietnam  
My third paper concentrates on Vietnam. It investigates whether province-level 
differences in the change of private firms’ share of formal employment during 2000-
2009 can help to explain changes in the geography of poverty between 1999 and 2009. 
The development of the private sector and the relationship between private firms and 
the state-owned sector continue to figure prominently in the debate about the reduction 
of economic deprivation (Hasan et al., 2007; Hanson, 2010), especially with respect to 
transition economies (Bai et al., 2006). Two contrasting views shape the related 
literature. On the one hand, an expansion of private firms’ weight relative to SOEs is 
often seen as a crucial step towards poverty alleviation. Private firms are regarded as 
guarantors of an efficient allocation of resources and creators of new economic 
opportunities. On the other hand, an alternative perspective is more sceptical of heavy 
reliance on private firms’ contribution to poverty alleviation. Proponents of this view 
argue that strong SOEs fulfil an important role as guarantors of social stability during 
times of rapid structural change and help to reduce economic deprivation.  
As outlined in the discussion of the second theme of this thesis, Vietnam’s transition 
towards a market economy and the steps towards legal and regulatory equal treatment of 
all firms irrespective of ownership did not proceed at the same speed in all parts of the 
country. While some provinces actively embraced private entrepreneurship and 
integration in the global economy, conservative province-level governments only 
slowly enforced reforms and often lagged behind the central government’s line 
(Malesky, 2004).  
Province-level heterogeneity regarding the changes of the relative weight of the private 
and the SOE sector has been mentioned (Beresford, 2008; Ishizuka, 2011) as a factor 
that may help to explain spatial patterns of development and economic deprivation in 
Vietnam. However, the direction of this association remains contested and there is a 
scarcity of systematic, quantitative research at the subnational level dedicated to this 
question. This contribution addresses this gap. It empirically examines this link through 
the combination of data from multiple sources. As a measure of economic deprivation, I 
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use estimates of absolute poverty at the province-level computed by researchers (Minot 
et al., 2003; Lanjouw et al., 2013) based on household surveys and census data. 
Information on private firms’ share of formal employment is taken from Vietnam’s 
annual enterprise survey, whereas variables regarding starting-level conditions of 
provinces and pre-trends predominantly come from Vietnam’s general statistical office 
and census data accessed via IPUMs. The empirical analysis relies on a long-difference 
estimation that uses a shift-share instrumental variable (Bartik, 1991; Faggio and 
Overman, 2014). 
The findings reveal that larger increases in private firms’ employment share are 
associated with larger reductions in poverty. Even when controlling for several variables 
frequently discussed in the literature on poverty in Vietnam, province-level changes in 
private firms’ relative weight are strong predictors of changes in poverty rates. An 
auxiliary step of the analysis suggests that, rather than private domestic firms, MNEs 
appear to act as a key driver of this association. 
 
Paper 4: Threat or opportunity? Sino-Vietnamese trade and firm-level dynamics in 
Vietnam  
The fourth paper of this thesis focuses on Sino-Vietnamese trade. It explores how 
growing exposure to imports from China during 2000-2012 affected firm-level 
outcomes in Vietnam’s manufacturing sector. 
As explained in the discussion of the third theme of this thesis, China’s resurgence as a 
major trading power is widely considered as one of the most fundamental changes of 
the geography of international trade in recent decades (de la Torre et al., 2015). The 
rapid expansion of China’s manufacturing capacities has given rise to a debate about 
potentially detrimental effects on other countries’ manufacturing activities. Vietnam has 
seen particularly fast growth in trade with China: between 2000 and 2012, China’s share 
of Vietnam’s imports rose from 5.7% to 24.3% (UN Comtrade data). In view of China’s 
economies of scale and rapid growth, there are fears in Vietnam that imports from 
China might crowd out domestic products (Coxhead, 2005; Ha, 2011).   
Recent micro-level investigations of the effect of trade with China on firms in other 
countries focus on relatively advanced economies (Mion and Zhou, 2013; Bloom et al., 
2016). In addition, as highlighted by Athukorola (2009), the literature on the 
repercussions of China’s rise as a large exporter of manufactures has paid limited 
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attention to the role of GPNs and trade in intermediates. This paper contributes to the 
literature in two ways. By studying the case of Vietnam, it addresses the scarcity of 
evidence on firm-level effects of exposure to imports from China in countries which are 
less developed than China. The paper also takes into account the importance of GPNs 
by testing whether the relationship between firm-level outcomes and imports from 
China is conditioned by the share of intermediate inputs in sector-level imports from 
China.  
The empirical analysis is conducted at the firm-level and draws on two main data 
sources. The annual Vietnamese enterprise survey is used to construct an unbalanced 
panel of 20,900 medium-sized and large manufacturing firms. The firms’ sectoral 
identifiers allow for a link with UN Comtrade data on sector-level imports from China. 
In addition to firm-level fixed effects, I use an instrumental variable approach that 
exploits exogenous variation coming from a basket of countries with similar trade 
profiles outside Asia and industry-level variation in exposure to imports from China. 
The OECD BTDIxE database on the end-use purposes of traded goods allows me to 
compute estimates of the intermediate share of sector-level imports from China.  
The findings show that, contrary to the picture emerging from previous studies focused 
on advanced economies, exposure to imports from China is positively associated with 
firm-level employment. While there are also limited signs of a positive link with firm-
level sales, I do not find conclusive evidence regarding the association with labour 
productivity. The use of information on the share of intermediates in imports from 
China reveals additional details. The positive link with employment is most pronounced 
in industries mainly importing intermediates from China. Conversely, an insignificant 
association is observed in cases where the intermediate share of imports is less than 
50%.  
IV. Overall conclusions 
 
This thesis has explored three main themes in four papers related to the geography of 
innovation and development as well as firm-level outcomes in emerging economies. 
The first theme is the interplay of the local and the global dimension in shaping regional 
patterns of knowledge creation. The first paper, focused on Russia, provides support for 
the view that the local and the global dimension of knowledge creation are intertwined 
(Bathelt and Cohendet, 2014). The findings cast light on the strong link between 
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regional R&D efforts and patenting and simultaneously point to an inadequate 
connection of R&D to human capital in Russian regions. In addition, a region’s 
exposure to inter-regional knowledge flows must be considered. Regions in the Asian 
part of Russia are less likely to benefit from this source of knowledge inputs. MNEs act 
as global pipelines, providing Russian regions with knowledge from distant places. The 
results for Russia simultaneously demonstrate the importance of taking into account 
historical legacies (Iammarino, 2005): by looking only at current inputs to knowledge 
production, we would overlook an important part of the picture.  
The second paper, which looks at three Latin American countries, disaggregates MNE 
investment projects by business function and entry mode, uncovering important 
dimensions of complexity regarding MNEs’ role in shaping emerging economies’ 
geography of innovation. The link between MNE investments and regional knowledge 
creation is particularly strong when subsidiaries perform command functions or conduct 
R&D, whereas it is weaker or even insignificant when subsidiaries are dedicated to 
production functions. This finding resonates with contributions stressing that different 
subsidiary mandates are likely to have different implications for regional knowledge 
creation (Fuller and Phelps, 2004; Jindra et al., 2009). The distinction between 
greenfield projects and M&A projects provides results suggesting that higher 
embeddedness of M&A projects may facilitate knowledge spillovers to local agents. In 
addition to the characteristics of MNE subsidiaries – function and entry mode – a 
region’s absorptive capacity appears to condition the association between MNE 
investments and regional innovative performance.  
The second theme of this paper relates to the link between the private sector’s relative 
weight in the economy and regional patterns of economic deprivation. The empirical 
results of the corresponding paper on Vietnam (paper 3) show that regional differences 
in private sector development can help to explain changes in the geography of economic 
deprivation. Yet, the related literature on the private sector’s and the state sector’s role 
in efforts to alleviate poverty largely focuses on the national level. Greater attention 
should therefore be paid to subnational heterogeneity in the implementation and speed 
of progress of reforms changing private firms’ regulatory treatment and the role of the 
state in the economy. The signs that MNEs, rather than domestically-owned private 
firms, might be driving the association identified in this paper shed light on the 
persistence of obstacles to growth faced by private domestic firms in many emerging 
economies.  
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The third theme of this thesis relates to the expansion of global production networks 
(GPNs) and China’s resurgence as a major trading power. The paper on Latin America 
(paper 2) highlights the importance of taking into account the type of functions a region 
attracts (regarding MNEs) and performs within GPNs. The most knowledge-intensive 
activities appear to provide the most valuable stimuli to regional knowledge production, 
providing their host regions with an advantage relative to regions predominantly 
attracting less knowledge-intensive activities. Yet, one has to read this finding carefully, 
as a region’s technological profile and level of development is simultaneously a key 
factor shaping the type of MNE activities it attracts (e.g. Cantwell and Iammarino, 
2003; Cantwell, 2009). The same paper also finds support for the view that a country’s 
export composition and trading partners are of relevance to its technological 
development (de la Torre et al., 2015). Mexico, which is embedded in GPNs and 
exports relatively sophisticated manufactures to the U.S., displays a strong link between 
MNE projects dedicated to production activities and regional patenting. The same link 
is not observed in Colombia – a country with greater specialization in natural resources 
that is less integrated in GPNs focused on manufacturing industries.  
Regarding the third theme, interesting insights also resulted from the analysis conducted 
as part of the fourth paper. Although imports from China are often primarily perceived 
as competition for domestic products (e.g. in the EU context, Bloom et al., 2016), the 
findings suggest that there might be substantial complementarities between imports 
from China and Vietnamese firms’ production activities. This analysis provides support 
for contributions stressing the need to overcome the traditional conception of trade as 
“wine for cloth” (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Athukorala, 2009; Baldwin, 
2011) and take into account the expansion of GPNs. Particularly regarding industries 
that were established relatively recently in an emerging economy, access to 
intermediates imported from technologically more advanced economies may enable 
local firms to expand their production and gain access to new export markets.  
Overall, the findings of the four chapters of this thesis highlight the role of MNEs as 
pivotal agents shaping processes of change at the regional level and at the level of the 
firm. The literature acknowledges MNEs’ importance as key actors “that orchestrate the 
process of global economic integration” (Dawley, 2011: 394). The findings presented in 
this thesis demonstrate that MNEs shape the architecture of global connectivity. Their 
strategic decisions, e.g. regarding location choices, profoundly influence regions’ and 
firms’ integration in international networks and thereby shape regions’ and firms’ 
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access to extra-local knowledge. Chapter 1 sheds light on the potential benefits remote 
regions may experience when MNEs contribute to the construction of ‘global pipelines’. 
When combined with favourable local conditions, extra-local linkages created by MNEs 
may help peripheral regions to mitigate the disadvantages associated with large 
geographical distance from major innovation hubs. The second chapter provides a more 
detailed examination of the way the developmental implications of MNEs’ activities are 
shaped by the heterogeneity of subsidiaries and the heterogeneity of the regional 
context. At the same time, one also has to take into account specific national-level 
characteristics regarding the host country’s level of technological development and 
trade profile. The analysis presented in chapter 2 can therefore also be read as a warning 
against broad-brushed statements about the consequences of MNEs’ activities with 
respect to regional development: a failure to take into account the above-mentioned 
multi-faceted heterogeneities is likely to result in misleading simplifications.  
By the same token, chapters 3 and 4 highlight that one cannot assume that greater 
presence of MNEs and integration in cross-border production networks will 
“automatically” enhance local agents’ technological capabilities and developmental 
prospects. Although formal employment in domestic private enterprises in Vietnam 
expanded substantially in the 2000s in the context of simultaneous growth in FDI 
inflows, the findings presented in chapter 3 suggests that domestic private firms’ 
contribution to poverty reduction was limited. The need for pro-active policies to 
support domestic firms’ upgrading is similarly underscored by the trade-focused 
analysis discussed in chapter 4. It suggests that Vietnam’s integration in cross-border 
production networks – which is driven by MNEs – appears to contribute to firm-level 
employment growth which, however, is not accompanied by productivity gains. One 
therefore cannot assume that assembly activities and export-oriented manufacturing in 
production networks shaped by MNEs will inevitably improve the technological 
capabilities of domestic firms. The empirical insights presented in this thesis hence 
confirm MNEs’ central role as “primary ‘movers and shapers’ of the global economy” 
(Dicken, 2015: 114). Yet, they simultaneously demonstrate that positive effects of 
MNEs’ activities on local agents’ technological capabilities cannot not be taken for 
granted but should instead be encouraged by policies that aim to boost local absorptive 
capacity and MNEs’ embeddedness in the regional economy.  
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V. Policy implications 
 
Each of the findings of this thesis has implications for policy-makers. While sensitivity 
to place-specific factors is important, the policy relevance of the empirical results 
presented in this thesis goes beyond the specific context discussed in the individual 
chapters. One can – without attempting to identify universally applicable regularities – 
carefully consider potential implications with respect to places sharing similar 
contextual characteristics. For example, the empirical analyses based on Vietnamese 
data (chapters 3 and 4) could be of relevance to policy-makers in emerging economies 
that are experiencing rapid increases in their degree of international economic 
connectivity and might soon become integrated in cross-border production networks. 
Similarly, the findings on the factors shaping regional innovative performance in the 
Russian context might be of value to policy-makers in remote regions characterized by 
long distances between major population centres. 
The first paper’s results demonstrate that large-scale public interventions in the spatial 
allocation of human capital and R&D activities – such as the Soviet planners’ decision 
to concentrate innovative resources in a  limited  set  of  specialized  places – may have 
long-lasting effects on geographic patterns of knowledge generation. Policy-makers in 
countries sharing similar legacies, including the Commonwealth of Independent States’ 
members, should therefore acknowledge the role of path dependence when designing 
regional innovation policies. Especially regarding the function of international 
connectivity, our analysis has implications for countries with vast territories and 
dispersed agglomerations, such as Chile. Peripheral regions’ lower exposure to inter-
regional knowledge flows should be acknowledged as a disadvantage. Yet, the 
encouraging performance of several peripheral Russian regions (e.g. Tomsk) shows that 
a combination of favourable regional-level characteristics and access to global pipelines 
can enable peripheral regions to generate new knowledge despite their large 
geographical distance from major innovation hubs. 
The second paper’s findings show that policy-makers intending to incorporate the role 
of MNEs in the design of regional innovation policies should acknowledge the 
importance of the entry mode and the business function of the subsidiary. Although 
frequently unpopular among voters and patriotic politicians, M&A projects might help 
to alleviate problems related to weak local embeddedness of foreign-owned plants. The 
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finding that more knowledge-intensive MNE investments appear to provide greater 
potential for knowledge spillovers presents a challenge for policy-makers seeking to 
reduce spatial disparities: MNEs locate their subsidiaries in a pattern of concentrated 
dispersion (Iammarino and McCann, 2013), and the most knowledge-intensive 
functions are stubbornly concentrated in a limited set of well-connected regions. 
Without efforts to increase second- and third-tier regions’ attractiveness for this 
category of investments, economic disparities – which are increasingly considered as an 
obstacle to economic growth, for example in Latin American countries (Atienza and 
Aroca, 2013) – might be exacerbated by the uneven distribution of access to global 
pipelines.   
The third paper suggests that, when trying to understand the evolution of economic 
deprivation in different regions, policy-makers should take into account the role of 
differences in private sector development. Although related policies – e.g. with respect 
to the regulatory treatment of firms of different ownership categories – are often 
primarily treated as national-level questions, greater importance should be attributed to 
regional heterogeneity regarding the way related reforms were implemented and 
enforced. Particularly in the context of rapid change, as is typically observed in 
transition economies, allowing some regions to move faster or slower than others 
regarding reforms changing the conditions for private firms and FDI is likely to leave an 
imprint on the country’s geography of development. Moreover, the tentative signs 
identified in the analysis which suggest that the link between private firms’ employment 
share and poverty reduction was driven by MNEs, rather than domestic private firms, 
point to the need for policies addressing the hurdles faced by SMEs in emerging 
countries (Altenburg and von Drachenfels, 2006; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006; 
Pietrobelli, 2007). 
The findings of the fourth paper indicate that trade in a world of expanding GPNs has 
different implications than in a scenario where products are mostly created in one place 
and subsequently traded as final goods. Potential complementary effects related to 
Vietnamese firms’ use of Chinese inputs in production processes may have received too 
little attention in the debate about Vietnam’s trade with its large neighbour. Proximity to 
a major centre of GPNs can constitute a strategic advantage that may allow countries 
such as Cambodia, Laos, and possibly Myanmar and the Philippines, to gradually start 
assembling or producing components for relatively sophisticated final products within 
GPNs. At the same time, policy-makers should be wary of considering the appearance 
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of new product-categories in their countries’ export baskets as a clear-cut sign of 
technological upgrading. Indigenous efforts, especially related to domestic firms’ 
absorptive capacity, are required to move beyond “hollow” assembly activities with 
limited connection to local firms’ capabilities (Ernst, 2004; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 
2006; Iammarino and McCann, 2013). 
VI. Limitations and extensions to the research 
 
It is necessary to give a word of caution regarding the difficulty of delineating regional 
economies in empirical analyses. The literature acknowledges the discretisation of 
continuous space as a conceptual and empirical challenge (e.g. Brown and Holmes, 
1971; Murphy, 1991; Overman, 2010). In an ideal world empirical researchers would 
have access to data that allow them to track decision making processes and the flow of 
factors of production, goods, and knowledge. In this ideal world, one would also be able 
to observe key variables (e.g. R&D spending) at multiple spatial scales. One would 
simultaneously have access to data that precisely reveal the spatial interactions between 
key agents – such as firms, regional governments, and research institutes. This would 
allow for an accurate identification of the spatial boundaries that delineate coherent 
regional economies.  
In practice, however, the availability of key variables at the subnational level is still 
limited. In many cases researchers are obliged to conduct their analysis at the spatial 
scale at which data were collected for administrative purposes. The data used in the 
analysis therefore often correspond to administrative regions that are often likely to fail 
to reflect the spatial patterns of economic interactions (Karlsson and Olsson, 2006). As 
a consequence, it is often possible that the spatial scale used in the empirical analysis 
(the de jure region) diverges from the spatial scale (the de facto region) of the 
underlying data generating processes (Briant et al., 2010).  
This problem has motivated scholars as well as statistical authorities to define 
functional regions whose “boundaries are determined on the basis of economic 
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relationships rather than history or political divisions” (Cheshire and Hay, 1989: 15).21 
Typically informed by data on commuting patterns
22
, definitions of regions such as the 
UK’s Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) aim to capture the a region’s economic sphere of 
influence. However, as commuting patterns and the spatial configuration of economic 
relationships are constantly evolving, there is often a trade-off between the intention to 
accurately reflect current spatial patterns and the need for continuity in terms of 
definitions of regions in order to facilitate the creation of longitudinal datasets (ONS, 
2015).
23
 Moreover, efforts to create spatial units that correspond to de facto or 
functional regions are still at a relatively early stage in many parts of the world, 
including in Europe (Calafati and Veneri, 2013). While U.S. metropolitan state areas are 
often considered as relatively self-contained economic areas, the NUTS-2 level that is 
often used as the closest equivalent in the EU context is less likely to reflect the 
geography of economic interactions (Crescenzi et al., 2007).  
Notwithstanding recent efforts of international organizations to identify functional 
regions based on an internationally harmonized methodology (OECD, 2013b; UN, 
2013), the use of functional regions in emerging countries is still at a very early stage.
24
 
This PhD thesis uses subnational data from five emerging economies (Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico, Russia, Vietnam). The data used for the empirical analyses refer to 
administrative (rather than functional) regions. They are highly diverse in terms of 
size.
25
 While the use of fixed effects in the empirical analysis partly addresses this 
aspect, one must take this heterogeneity into account when interpreting the empirical 
results regarding knowledge spillovers. Regions in the Asian part of Russia tend to be 
larger than regions located in the European part of Russia. Localized knowledge 
spillovers in Eastern Russia might operate at a spatial scale that is more fine-grained 
than the spatial scale of the data that were available for our empirical analysis. In future 
                                                 
21
 In addition, georeferenced data (e.g. Duranton and Overman, 2005) may allow researchers to overcome 
difficulties associated with the divergence between administrative regions and functional regions. 
However, the availability of georeferenced data is still limited.  
22
 Examples of alternative ways of delineating functional regions include land prices (Bode, 2008) and 
telephone usage patterns (Ratti et al., 2010). 
23
 Moreover, several authors (e.g. Brown and Holmes, 1971) have highlighted that prevalent approaches 
to the delimitation of functional regions insufficiently take into account indirect interactions between 
regions and territorial systems.  
24
 This is partly due to data constraints. The accuracy of delimitations of functional regions depends on 
the availability of spatially fine-grained data on economic interactions (Karlsson and Olsson, 2006). 
25
 For example, in the case of Russia the largest region in the sample (Sakha Republic) is circa 4.7 times 
the size of Alaska (or 5.6 times that of mainland France), whereas the territory of the smallest one (St. 
Petersburg) corresponds to less than one percent of the size of the largest region. 
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research data at a smaller spatial scale might allow for a more detailed examination of 
the geography of knowledge flows in Russia. Importantly, the level of analysis in the 
first chapter corresponds to the level where many innovation-related choices are made. 
The relevance of the regional level for policy decisions regarding innovation and 
education in Russia (OECD, 2011; Nikolaev and Chugunov, 2012) warrants efforts to 
improve our understanding of the territorial dynamics of innovation at this spatial scale. 
Similarly, the spatial units used in the second chapter (focused on Brazil, Mexico, and 
Colombia) are diverse in terms of size and do not represent functional regions. 
Although Latin American scholars have proposed alternative ways of delineating 
regions (e.g. Lemos et al., 2003), the way statistical authorities collect socio-economic 
data remains heavily shaped by administrative boundaries. The empirical analysis 
presented in the second chapter acknowledges the difficulty of identifying the right 
scale for economic interactions by including macro region dummies and through a 
discussion of the relevance of macro regions (encompassing several administrative 
regions) with respect to the diffusion of interregional spillovers.  
While the availability of data for functional regions in these three Latin American 
countries would open new research opportunities, the administrative regions used for 
the empirical analysis are undoubtedly meaningful: they correspond to the level that 
plays an increasingly important role in the design of innovation policies in these 
countries (CAF, 2010). The literature highlights, for example, Brazilian states’ different 
approaches in terms of strategies to attract MNEs (Rodríguez‐Pose and Arbix, 2001) 
and innovation policies (Koeller and Cassiolato, 2009). In Colombia, the administrative 
level used in our empirical analysis is of paramount importance to the distribution of 
public R&D funding (Salazar et al., 2014). In the Brazilian case, Espírito Santo has 
been mentioned as a region that has successfully implemented measures aimed at 
enhancing local technological capabilities (Filho et al., 2006), while Jalisco’s policies 
have attracted researchers’ attention in the Mexican case (Iammarino et al., 2008).  
In the Vietnamese case, the spatial units used in the third paper, Vietnamese provinces, 
are administrative regions and accordingly do not correspond to functional regions that 
could be compared to British TTWAs. However, several authors have emphasized the 
significance of the province-level with respect to economic interactions and 
developmental processes in Vietnam. Drawing on population census and household 
survey data, McCaig (2011) concludes that migration predominantly occurs within 
provinces in Vietnam. Moreover, provinces enjoy considerable leeway in their 
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interpretation of national reforms and business legislation (Malesky and Taussig, 2009). 
The great extent of variation in province-level economic policies motivates Schmitz et 
al. (2015: 187) to argue that “Vietnam is learning by experimenting in 63 laboratories”. 
To sum up, the spatial units used in the empirical analyses presented in this thesis are 
not functional regions. While this aspect must be kept in mind when interpreting the 
empirical findings, the administrative regions used here nevertheless constitute a 
meaningful level of analysis – especially regarding their relevance to the design of 
regional development policies.  
The results and the limitations – which are discussed in more detail in the individual 
papers – of the research presented here offer several promising areas for future research. 
Regarding the first theme (i.e. the interplay of the local and the global dimension in 
shaping regional patterns of knowledge creation), data at a more fine-grained spatial 
scale would allow for a more detailed examination of inter-regional knowledge flows 
Beyond aspects related to the delineation fo regional economies, alternative measures of 
innovation could lead to additional, valuable insights.. While the use of panel datasets 
involving a large number of regions enables us to identify important patterns in regard 
to the link between MNEs and regional knowledge creation, the underlying mechanisms 
related to the different functions and MNEs’ entry mode were not illuminated in this 
analysis. Future research relying on micro-level data and qualitative methods could 
improve our understanding of these dimensions of heterogeneity and their potential 
links to regional policies. Besides, quasi-experimental settings related to MNEs’ 
investment decisions and regional levels of absorptive capacity would enable scholars to 
address remaining problems of causality. In addition, the cross-fertilization of different 
conceptual and methodological approaches to the analysis of the link between global 
connectivity and regional innovative performance constitutes a further promising 
direction for future research. The second paper of this thesis simultaneously takes into 
account MNE subsidiaries’ heterogeneity and the heterogeneous regional contexts of 
their host economies, with a longitudinal dataset allowing us to examine these aspects in 
a large number of regions and over a 10-year period. At the same time, this framework 
does not illuminate several points that play an important role in related case studies, e.g. 
hierarchies and governance patterns. Future work may develop an integrated framework 
combining insights obtained from quantitative analyses using information on MNE 
subsidiaries’ business functions with the detailed information on micro-level 
mechanisms, network structures and policies uncovered by related qualitative studies.  
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With respect to the second theme (i.e. the link between the relative weight of the private 
sector and regional patterns of economic deprivation), the corresponding paper (paper 3) 
has revealed a clearly visible association between private firms’ employment share and 
poverty reduction in Vietnamese provinces. However, in doing so it has left a major gap 
related to the relevant channels. An extension would be to investigate these issues at 
alternative levels of analysis, e.g. at the household or firm-level. In addition, the 
differential role of domestic private enterprises and MNEs merits closer examination. 
Longitudinal survey data on the constraints faced by Vietnamese SMEs might be a 
fruitful starting point for future research in this direction. In addition, qualitative 
research may help to paint a more fine-grained picture of the heterogeneity in province-
level state-business relations in Vietnam. More detailed information on the policies, 
especially related to SMEs, implemented by specific provinces could allow researchers 
to link the results of the third paper of this thesis to the debate about “minimalist” 
versus pro-active approaches to private sector development in developing countries 
(Altenburg and von Drachenfels, 2006; Pietrobelli, 2007). 
The fourth paper draws on data on formal medium-sized and large firms in Vietnam. 
While these firms account for the lion’s share of Vietnam’s export-oriented 
manufacturing, future research focused on linkages to smaller firms and channels for 
spillovers to the informal sector could improve our understanding of the way imports 
from China affect Vietnam’s economy as a whole. Similarly, important complementary 
insights could result from efforts to examine related questions at the level of individuals 
and households exposed to different levels of imports (to be measured via the sector of 
employment or the home region’s sectoral specialization), e.g. with respect to wages 
and returns to education. Moreover, more detailed data on the technology content of 
imports and the way Vietnamese firms use intermediates from China could shed light on 
the underlying processes. Conceptually, future research may explore the macro-level 
developmental implications of the trade patterns highlighted in paper 4: the growth of 
trade in intermediates and the increasingly fine fragmentation of production processes 
open new opportunities and simultaneously create new challenges. An in-depth 
comparison of the difficulties faced by emerging economies currently pursuing 
manufacturing-centred development strategies linked to GPNs and the insights obtained 
from earlier experiences of development and the diffusion of industrialization in East 
Asia (Kojima, 2000) constitutes a promising direction for future research. 
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1 INNOVATION IN RUSSIA: THE TERRITORIAL 
DIMENSION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Despite its relatively advanced technological position after the collapse of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and substantial investment in research and 
development (R&D), Russia’s innovative performance remains astonishingly low. The 
debate about this “Russian innovation paradox” (Gianella and Tompson, 2007) has 
focussed on national-level institutional factors: weak linkages (Klochikhin, 2012), 
inadequate intellectual property rights protection (Aleksashenko, 2012), insufficient 
evaluation of public R&D spending (Graham and Dezhina, 2008), degradation of 
human capital (Gaddy and Ickes, 2013) and negative effects of natural resource 
abundance (EBRD, 2012). Several authors compare Russia’s performance with China’s 
and India’s (Cooper, 2006; Klochikhin, 2013). However, despite the country’s special 
spatial configuration, the existing literature has paid little attention to the geographical 
aspects of the genesis of knowledge in Russia. 
As the world’s largest country by land area, Russia covers roughly a third of Europe’s 
and Asia’s combined continental landmass. Low density and large distances between 
population centres (especially in the East) interact with a distinctive historical legacy, 
shaping patterns of knowledge production and diffusion. Space and history hence 
appear particularly important in the Russian case. In contrast to the cross-country 
perspective characterizing most previous contributions, this paper concentrates on 
differences in knowledge generation across Russia’s regions. The analysis sheds light 
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on potential spatial mismatches that might help to address the long-debated ‘innovation 
paradox’ from a geographical perspective. 
This paper contributes to the growing stream of literature looking at the territorial 
dynamics of innovation in emerging countries (Fu, 2008; Llisteri et al., 2011; Crescenzi 
et al., 2012), which builds upon the broader geography of innovation literature 
(Feldman, 1994; Storper, 1997; Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose, 2011). Empirical work 
since the 1990s has improved our understanding of geographical patterns of knowledge 
creation in advanced economies. Yet, we are only starting to investigate whether similar 
mechanisms apply in different institutional and technological contexts. As emerging 
economies’ share of global knowledge production increases, innovation policies 
adopted by countries like Russia are frequently inspired by advanced economies’ 
experiences and often have a clear spatial dimension (Radošević and Wade, 2014). In 
response to this trend, this paper aims to push the geography of innovation boundaries 
beyond its OECD-centred perspective in order to be able to participate in the debate 
about innovation in emerging countries (Lundvall et al., 2009) and support evidence-
based design of policies.  
This paper also responds to renewed interest in evolutionary concepts and in the 
relevance of historical legacies in shaping the interaction between path-dependence and 
path-creation, impacting on contemporary geographies of transformation, innovation 
and development (Martin and Sunley, 2007; Boschma and Martin 2010). Russia 
inherited a large-scale science and R&D infrastructure following the USSR’s breakup. 
Legacies of the Soviet era are likely to influence present-day patterns of innovation, 
linking long-term path-dependence and path-creation with present-day geography. 
Whereas existing quantitative analyses of the geography of innovation are often 
restricted to contemporaneous variables, the availability of proxies for USSR-related 
historical factors provides us with a unique opportunity to investigate the role of 
evolutionary elements in explaining today’s knowledge-generation patterns. 
This paper explores the territorial dynamics of knowledge creation in Russia by 
‘augmenting’ the regional knowledge production function (O’hUallachain and Leslie, 
2007; Charlot et al., 2014) in order to account for spatially-mediated inter-regional 
knowledge flows, global knowledge pipelines in the form of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as well as long-term historical geographies from the Soviet era. Although data 
constraints force us to rely on patent intensity as a proxy for innovation – section 3 
extensively discusses the limitations of this indicator – a number of new insights emerge 
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from the empirical analysis, testing factors that have been rarely verified empirically in 
the evolutionary economic geography literature. 
The results reveal a strong connection between regional R&D investment and patenting 
performance. However, they also suggest that R&D is inadequately aligned with 
regional human capital. This fundamental spatial mismatch between two key inputs to 
the knowledge creation process is likely to hamper the returns to regional R&D 
expenditure. At the same time, regional access to external knowledge is highly 
differentiated. On the one hand, multinational enterprises (MNEs) seem to play a 
pivotal role, forming global pipelines that ‘channel’ new knowledge into Russian 
regions. On the other hand, inter-regional localised knowledge flows seem to benefit 
mostly regions in ‘European’ Russia – regions to the East of the Urals are less likely to 
benefit from this knowledge source. This suggests that international tensions that tend to 
isolate Russia from the rest of the world might substantially impair all Russian regions’ 
innovation performance. However, adverse effects are likely to be particularly 
pronounced in Eastern regions that cannot rely on localised knowledge flows to 
compensate – at least temporarily – for their remoteness.  
These results confirm the importance of incorporating an evolutionary historical 
dimension (Arthur, 1989; David, 2005) in the knowledge production function 
framework. The empirical results unveil a strong path-dependency in geographical 
processes. The legacy of Soviet-founded science cities remains a strong predictor of 
current regional patenting performance. Soviet planners’ decisions regarding the 
concentration of human capital and research activities in a set of specialized locations 
continue to influence Russia’s geography of patenting. However path-dependency 
constantly interacts with path-creation and path-renewal opportunities offered by 
exposure to external knowledge in the form of spatially-mediated knowledge flows and 
MNE activities. Recent public policy attempts to develop new innovation centres in 
Russia, such as Skolkovo, have to confront these forces and leverage path-creation 
factors in order to generate the conditions for new milieux to enter virtuous long-run 
evolutionary trajectories. 
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1.2 Innovation in Russia: context and recent trends 
 
In the USSR, establishments in Russia accounted for three quarters of Soviet R&D 
expenditure (Gokhberg, 1997: 15). After the USSR’s collapse innovation-enhancing 
changes – e.g. freedom of mobility – were overshadowed by dramatic reductions in 
R&D resources (Cooper, 2008). Notwithstanding the Soviet system’s implosion after 
1991, analysts of Russia’s present innovation system consider many of its strengths and 
weaknesses as Soviet legacies (Klochikhin, 2012; Narula and Jormanainen, 2008). The 
country retained strong positions in defence-related fields (aerospace, nuclear science). 
Although Russia inherited large numbers of highly educated workers, budget cuts 
severely affected the education sector and drove up researchers’ average age (Graham 
and Dezhina, 2008). 
Key weaknesses identified in analyses of Russia’s innovation system concern 
institutions (Klochikhin, 2012). Despite recent steps to strengthen intellectual property 
rights, enforcement has not reached Western standards (Aleksashenko, 2012). R&D 
funding allocation still broadly resembles Soviet-era patterns (OECD, 2011). Until 
1991, most R&D activities took place outside firms, remaining functionally and 
organizationally separated from production (Cooper, 2008). Today the public sector 
remains the key player, with government agencies – separated from firms – conducting 
nearly 75% of total R&D (EBRD, 2012) and weak linkages between innovative agents 
(Gokhberg and Roud, 2012). The role of private firms grows only slowly, with 20% 
(EBRD, 2012) conducting intramural R&D.   
Amidst concerns over  natural resource dependence, innovation has recently moved up 
the political agenda. Initiatives launched in the 2000s include new technology parks, 
SME support agencies, and venture capital funds (Graham, 2013). In 2007 the 
government launched an organization to promote nanotechnology (‘RUSNANO’) 
endowed with approximately 16.4 billion US Dollars (Gokhberg et al., 2012). However, 
so far, these ambitious policies have failed to shift the economy to a knowledge-based 
growth path.  
In another state-directed effort, plans for an ‘innovation city’ – Skolkovo – in the 
Moscow region (enclosing Russia’s capital like a belt) were announced in 2009. 
Skolkovo involves close collaboration with foreign corporations (e.g. Intel) and 
academic partners (e.g. MIT). This megaproject is meant to generate lessons for other 
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Russian regions (Gokhberg and Roud, 2012). Given the strong spatial dimension of 
such initiatives, a better understanding of the territorial dynamics of innovation in 
Russia is of paramount importance. At the same time, Russia is a very important 
laboratory for innovation policies that can offer policy lessons for other emerging 
countries aiming at shifting towards knowledge-based growth models.  
1.3 The Geography of Innovation in Russia 
 
Capturing innovation in emerging economies is a conceptual and empirical challenge. 
Whereas a large proportion of innovation in advanced economies is new to the world as 
a whole, in developing and emerging countries innovations tend to be mostly new to the 
individual firm (Bell, 2007). As technological gaps between Russia and leading 
countries have accumulated in several sectors, imitation strategies are prevalent among 
firms (Gokhberg and Roud, 2012). In order to capture the complexity of firms’ 
innovation strategies, it would be ideal to analyse firm-level innovation data (such as 
the EU’s Community Innovation Survey or Brazil’s Pintec). However, the regional-
level coverage of such data is still very limited in Russia. Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) patent applications (counted according to inventor’s region of residence) 
therefore remain the best available proxy for regional knowledge production.  
For the purpose of spatial analyses patents can be considered as a “fairly good, although 
not perfect, representation of innovative activity” (Acs et al., 2002: 1080). Not all forms 
of inventions are equally likely to be patented (Griliches, 1990) and data constraints 
force researchers to focus on inventions for which there are reliable data (Brenner and 
Broekel, 2011; Smith, 2005). The global novelty requirement associated with PCT 
patents implies that minor adaptations, imitations, and innovations primarily new to 
Russia’s market will not be captured by our proxy. We hence capture a subset of the 
new knowledge generated in Russian regions; especially knowledge with relevance to 
export purposes and proven novelty on a global scale. However, “the PCT reflects the 
technological activities of emerging countries quite well (Brazil, Russia, China, India, 
etc.)” (OECD, 2009: 66)26. 
                                                 
26
 We chose PCT patents after a careful consideration of all options. While this comes at the price of 
discounting inventions new to local markets (as opposed to new to the world), it helps to avoid issues 
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Russia’s territory is subdivided into 83 regions.27 In 2011 Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
where 11.4% of Russians live, accounted for nearly 51% of all PCT applications; down 
from 68% in 1995. Figure 1 illustrates the regional distribution of patenting between 
1995 and 2011, focussing on the 10 regions with the highest patent counts. The leading 
regions’ share has slightly decreased over this 17-year period. While the top five regions 
still accounted for 82.4% of Russian PCT patenting during 1995-1998, their share 
accounted for 74.3% during 2008-2011. Knowledge production (as proxied by PCT 
applications) in Russia has slowly become less spatially concentrated, as lower-tier 
regions increased their contribution.
28
  
Kaliningrad and Tomsk are two examples of second-tier regions that increased 
patenting between 1997 and 2011. A Russian enclave between Lithuania and Poland, 
Kaliningrad benefits from tax exemptions and has emerged as a major FDI recipient in 
recent years (Ledyaeva et al., 2015). Roughly 4,000 Kilometres further east – in the 
southwest of the Siberian Federal District – the region of Tomsk has been one of 
Russia’s leaders in the promotion of knowledge-based development. A programme 
supporting firms to enter foreign markets and networks (e.g. via trade fairs) resonates 
with recent contributions in economic geography emphasizing access to knowledge 
from distant sources (Maskell, 2014). A vibrant technology park and incubators for 
spin-offs from the region’s six state universities are further examples of Tomsk’s 
innovation policies (OECD, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
related to domestic patent coverage and quality. “A PCT filing can be seen as a ‘worldwide patent 
application’ and is much less biased than national applications” (OECD, 2009: 65). The use of PCT also 
facilitates comparisons with related studies (Crescenzi et al., 2012; Fagerberg et al., 2014). In 2012, 
Russia accounted for 77.9% of PCT filings from European middle-income countries (WIPO, 2013: 28) 
and China overtook Germany as PCT’s third-largest user in 2013 (WIPO, 2014). 
27
 Following the events of March 2014, two regions (Republic of Crimea; city of Sevastopol) were added. 
Rosstat did not cover these territories during our period of analysis. 
28
 For a map of Russia showing regional patenting intensities, see Figure 1.A.1 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1.1 Cumulative distribution of Russian PCT applications: 10 most 
innovative regions 
 
 
Russia’s R&D investments are also spatially concentrated – beyond the level of 
clustering of the population.
 Out of Russia’s eight federal districts (administrative 
groupings of regions; without decision-making powers), the Central District (which 
includes Moscow), the North-Western District (encompassing St. Petersburg) and the 
Volga district (which hosts a large share of Russian manufacturing) in 2010 accounted 
for 57.4% of Russia’s population and conducted 82.3% of Russian R&D (OECD, 2011: 
116). In line with the strong role of the state in Russia’s innovation system, public 
spending decisions shape the geography of R&D. The capital hosts numerous public 
research centres and higher education institutions. Yet, several regions (e.g. Tomsk) 
have significantly intensified their R&D efforts (R&D expenditures relative to GDP) 
during 1997-2011. 
The geography of human capital is also uneven, with firms in Eastern regions 
particularly likely to report skill shortages (EBRD, 2012). The share of citizens holding 
a university degree ranged from 11.9% in Chechnya to 41.2% in Moscow in 2010 
(Russian census, 2010). Highlighting spatial variation in quality of education, Amini 
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and Commander (2012) find that pupils’ performance is positively associated with 
population size of the town where they attend school. 
The circulation of knowledge among innovation centres is likely to be hindered by large 
distances (especially in the East). The transfer of complex knowledge is facilitated by 
face-to-face contacts – “an intrinsically spatial communication technology” (Rodríguez-
Pose and Crescenzi, 2008: 379). Therefore, places outside Russia’s relatively densely 
populated European part may face higher costs in accessing knowledge produced in 
other regions. Russia’s spatial distribution of capital and labour still reflects central 
planners’ decisions that often ignored transport costs, agglomeration economies, and 
climatic conditions (Gaddy and Ickes, 2013). The inefficient location of factors of 
production is likely to slow down economic transactions and knowledge diffusion.  
Peripheral regions may compensate for their isolation by relying on alternative 
proximities to access external knowledge. However, low inter-regional labour mobility 
(Andrienko and Guriev, 2004; Ivakhnyuk, 2009) may weaken such linkages between 
Russian regions. Studies examining inter-regional trade found low levels of regional 
integration (Gluschenko, 2010), with Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) uncovering 
‘internal borders’.  
While inter-regional knowledge circulation is constrained by physical and institutional 
factors, opportunities to access knowledge via global linkages are also highly localised 
and hampered by geo-political factors. The country as a whole remains relatively closed 
(OECD, 2011). Only two percent of manufacturing enterprises target international 
markets (Gokhberg and Roud, 2012: 122) and restrictive immigration rules often 
prevent foreigners from filling skill gaps (EBRD, 2012). Skolkovo’s emphasis on 
international collaboration indicates that Russian policy-makers appreciate the potential 
benefits of exposure to new knowledge. However, recent political events after Crimea 
was announced part of Russia threaten to undermine these efforts to reduce the 
country’s relative isolation.  
Great heterogeneity characterizes Russian regions’ levels of embedment in international 
business networks (Gonchar and Marek, 2014; Ledyaeva et al., 2015). Foreign 
investments are mostly attracted by Russia’s market size and natural resources 
(Ledyaeva, 2009). A limited number of agglomerations in Western Russia and resource-
rich regions in Eastern Russia attract the lion’s share of FDI. Highly dependent on 
hydrocarbons, the Sakhalin region accounted for nearly a third of total FDI inflows 
 84 
between 2001 and 2006 (Strasky and Pashinova, 2012: 3). During 1996-2007, 
approximately 62% of foreign firms (i.e. at least 10% foreign ownership and at least one 
million roubles of capital) were registered either in Moscow, in the region of Moscow, 
or in St. Petersburg (Ledyaeva et al., 2013: 4). In addition to Kaliningrad, foreign firms 
play a growing role in a number of destinations beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg. 
Devoid of natural resources, Kaluga (150 kms southwest of Moscow) has focused on 
improvements of business conditions and succeeded in establishing an automotive 
cluster with large MNEs (e.g. Peugeot-Citroën). With FDI scattered across the country 
in a mosaic pattern, opportunities to benefit from this source of extra-local knowledge 
are distributed unevenly across Russian regions. 
While the spatial configuration of knowledge sources is key to the understanding of 
Russia’s current geography of innovation, two fundamental aspects of the spatial legacy 
of the Soviet era are also crucially important: ‘science cities’ and major ‘military 
installations’. Soviet planners dedicated large resources to the creation of ‘science 
cities’. Often isolated from the rest of the world, these places offered researchers 
privileged living conditions (Castells and Hall, 1993). Most of these cities entered a 
period of decline after 1991 but others, e.g. Akademgorodok near Novosibrisk (Siberian 
federal district), have developed new identities and attracted MNEs (Becker et al., 
2012). The Moscow region is known for Soviet-founded science cities and research 
centres that still show remarkable dynamism, e.g. in nuclear energy (Dubna, Protvino) 
and physics (Troitsk).   
Conversely, high levels of militarization in the late Soviet period may not necessarily be 
beneficial for a region’s current innovative performance. Whereas in the U.S. military 
expenditure contributed to high-tech clusters’ emergence (Saxenian, 1994), areas 
specialized in Soviet military production in the 1980s did not display higher human 
capital levels at that time (Gaddy, 1996). In a context of resource constraints, 
uncertainty, and defence conversion,  Russia’s military sector as a whole did not gain a 
reputation as the spearhead of innovation in the transition years but appeared “largely to 
be living off the intellectual capital of the Soviet era” (Eberstadt, 2011: 106).  
1.4 A theory-driven framework for empirical analysis 
 
The spatial organisation of innovative activities in Russia points to the importance of 
the R&D-patenting nexus. Those Russian regions accounting for a high share of total 
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Russian R&D spending simultaneously seem to be major hubs of patenting. However, 
this ‘linear’ link – observed in numerous regions in developed countries (Botazzi and 
Peri, 2003; O’hUallachain and Leslie, 2007) – appears weaker in emerging countries 
(Crescenzi et al., 2012). Therefore, one needs to ‘augment’ the ‘traditional’ regional 
knowledge production function to account for a wider set of territorial factors 
determining – in the case of Russia – the balance between (historical) path-dependency 
and path-creation. 
Relative to sparsely populated places, regions with a largely urban population are likely 
to face lower costs of exchanging knowledge within the region (Jacobs, 1969; Carlino 
and Kerr, 2015). The difficulty of transferring highly valuable tacit knowledge across 
large distances (Storper and Venables, 2004) has fundamental implications for regional 
knowledge production in a country characterized by large distances between 
agglomerations. Geographical remoteness may constitute a structural disadvantage in 
the form of reduced exposure to knowledge flows. Places within the driving range of 
innovation centres are favoured by knowledge inflows via face-to-face contacts 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008). Geographical distance to Moscow, the 
traditional centre of Russia’s innovation system (Gokhberg, 1997), might therefore 
shape exposure to inter-regional knowledge flows.  
To compensate for limited exposure to inter-regional knowledge flows regions may rely 
on ‘global pipelines’: linkages - not necessarily based on geographical proximity - to 
innovative places that provide valuable knowledge inputs (Bathelt et al., 2004). MNEs 
may act as channels for cross-border knowledge flows, increasing regional patenting 
performance (see Ford and Rork, 2010 for the USA; Fu, 2008 for China). Therefore, 
Russian regions’ knowledge production might also be influenced by their access to 
inputs from locations outside Russia – in line with evidence that international 
collaboration enhances Russian researchers’ productivity (Ganguli, 2011).  
Internal efforts and external inputs are translated into new knowledge in diverse ways in 
different regional contexts. Long-term evolutionary trajectories and heterogeneous 
regional systems of innovation conditions (Braczyk et al., 1998) shape the way in which 
both R&D and human capital are organised in space and matched with each other. With 
Russia’s innovation system struggling to overcome its top-down bias and R&D’s 
separation from production, path-dependencies (Klochikhin, 2012) are of particular 
relevance in the Russian case. As emphasized by evolutionary economic geography 
(Rigby, 2000; Iammarino, 2005), inherited socio-institutional structures and 
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specialisation patterns shape future development opportunities. Russian regions’ 
historical endowments with R&D-related infrastructure from Soviet days are likely to 
influence present-day capacities to generate knowledge. Involvement in USSR military 
production and endowment with Soviet-founded science cities can be expected to play a 
key role in shaping current systemic conditions. 
Path-creation evolutionary forces (matching between local innovation efforts and 
human capital as well as exposure to inter-regional and ‘global’ knowledge flows) and 
path-dependency (linked to historical legacy) can be combined into an ‘augmented’ 
knowledge production function (Charlot et al., 2014) specified as follows: 
  1,31,22,2,1, _&&)1ln( tititititi FOREIGNKHUMANDWRDRPAT                                       
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh 1, tiCONTROLS tiit ,   
Where: 
)1ln( , tiPAT   is the natural logarithm of PCT applications, counted according 
to the inventor's region of residence, per one million inhabitants. .  
2,& tiDR    is R&D expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP
29
. 
2,& tiDWR   is a spatially weighted
30
 average of the R&D expenditure in 
neighbouring regions
31
 (i.e. excluding region i) as a proxy for 
exposure to inter-regional knowledge flows 
1,_ tiKHUMAN  is the share of employees with higher education. This variable 
encompasses post-secondary degrees, including technical 
training.
32
 
                                                 
29
 As highlighted by one referee, this analysis would benefit from R&D data disaggregated by source of 
funding. This information is unfortunately unavailable at the regional level.  
30
 Since Russian regions differ vastly in area, a weight-matrix based on a distance-threshold would be 
problematic. A low threshold might create unconnected observations, whereas a distance chosen to 
guarantee a minimum of one neighbour might inflate the number of small regions’ neighbours (Anselin, 
2002). Simple contiguity weights may introduce bias due to heterogeneity in the number of neighbours. 
The k-neighbours scheme is therefore the most suitable choice. It allows us to connect Kaliningrad to 
mainland Russia. For details regarding the calculation of weights, see the Appendix.  
31
 Ideally, we would also consider R&D in adjacent regions in neighbouring countries. Given the 
diversity of statistical procedures used by neighbouring countries, this was not feasible. Including 
regional fixed effects partly addresses this problem by capturing proximity to the nearest national border. 
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1, tiFOREIGN  is the turnover of foreign enterprises as a percentage of regional GDP.
33
  
1, tiCONTROLS  Sectoral Controls - Six sectoral controls for agriculture, 
manufacturing, transport and communications, services and retail, and construction. 
Given Russia’s dependence on natural resources, we also control for oil and gas 
production. Following Ledyaeva et al. (2013), we use an index of resource potential 
(provided by Russia’s rating agency Expert RA). We also include an index of oil and 
gas production provided by Russia’s statistical agency Rosstat. 
Socioeconomic controls - Two controls for socioeconomic conditions. Motivated by 
findings suggesting that a younger demographic structure enhances patenting (Crescenzi 
et al., 2007), we include the region’s share of the population aged 15 or younger. To 
adjust our knowledge production framework to idiosyncrasies of the Russian context, 
we also add the share of ethnic Russians. As several Russian regions with large ethnic 
minorities are conflict-prone, controlling for this appears important.  
Geographical control - the percentage of the regional population living in urban areas
34
 
as a proxy for the geographical distance between agents within each region.  
Time dummies t  are included to account for common shocks, such as macro-
economic crises. Conversely, region-fixed effects i , enable us to control for the time-
invariant part of unobserved heterogeneity: this includes the cross-sectional dimension 
of variation in regions’ institutional quality as well as long-term historical conditions 
(including technological capabilities) that cannot be included explicitly in the model. 
Finally, ti,

 is the idiosyncratic error term. 
                                                                                                                                               
32
 Comparable studies in other countries mostly use the share of population holding academic degrees, for 
Russian regions this variable is only available for census years (2002 and 2010). For the year 2002, both 
measures of human capital are relatively highly correlated (0.75). 
33
 Data on the stock of foreign direct investments are only available for the late 2000s from Russia’s 
central bank. While data on FDI inflows are available for the entire period from Rosstat, this measure 
does not reflect outflows or activities that do not coincide with an investment in the same year. We 
therefore use another variable provided by Russia’s statistical agency Rosstat - the turnover of firms 
located in the region with at least 10 percent foreign capital. Compared to FDI inflows, foreign firms’ 
turnover is more likely to represent continuous interactions. 
34
 Becker et al. (2012) provide a discussion of the Russian definition of “urban” and “rural”. “Current 
Russian practice is to award city status to settlements of at least 12,000 inhabitants with at least 85 per 
cent of the working-age population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits. This is the strictest definition in 
the former USSR” (Becker et al., 2012: 19). 
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Given the substantial time lag between R&D investments and patent applications
35
, 
R&D (and its spatial lags) enters the regional knowledge production function with a 
two-period lag. All other independent variables are lagged by one period in order to 
reduce the likelihood of reverse causality. We adopt an averaging strategy to deal with 
the volatility of our data; as customary in similar studies (Botazzi and Peri, 2003; 
O’hUalla-chain and Leslie, 2007). The link R&D-patenting is known to be stronger 
over longer periods (Griliches, 1990; Botazzi and Peri, 2003). Following Ponds et al. 
(2010), we collapse all variables into periods of two years – except for the first period 
(based on 1997 only). Our panel data set therefore encompasses 8 periods. 
The model is estimated for 1997-2011 and covers 78 out of 83 Russian regions.
36
 Data 
on patent applications come from the OECD-RegPat database. Apart from the resource 
potential index (provided by rating agency Expert RA), data for all other time-varying 
variables come from Russia’s statistical agency Rosstat (also see Table 1.A.1 in the 
Appendix). Rosstat collects information on numerous social and economic indicators. 
We primarily relied on data from 15 editions (1997-2011) of the annual publication 
“Regioni Rossii” (Rosstat, 1997) and partly drew on a database prepared by Mirkina 
(2014) providing user-friendly access to the same Rosstat data. Firm-level information 
relies on compulsory statistical reports submitted to Rosstat’s regional offices. Rosstat’s 
collection of R&D data is inspired by the EU Community Innovation Survey. Unlike 
the sampling used by most EU countries, the Russian innovation survey is a mandatory 
census (OECD, 2011). 
The inclusion of region and year-fixed effects reduces the likelihood of omitted variable 
bias and allows us to control for time-invariant region-specific variables (e.g. 
institutional conditions). However, in a second step of the analysis we use a cross-
sectional regression to shed descriptive light on a set of variables otherwise absorbed by 
the regional fixed effects: historical endowments and distance to Moscow.  
                                                 
35
 Fischer and Varga (2003) choose a two-year lag, Ronde and Hussler (2005) use R&D expenditure in 
1997 to explain patenting during 1998-2000. O’hUalla-chain and Leslie (2007) relate R&D efforts in 
2000 and 2001 to patenting during 2002–2004. The time lag helps to mitigate – to some extent – reverse 
causality problems regarding the R&D-patenting relationship. 
36
 Data constraints forces us to exclude Chechen Republic, Republic of Ingushetia, sub-region Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug, sub-region Khanty Mansi Autonomous Okrug – Yugra, and sub-region Yamalo 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Based on averages (1997-2011), those regions account for 2.38% of Russia’s 
population and 0.56% of all regions’ R&D expenditure. 
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The cross-sectional specification includes the following additional time-invariant 
variables aimed at capturing the spatial impact of historical legacies: 
Proxies for endowment with Soviet-founded science infrastructure and military 
facilities. Based on several sources (including Gokhberg, 1997; Becker et al., 2012; 
union of science cities’ website), we compiled a list of 63 Soviet-founded science cities. 
As a second time-invariant historical variable, we add the percentage of industrial 
employees working in defence production in 1985. Provided by Gaddy (1996)
37
, this 
variable should capture the militarization of a region’s economy in late Soviet years.  
Measure of remoteness from the centre of the innovation system. The geography of 
innovation literature stresses the advantages of spatial proximity to centres of 
knowledge production (Feldman and Kogler, 2010). To take into account a region’s 
remoteness relative to the traditional centre of Russia’s innovation system, our 
estimations include the distance between the regional capital and Moscow. In the Soviet 
era, Moscow accounted for 30% of USSR R&D expenditure (Gokhberg, 1997: 15) and 
continues to play a pivotal role in the production of new knowledge (Graham, 2013). 
Roughly 20 kilometres west of central Moscow, the ambitious Skolkovo innovation 
centre (founded in 2009) may increase the capital region’s importance even further in 
the future (Radošević and Wade, 2014). Distance to Moscow simultaneously roughly 
captures distance to the most densely populated part of Russia and to the European 
Union. Due to this variable’s time-invariant character, we can only include it in cross-
sectional estimations.
38
  
1.5 Empirical Results 
 
The analysis is divided into two parts. We first examine the role of contemporary 
factors, relying on panel fixed-effect estimations. The second part examines time-
invariant historic variables based on a cross-sectional data set. 
                                                 
37
 Gaddy’s (1996) estimates rely on omitted categories in official documents. For a discussion of their 
limitations, see Gaddy (1996).  
38
 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.A.1 of the Appendix. 
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1.5.1 R&D, Human Capital, and “Global Pipelines” 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide the results of the main analysis based on panel fixed-effect 
estimations. Table 1.1 focuses on the association between regional patenting and 
internal drivers and starts by exploring the regional R&D-patenting nexus (columns 1-
3). When lagged by one period, R&D is marginally significant but the coefficient 
becomes larger and strongly significant with a two-period lag (column 2). With a three-
period lag (column 3), the coefficient is still of a similar magnitude (compared to 
column 1) but no longer statistically significant. In all following estimations we 
therefore lag R&D by 2 periods, equivalent to a delay of three to five years. Similar lags 
are used by Fritsch and Slavtchev (2007), Ronde and Hussler (2005), and Usai (2011). 
Our results reveal a positive and statistically significant association between regional 
R&D expenditure and patenting. This result is robust to the inclusion of all other 
variables (columns 2-7). Considering the debate about insufficient monitoring of R&D 
organizations and inefficient allocation of public R&D funds in Russia (Graham and 
Dezhina, 2008; EBRD, 2012), this finding is noteworthy. Despite such deficiencies, 
R&D expenditure is a strong predictor of regional patenting performance. 
Whereas our result for R&D is largely in line with the literature, we do not find a 
strongly significant association between regional human capital and patenting. Russia’s 
higher education system expanded remarkably in the past two decades, with enrolment 
increasing from just over 2.5 million in 1993 to 7.8 million in 2008 (Motova and Pykkö, 
2012: 27). This growth was partly driven by the rise of private institutions (Geroimenko 
et al., 2012). With limited external influence on curricula, rapid increases in enrolment 
and private establishments’ expansion may have diluted quality standards (Nikolaev and 
Chugunov, 2012).  
It has also been argued that the service sector’s expansion and reduced R&D spending 
in transition years have incentivized students to acquire skills that are not conducive to 
innovation (EBRD, 2012). Motova and Pykkö (2012: 27) emphasize that enrolment 
mostly grew in economics, law and the humanities, “which did not require too much 
investment in material resources, but were considered highly prestigious by society”. 
Stressing instead institutional continuity, Gaddy and Ickes (2013) and Cooper (2006) 
regard curricula inherited from the Soviets as ill-suited for a market-based economy.  
It hence appears plausible that our variable imprecisely measures the skills that are of 
relevance to patenting.
 
At the same time, our finding that increases in the regional level 
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of human capital are not significant predictors of changes in patenting performance of 
the same region may also indicate a spatial mismatch between skilled labour and R&D. 
Graduates with quantitative skills often find employment in activities offering higher 
wages than the mostly publicly funded R&D positions, such as financial services 
(OECD, 2011). Average salaries in Moscow’s R&D sector were only 47% of those paid 
in Moscow’s finance sector in 2009 (Makarov and Varshavsky, 2013: 474), making 
careers in innovation-related activities relatively unattractive. Regional patenting may 
therefore not benefit from increases in the regional human capital stock if skills are not 
employed in research-intensive activities.  
As we extend our analysis to include foreign firms (column 5), access to extra-regional 
knowledge emerges as a key driver of patenting performance. The coefficient is 
significant and positive. This result sheds light on the role of MNEs in Russian regions: 
since their subsidiaries are simultaneously embedded in their host regions and in global 
intra-firm networks, MNEs facilitate the transmission of knowledge flows. Our analysis 
suggests that these extra-regional linkages provide Russian regions with valuable inputs, 
boosting their knowledge production.  
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Table 1.1 Fixed effects estimation for period 1997-2011 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
R&D expenditure as 0.1200*       
percentage of GDP, in t (0.0699)       
R&D expenditure as  0.1761***  0.1844*** 0.1740*** 0.1964*** 0.1977*** 
percentage of GDP, in t-2  (0.0650)  (0.0662) (0.0646) (0.0655) (0.0659) 
R&D expenditure as   0.1226     
percentage of GDP, in t-3   (0.0871)     
Human capital, in t-1    0.0123 0.0122 0.0145* 0.0148* 
    (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0080) 
Foreign firms’ turnover as     0.0030** 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 
percentage of GDP, in t-1     (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Internal geography NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Sectoral controls NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Socioeconomic controls NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 546 468 390 468 468 468 468 
R-squared 0.2087 0.2073 0.1950 0.2108 0.2283 0.2584 0.2651 
Number of regions 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of patent applications per one million inhabitants +1. All regressions include year fixed effects and regional fixed effects. Variables 
collapsed (averaged) into periods of 2 years for the years 1998-2011. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses; clustered at level of 
regions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.2 Fixed effects estimation for period 1997-2011 including spatially lagged R&D expenditure 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D expenditure as 0.1804*** 0.1882*** 0.1892*** 0.2065*** 0.2065*** 0.2011*** 
percentage of GDP, in t-2 (0.0525) (0.0540) (0.0540) (0.0584) (0.0589) (0.0591) 
W R&D (k4), in t-2 0.0150*** 0.0148*** 0.0127*** 0.0114** 0.0107** 0.0107** 
 (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0044) 
W R&D (k4) X in Asia     -0.0904**  
(interaction term)     (0.0373)  
Human capital, in t-1  0.0116 0.0127 0.0145* 0.0132 0.0142* 
  (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
Foreign firms’ turnover as    0.0023** 0.0031*** 0.0028** 0.0038*** 
percentage of GDP, in t-1   (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Foreign firms’ turnover (% of       -0.3750** 
GDP) X Moscow/St.Pete (interaction)      (0.1561) 
Sectoral controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Socioeconomic controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Internal geography NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 468 
R-squared 0.2220 0.2251 0.2335 0.2722 0.2760 0.2762 
Number of regions 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of patent applications per one million inhabitants +1. All regressions include year fixed effects and regional fixed effects. 
Variables collapsed (averaged) into periods of 2 years for the years 1998-2011. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
clustered at level of regions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The first part of our analysis revealed that ‘global pipelines’ play a key role, potentially 
allowing regions to overcome disadvantages associated with the spatial dispersion and 
relative isolation of Russia’s innovation hubs. The second part focuses on inter-regional 
knowledge flows or spillovers within Russia. As Table 1.2 shows, we identify a positive 
and statistically significant association between regional patenting performance and the 
spatially weighted average of neighbouring regions’ R&D expenditure (column 1). The 
progressive inclusion of additional knowledge inputs and further geographical and 
sectoral controls (columns 2 to 4) confirms the significance of inter-regional knowledge 
flows in addition to internal inputs and ‘global’ pipelines. 
To examine whether different dynamics are at play in the European and Asian parts of 
Russia the model is ‘augmented’ by an interaction term. This additional variable is the 
product of the spatially weighted R&D expenditure and a dummy variable that equals 
one if a region is located in Asia (column 5). The coefficient is negative and significant. 
The sum of the coefficients of the interaction term and the spatially weighted R&D 
reveals that neighbouring R&D expenditure is negatively associated with regional 
patenting performance in Asian Russia. This is consistent with a situation where a few 
places with high patenting activity in Asian Russia divert inputs (e.g. public and private 
R&D funds) away from nearby regions. This picture resembles patterns identified in 
China where knowledge production hotspots (often centrally designated by the 
government) absorb resources from neighbouring regions with a shadow effect a la 
Krugman (Crescenzi et al., 2012). High knowledge-density places in Asian Russia, such 
as Novosibirsk, have a strong capacity to translate their own R&D investment into 
patents but most regions in Asian Russia are unlikely to benefit from inter-regional 
knowledge spillovers. The contrary is true in European Russia where spatially mediated 
knowledge exchanges across regional boundaries play an important role, resembling the 
function of European Union regions (Moreno et al., 2005; Crescenzi et al., 2007). 
It is important to acknowledge that our analysis of knowledge flows might be sensitive 
to the selected spatial unit of analysis (modifiable aerial unit problem, see Briant et al., 
2010) and that spillovers may operate at different spatial scales simultaneously (see 
Carlino et al. 2012 for the USA). In Russia, the lack of more geographically fine-
grained data prevents us from directly testing our findings’ sensitivity. However, the 
regional units on which our data are based not only correspond to the spatial level 
officially adopted for the collection of innovation-related statistical information in 
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Russia, but these are also the regional units where many innovation-related choices are 
made (OECD, 2011; Nikolaev and Chugunov, 2012).  
By further developing the comparison between European and Asian regions, our 
analysis does not identify statistically significant differences regarding the association 
between patenting and human capital (insignificant interaction terms – not reported) and 
with respect to R&D expenditure (not reported). Conversely, the role of foreign firms 
seems to be significantly different in different parts of the country. The strongly 
significant negative interaction between a dummy for St. Petersburg and Moscow and 
foreign firms’ activities (column 6) suggests that the patenting performance of Russia’s 
two major cities does not benefit from the large share of foreign direct investment which 
they receive. This may reflect a dominance of services (including finance) in the 
composition of FDI going to these cities. FDI targeting Moscow and St. Petersburg 
might increase the competition for skilled personnel: research institutes may lose out to 
foreign firms that offer higher salaries but that do not necessarily contribute to 
innovative activities in these centres of administration and services. This competition 
for skilled workers might reinforce the fundamental human capital mismatch identified 
in our analysis and divert well-trained graduates from research-intensive careers.  
The possibility of FDI to provide beneficial global knowledge pipelines therefore 
appears highly dependent upon ‘localised’ conditions: when pipelines break the 
potential lock-in and isolation of otherwise disconnected clusters they maximise their 
impact on regional knowledge production and lead to path-renewal and path-creation. 
This implies that it is not major agglomerations - like Moscow or St Petersburg - but 
relatively remote places that are most likely to be hurt by a deterioration of Russia’s 
relations with foreign partners. Places such as Tomsk have successfully extended their 
embeddedness in international networks (OECD, 2011). Since such regions cannot rely 
on proximity to innovative centres within Russia, steps isolating the country from the 
rest of the world are particularly likely to damage their development. 
1.5.2 The Role of Historic Legacy and Remoteness from Moscow 
While the inclusion of fixed effects in our main model reduces the likelihood of omitted 
variable bias, it simultaneously precludes us from examining the role of time-invariant 
variables: in our panel estimations Soviet legacies as well as geographical remoteness 
are absorbed by regional-level fixed effects. We therefore take an ancillary step. In 
order to shed light on historical endowments and remoteness relative to Moscow, we 
 96 
create a cross-sectional dataset by averaging all variables across the 15 years covered by 
our dataset. While we cannot add fixed effects at the level of the 78 regions in this 
cross-sectional specification, the inclusion of dummies for Russia’s eight federal 
districts still enables us to control for unobserved characteristics that vary across these 
eight macro regions.  
The key time-invariant variables of interest are introduced in Table 1.3, column 1: the 
number of science cities, the number of defence employees in 1985, and distance to 
Moscow. The coefficients of both proxies for historical endowments are statistically 
significant and positive: Soviet-founded science cities and specialization in defence 
production in the mid-1980s are positively associated with patenting performance 
during 1997-2011. Conversely, the coefficient of distance to Moscow is significant and 
negative, indicating that being further away from the historical centre of Russia’s 
innovation system is associated with lower patenting performance. This finding 
corresponds to a situation where regions located far away from the country’s major 
agglomeration may face difficulties in accessing new knowledge produced in the 
country’s capital and other innovative places in European Russia39, such as Kaluga 
(home to an automotive cluster) or Nizhny Novgorod (specialized in electronics). Given 
external inputs’ importance to regional knowledge creation (Bathelt et al., 2004), this 
disadvantage is likely to take a toll on remote regions’ patenting performance. This 
evidence is reinforced by a statistically significant, negative bivariate relationship 
between R&D productivity (patent applications per million roubles invested in R&D) 
and distance from the country’s largest agglomeration (not reported).  
The results presented in column 1 only provide a first glance at the time-invariant 
variables’ association with patenting. In columns 2 to 5, we gradually introduce further 
regressors to test the robustness of these results. The coefficient of defence employment 
remains positive but loses statistical significance at conventional levels when we add 
internal innovation inputs, foreign firms’ turnover, control for internal geography 
(column 2), add dummies for Russia’s eight federal districts (column 3), sectoral 
controls (column 4), and socioeconomic controls (column 5). This suggests that, after 
controlling for other regional patenting-related characteristics, greater specialization in 
                                                 
39
 Alternative specifications (not reported) using distance to St. Petersburg and Warsaw produce very 
similar results, confirming that distance to Moscow simultaneously captures exposure to knowledge from 
European Russia as well as the EU. 
 97 
military production in the mid-1980s does not influence current patenting performance: 
higher ‘historical’ levels of militarization are neither a ‘boon nor a bane’. The potential 
advantages associated with a strong military sector – such as spillovers from military 
R&D (Mowery, 2010) – might in the Russian case be offset by disadvantages associated 
with an economic structure of large, state-dependent enterprises which may induce 
regional governments to lobby for transfers from Moscow and neglect efforts for 
technological modernization (Commander et al., 2014). 
Contrasting with the results for defence employment, the legacy of Soviet-founded 
science cities is still a predictor of current regional patenting, robust to the inclusion of 
all further explanatory variables (columns 2-5). Some Soviet-founded science cities 
experienced a renaissance and expanded their international linkages (Becker et al., 
2012; EBRD, 2012). For example, Dubna, a science city founded in 1956, hosts the 
Joint Nuclear Research Institute (JNRI) that involves 18 countries and is associated with 
6 further countries (including Germany and Italy). In 2011, its 3,000 employees 
included 500 foreign researchers (OECD, 2011: 239). 
The fact that the coefficient of science cities remains significant even after controlling 
for current R&D investment and human capital suggests that regions that inherited 
science cities are able to draw on historically shaped technological capabilities. In 
consideration of the Soviet system’s implosion and the socioeconomic turmoil of the 
1990s, this result is a striking example of strong path dependencies in regional patterns 
of knowledge generation highlighted by evolutionary contributions (Rigby and 
Essletzbichler, 1997). This historical dimension appears to be highly relevant in Russia. 
By looking only at current inputs to knowledge production we would overlook an 
important part of the picture. 
Distance to Moscow is only a weak predictor of patenting after controlling for sectoral 
specialization (column 4) and socioeconomic conditions (column 5). This suggests that 
regions located close to the traditional centre of Russia’s innovation system tend to 
display sectoral and socioeconomic characteristics that are conducive to patenting. This 
result is also in line with a system with multiple sub-centres, where a number of second-
tier places display strong knowledge generation in specific sectors. For example, 
Novosibirsk (Siberian federal district) is home to Russia’s leading biology cluster. 
While the bulk of R&D resources are still concentrated in the country’s two main 
agglomerations, the 2000s saw tentative steps towards a more even distribution 
(Graham and Dezhina, 2008). The fact that distance to Moscow is only marginally 
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significant once we add sectoral and socioeconomic variables indicates that favourable 
conditions, for example in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, may allow Russian regions to 
achieve high levels of patenting performance despite relative remoteness. Tomsk has a 
long tradition of political support of innovation. Akademgorodok, a science city in the 
region of Novosibirsk founded in the 1950s, has recently experienced strong growth in 
IT and has been labelled “Silicon taiga” (EBRD, 2012).  
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Table 1.3 Cross-sectional estimation based on averages during period 1997-2011 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of Soviet-founded 0.1153*** 0.0375** 0.0312** 0.0332*** 0.0293** 
science cities  (0.0224) (0.0170) (0.0128) (0.0118) (0.0115) 
Defence employees per  0.1077*** 0.0186 0.0238 0.0119 0.0165 
1,000 industrial employees in 1985 (0.0380) (0.0346) (0.0352) (0.0311) (0.0314) 
Distance to Moscow -0.0512*** -0.0424*** -0.1016* -0.0857* -0.0657 
 (0.0184) (0.0142) (0.0512) (0.0466) (0.0452) 
R&D expenditure   0.2429*** 0.2448*** 0.2404*** 0.2248*** 
as percentage of GDP  (0.0675) (0.0681) (0.0671) (0.0655) 
Human capital  0.0486*** 0.0556*** 0.0473*** 0.0422*** 
  (0.0132) (0.0145) (0.0129) (0.0154) 
Foreign firms’ turnover as   0.0065*** 0.005** 0.0052* 0.0059* 
percentage of GDP  (0.002) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0034) 
Internal Geography  NO YES YES YES YES 
Federal district dummies NO NO YES YES YES 
Sectoral controls NO NO NO YES YES 
Socioeconomic controls NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.3433 0.7983 0.8231 0.8653 0.8712 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of patent applications per one million inhabitants. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.6 Conclusion 
 
The debate about innovation in Russia has concentrated on national-level factors and 
cross-country comparisons, paying little attention to subnational heterogeneity within 
this vast country. This paper applies an augmented knowledge production function 
framework to improve our understanding of differences across Russia’s regions. While 
critical voices have questioned the criteria underlying the allocation of Russian R&D 
funds (Gokhberg and Roud, 2012), our analysis identifies regional R&D expenditure as 
a strong predictor of patenting. Conversely, changes in regional human capital are not 
strongly significant predictors of patenting. Our results point to a potential spatial 
mismatch of key inputs to knowledge production: R&D investment in Russian regions 
is inadequately connected to regional human capital resources.  
This asymmetric contribution of internal innovation inputs is coupled with a strong role 
of external inputs. MNEs act as global pipelines, providing Russian regions with 
knowledge from distant places. Simultaneously, spatially-mediated inter-regional 
knowledge flows contribute to the genesis of new knowledge. However, regions to the 
East of the Urals are less likely to benefit from inter-regional knowledge flows. In Asian 
Russia inter-regional spillovers do not contribute to regional patenting performance. 
Instead, innovation hotspots may divert resources from nearby regions with significant 
shadow effects. 
Exploiting a rare opportunity to integrate an evolutionary dimension in a knowledge 
production function framework, our analysis unveils strong path-dependencies in 
regional patterns of knowledge generation. Soviet-founded technological infrastructure 
remains a significant predictor of current patenting performance. This illustrates that 
large-scale public interventions in the spatial allocation of human capital and R&D 
activities – such as the Soviet planners’ decision to concentrate innovative resources in 
a limited set of specialized places – may have long-lasting effects on geographical 
patterns of knowledge generation. Our analysis of the Russian case offers concrete 
examples of the territorial manifestation of factors taking centre stage in evolutionary 
theories and in the regional systems of innovation literature that have been rarely tested 
empirically (Braczyk et al., 1998). Learning and knowledge production do not occur in 
an ‘atemporal vacuum’ detached from regions’ history and past policies. Regional long-
run trajectories are “conditioned by their history and geography” (Rigby and 
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Essletzbichler 1997: 272): regions are “repositories of knowledge” (Rigby, 2000) and 
their technological and systemic capabilities are cumulative in nature and tend to persist 
over time. However, even if regions endowed with Soviet-founded technological 
infrastructure benefit from historically shaped capabilities, current innovation drivers 
and policies also concur to enhance (or hinder) innovation performance in all regions. 
The alignment of regional innovation efforts, exposure to localised knowledge flows 
and injections of ‘foreign’ knowledge channelled by MNEs make path-renewal 
possible, opening new windows of locational opportunity.  
Our results have several implications for the debate about Russia’s disappointing 
innovative performance. Relatively weak inter-regional knowledge flows (particularly 
in Asian Russia) point to a frequently mentioned deficiency of Russia’s innovation 
system: weak knowledge diffusion. Patenting intensity as well as R&D productivity 
decrease with increasing distance to Moscow. At the same time, we observe 
encouragingly strong performance of a set of relatively remote places like Tomsk and 
signs of an emerging multipolar system with influential second-tier regions. This 
suggests that disadvantages associated with remoteness can be successfully addressed 
through the promotion of favourable systemic conditions and the stimulation of 
pipelines for inter-regional and international knowledge flows.  
The two most obvious policy levers emerging from our analysis concern the 
dissemination of knowledge and international linkages. Recent measures, e.g. 
specialized agencies designed to disseminate research findings (OECD, 2011), are 
aiming at the right direction. Similarly, international partners’ involvement in the 
Skolkovo initiative and Tomsk’s efforts to enhance local firms’ integration into global 
networks appear highly justified. Yet, our results regarding inter-regional spillovers also 
imply that localized megaprojects such as Skolkovo are unlikely to boost innovative 
performance across the country’s vast territory. In light of these considerations the 
success of measures to address the ‘Russian Paradox’ seems to hinge on the ability to 
establish inter-regional and global linkages while supporting – at the territorial level – 
their embeddedness into regional innovation systems.   
Our findings also have implications regarding the way recent geopolitical turbulence 
may impinge on Russia’s geography of innovation. We must consider the region as a 
“localised interface where global and local flows of knowledge intersect” (Kroll, 2009: 
1). Any steps jeopardizing Russian regions’ connections to innovative places abroad can 
be expected to undermine measures designed to shift the country’s economy to a 
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knowledge-based growth path. While import substitution may result in short-term 
improvements of technological capabilities, insufficient access to the often tacit 
complementary knowledge required to create cutting-edge products is likely to act as a 
drain on innovative performance in the long run. Recent trends provide cause for 
concern, with MNEs considering divestment (Jost, 2015) and Russian researchers’ 
international collaborations trending downward (Kozak et al., 2015). Our analysis 
strongly suggests that it would not be major agglomerations like Moscow but remote 
regions whose performance would be most severely affected by reduced integration in 
global networks.  
Russia’s development continues to influence other former Soviet Republics, including 
the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) members with over 275 million 
citizens (Libman and Vinokurov, 2012). Notwithstanding those countries’ 
heterogeneity, insights from this study – such as the significance of path-dependency 
and the importance of ‘global’ connectivity to shape path-renewal and path-creation – 
are highly relevant to places sharing similar legacies. However, the significance of 
lessons learned from Russia is not limited to countries with a Soviet past (Radošević, 
1997). Many emerging economies face similar challenges, such as weak diffusion of 
knowledge (Lundvall et al., 2009). Latin American middle-income countries with 
abundant natural resources also suffer from underdeveloped private R&D and 
insufficient external linkages (Kattel and Primi, 2012). Especially regarding the 
function of international connectivity, our analysis may provide inspiration to economic 
geographers concentrating on countries such as Chile, with vast territories and dispersed 
agglomerations. 
Thanks to its unique spatial configuration and rich history, Russia provides scholars 
interested in territorial innovation processes and evolutionary dynamics with an 
insightful laboratory. The findings as well as the limitations of this paper indicate 
directions for future work. As regional coverage of firm-level surveys improves and 
new data become available, future research will be able to employ alternative proxies 
for innovation. The availability of FDI micro-data will open new avenues for in-depth 
research on the link between regional knowledge creation and the typology (value chain 
stage, technological intensity, etc.) of foreign activities. Moreover, the way MNEs 
might influence local perceptions of intellectual property rights merits closer 
examination. These developments are in our agenda for future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Description of weights matrix. 
We choose k-nearest-neighbour weights which are calculated as follows: 
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where di(k) is the 
thk order smallest distance between region i and j such that each 
region i has exactly k neighbours. Acknowledging that the “true” weights matrix will 
always remain unknown (Anselin, 2002), we test four types of k-nearest-neighbour 
weights: k=2, k=3, k=4, and k=5.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 112 
Figure 1.A.1 Map of Russia: regions, key cities and patenting intensity 
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Table 1.A.1 Descriptive statistics and data sources 
 Included in  
Variable Unit Mean S.D. Min. Max. Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Source 
Dependent variable 
Patenting Log of patent 
appls. per 1 mio 
inhabitants 
0.6943 0.7604 0 3.6116 X X OECD 
Classic inputs to innovation 
R&D R&D expenses 
as % of GDP 
0.8374 0.9547 0.0096 5.3809 X X Rosstat 
Spatially weighted 
R&D 
Weighted 
average of R&D 
expenditure of 
other regions (in 
billion 
Roubles), based 
on k4-
neighbours 
3.3212 7.5943 0.0076 74.9606 X  Rosstat 
Human capital % of employees 
with higher 
education 
22.3215 5.9099 7.3 49.9 X X Rosstat 
International linkages 
Foreign firms’ 
turnover 
Foreign firms’ 
turnover as % 
of regional GDP 
25.4162 27.8504 0 191.2554 X X Rosstat 
Space 
Urbanization % of population 
living in urban 
areas 
69.4198 12.4676 23.9 100 X X Rosstat 
Sectoral specialization 
Agriculture Share of 
regional GDP 
10.1933 6.366 0 33.7 X X Rosstat 
Manufacturing Share of 
regional GDP 
31.3494 12.3144 4.3 68.8 X X Rosstat 
Transport and 
communications 
Share of 
regional GDP 
10.7529 4.9924 2 34.1 X X Rosstat 
Services and retail Share of 
regional GDP 
13.588 5.3893 3.2 53.6 X X Rosstat 
Construction Share of 
regional GDP 
7.4463 3.8148 0.4 32.6 X X Rosstat 
Index of resource 
potential  
Rank among all 
regions 
42.8932 23.8895 1 89 X X Expert RA 
Index of oil and gas 
production 
Output as % of 
level in 1992 
48.7894 66.9247 0 812.8 X X Rosstat 
Socioeconomic controls 
Young population % of population 
aged 15 or 
younger 
18.7211 3.85742 12.3 35.1 X X Rosstat 
Percentage of ethnic 
Russians 
% of region’s 
population 
76.7365 22.7747 3.5743 97.4247 X X Rosstat 
Historical legacy from Soviet period 
Defence employees 
(time-invariant) 
Defence 
employment in 
1985 as 
percentage of 
total industrial 
employment in 
1985  
21.8891 12.7504 0 57  X Gaddy 
(1996) 
Science cities (time-
invariant) 
Number per 
region 
0.7821 2.3502 0 19  X Gokhberg 
(1997), 
Becker et 
al. (2012),  
website of 
union of 
science 
cities 
Distance to Moscow Distance in 
kms. 
2333.346 2707.145 0 11736  X Authors’ 
calc. 
 114 
 
2 MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE 
GEOGRAPHY OF INNOVATION IN LATIN 
AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL, MEXICO, 
AND COLOMBIA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Most Latin American countries experienced strong economic growth in the 2000s. Their 
integration in global production networks deepened in the same period, with foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Latin America accounting for a quarter of all FDI flows to 
developing economies in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012). However, the economic slowdown 
since 2013 has laid bare structural weaknesses that continue to plague that part of the 
world (Talvi and Munyo, 2013). Its productivity lags behind advanced economies and 
several Asian emerging economies (Caselli, 2015; Montalbano et al., 2016). While 
Latin American countries (LACs) are diverse regarding many dimensions – including 
institutions and macroeconomic policies –, they share fundamental deficiencies in the 
ability to produce economically valuable knowledge.  
In a globalizing world, the capacity to access and create new knowledge is a key driver 
of productivity, shaping regional and national economies’ growth prospects (Storper, 
1997; Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008; Kemeny, 2011). Based on indicators such as 
patents, research and development (R&D) expenditure, and scientific citations, LACs 
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compare unfavourably to most OECD countries and key emerging countries outside 
Latin America (IDB, 2010; Lederman et al., 2014; OECD, 2016). Although cross-
country comparisons mask a great deal of within-country heterogeneity, the policy 
debate about this disappointing innovative performance and its developmental 
consequences has concentrated on the national level (Araujo et al., 2015; WEF, 2015).  
The subnational dimension takes centre stage in this paper. The analysis concentrates on 
differences across regions, exploring the link between multinational enterprises’ 
(MNEs) investment projects, structural conditions of the host regions and regional 
patenting performance – measured by patents filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) – in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia during 2003-2012. Building on the geography 
of innovation literature (Feldman, 1994; Storper, 1997; O’hUallachain and Leslie, 2007; 
Feldman and Kogler, 2010; Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose, 2011; Fagerberg et al., 
2014), this article adds to the literature examining territorial patterns of knowledge 
production in LACs and emerging countries more generally (Fu, 2008; Cassiolato et al., 
2011; Crescenzi et al., 2012; Crescenzi and Jaax, 2016; Wang et al., 2016).  
Three characteristics shape this contribution’s novelty. First, we adopt a comprehensive 
regional-level approach that encompasses heterogeneous global linkages and diverse 
regional conditions as factors jointly shaping regional technological trajectories. The 
empirical analysis relies on a dataset that covers virtually all MNE investments and 
enables us to account for their heterogeneity in terms of entry mode and business 
function as well as for the host regions’ territorial conditions. Second, this study focuses 
on Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia – which jointly account for a large share of the 
subcontinent’s population (60%), GDP (65%), FDI inflows (56%), and patenting 
(83%)
40
 – in a 10-year period that saw a deepening of many Latin American regions’ 
integration into global production networks. This paper illuminates the link between 
global connectivity and regional knowledge creation in three economies representing 
different levels of technological development, types of global connectivity, and 
agglomeration patterns. Third, we use information on patents’ inventors to ensure that 
we capture knowledge creation processes involving domestic citizens. 
                                                 
40
 These shares were calculated based on UNCTAD and World Bank data for 2012. Patenting refers to 
patenting by residents.  
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It is becoming increasingly apparent that regional innovative performance is shaped by 
connectivity to non-local agents providing valuable knowledge inputs (Maskell, 2014). 
With subsidiaries embedded in their host regions’ economies and international intra-
firm networks, MNEs act as channels for global knowledge flows (Iammarino and 
McCann, 2013). Yet, access to this type of “global pipelines” (Bathelt et al., 2004) is 
distributed unevenly. Numerous peripheral regions remain largely disconnected. Others 
predominantly attract activities of limited knowledge-intensity, whereas a small set of 
locations are deeply integrated in MNEs’ R&D and management functions. For regions 
that do attract MNE activities positive effects on local innovative performance are not 
guaranteed. Weak local embeddedness and insufficient indigenous human capital and 
innovative efforts may limit technological benefits for host regions (Phelps et al., 2003; 
Fu et al., 2011). One therefore has to consider both the heterogeneity of global linkages 
and regional conditions in order to improve our understanding of the way global 
connectivity shapes regional technological trajectories. 
Given the expansion of MNEs’ activities in Latin America in the 2000s, there is a 
renewed interest in their potential role in addressing LACs’ poor innovative 
performance (Franco et al., 2011; ECLAC, 2013; Lema et al., 2015; OECD, 2016). In 
view of the growing importance of the regional and local level to the design of 
innovation policies in LACs (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006; Koeller and Cassiolato, 
2009; CAF, 2010; Maffioli et al., 2016), a better understanding of the interplay of 
heterogeneous global pipelines and diverse regional factors in shaping regional 
knowledge creation is needed. 
However, data constraints have until recently hindered quantitative research into the 
determinants of the geography of innovation of LACs, frequently forcing scholars to 
concentrate on one sector, or a limited set of regions and rather short periods of time. 
Empirical work on related questions has often relied on case studies (e.g. Giuliani et al, 
2005; Iammarino, et al., 2008). Previous contributions regarding FDI and knowledge 
creation in LACs suggest that local conditions and subsidiaries’ knowledge-intensity 
influence the potential for positive effects on local capabilities (Marin and Bell, 2006; 
Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006; Iammarino et al., 2008).  
Starting from this point, we explore two principal research questions. First, we ask: 
What is the general association between MNEs’ investments and regional patenting? 
Second, we examine how this relationship is shaped by (a) the heterogeneity of 
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investments and (b) by the heterogeneity of the regional contexts of the host economies. 
With respect to a), we consider, on the one hand, the entry mode: we include greenfield 
as well as M&A projects to explore whether investments of a specific entry mode are 
more likely to enhance patenting. In addition, we take into account the investments’ 
heterogeneous business functions. Each investment is categorized according to a 
functional taxonomy which can be consistently applied across different sectors. 
Regarding b) – the heterogeneity of host economies –, we investigate the role of 
regional R&D activities, human capital, and inter-regional knowledge flows in shaping 
regional knowledge creation and mediating regions’ ability to translate access to global 
pipelines into improved patenting performance. In addition, we draw on the differences 
across the three countries to explore how the role of multi-faceted heterogeneities of 
MNE investments and host regions varies across different stages of technological 
development and models of international economic integration. 
Our results cast light on the importance of MNE investments’ heterogeneity. The link 
between patenting and MNE investments is generally stronger in the case of M&A 
projects (compared to greenfield), suggesting that the embeddedness of M&A projects 
may facilitate knowledge spillovers to local agents. In Colombia, only the most 
knowledge-intensive investments are a significant predictor of patenting. In Brazil and 
Mexico, all three categories of investments are significantly linked with patenting. Yet, 
we find the strongest association for the most knowledge-intensive investments. The 
link between production activities and patenting is surprisingly strong in Mexico. We 
discuss this finding in the light of the existing literature and the three countries’ profiles 
in terms of international linkages. Heterogeneous regional conditions simultaneously 
play a crucial role: R&D efforts and human capital act as direct inputs and as factors 
conditioning regions’ ability to benefit from knowledge obtained via global pipelines. 
There are only limited signs of inter-regional spillovers, with Mexico in particular 
emerging as a highly fragmented innovation system.  
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses recent trends regarding 
knowledge creation and FDI in Latin America and provides a description of the 
geography of FDI as well as patenting in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia. Section 3 
outlines the related conceptual and empirical literature. Section 4 explains the empirical 
approach, while section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.  
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2.2 Context 
 
Latin America is a lightweight in terms of its importance to global knowledge 
production (De La Fuente, 2010; Montobbio and Sterzi, 2014; Araujo et al., 2015). 
Common indicators, such as royalty payments and employment of scientists, suggest 
that the subcontinent’s contribution to the world’s knowledge creation is less than half 
its share of global GDP and population (Meller and Gana, 2016). Whereas OECD 
countries registered, on average, 132 patents per one million inhabitants in the early 
2010s, LACs registered only 0.9 (OECD, 2016). Even compared to Asian and European 
countries at similar levels of development, most LACs invest less in R&D (IDB, 2010). 
This weak innovative performance figures prominently in the debate about LACs’ 
divergence from East Asian newly industrialized countries (Kohli et al., 2010; 
Kaplinsky, 2013).
41
 
There are substantial differences between and within LACs with respect to economic 
level of development, innovative performance, and, importantly, extent and shape of 
integration in the global economy. With a combined population of roughly 373 million 
people, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia account for large shares of MNE activities as 
well as knowledge production in Latin America. As illustrated by the indicators listed in 
Table 2.1, these three countries also represent different stages of technological 
development, different types of global connectivity, and different geographies of MNE 
investments and patenting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 For example, Mexico’s GDP per capita was more than twice as high as that of South Korea in 1960. 
This relationship had inverted by 2003 (OECD, 2009). 
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Table 2.1 Major national-level characteristics 
Indicator Brazil Mexico Colombia 
GDP/capita*  15,246 16,290 12,058 
Trade (% of GDP)*  25.66% 57.88% 36.55% 
FDI projects (greenfield & M&A) per million 
inhabitants**  
1.78 2.23 1.64 
FDI projects of 2 most populous regions (% of national 
count)**  
58.81% 25.7% 63.73% 
R&D (% of GDP)*  1.15% 0.43% 0.22% 
PCT patents/mio inhabitants**  2.06 1.36 0.82 
Patent appls. of 2 most populous regions (% of national 
count)**  
57.21% 42.58% 71.77% 
* Data for 2012, based on World Development Indicators (WDI). GDP/cap data are in current international PPP 
Dollars. ** Average 2003-2012, own calculation based on OECD REGPAT database and combination of fDi markets 
and Zephyr database. The two most populous regions are Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais in Brazil, Mexico City and 
Mexico State in Mexico, Bogota and Antioquia in Colombia. 
 
After large FDI inflows spurred by privatization efforts in the 1990s, LACs experienced 
a second major recent FDI wave between the mid-2000s and 2012. A small number of 
regions in these three countries already received MNE investments in the 1970s and 
1980s (see, for example, Cunningham, 1981 for Brazil). However, the latest wave (ca. 
2003-2012) marks a turning point regarding the number and geographical spread of 
investment projects. The increase in the sheer volume of FDI inflows is also reflected in 
the levels of FDI inflows relative to GDP: During 1975-2000, annual FDI flows to these 
three countries corresponded, on average, to 1.37% of GDP. During our period of 
analysis (2003-2012), the average is 3.03% of GDP (calculated based on World Bank 
development indicators). Supported by booming commodity exports, growing incomes 
attracted market-seeking investments in the 2000s (UNCTAD, 2015).  
Brazil is the subcontinent’s largest FDI recipient. It accounted for 37% of total flows to 
LACs in 2012, whereas Mexico’s share amounted to 11%. Chile (14%) and Colombia 
(8%) have extended their share in recent years. With its large domestic market, Brazil 
remains less outward-oriented than many other LACs. ICT and electronics accounted 
for nearly a fifth of all greenfield investment projects in Brazil during our period of 
analysis (2003-2012), closely followed by automotive (13%) and chemicals, metal, and 
mining-related activities (8%). Mexico and Brazil adopt very different roles in global 
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production networks. While Brazil increasingly specializes in the provision of upstream 
commodities, Mexico is a major location for manufacturing and assembly activities that 
incorporate a large amount of imported intermediates (Montalbano et al., 2016). Brazil 
attracts MNE investments predominantly because of its market size and is also used as a 
hub for MNEs targeting other Latin American markets (Dahlman, 2006). Mexico, in 
contrast, is a highly outward-oriented economy and integrated in cross-border 
production networks. Mexico’s export-oriented manufacturing activities primarily 
serve, similar to the Costa Rican case, the U.S. market. In Mexico, automotive (23%) 
projects and investments related to ICT and electronics (15%) play a major role (own 
calculation based on fDimarket data).
42
 Colombia’s integration in cross-border 
manufacturing production networks is limited. Natural resource-related investments and 
financial services play a particularly relevant role in Colombia (ECLAC, 2013). 
Brazil and Mexico, as well as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, are examples of 
fragmented and dual innovation systems simultaneously operating at two speeds 
(Chaminade and Padilla-Pérez, 2014). On the one hand, some of their universities, e.g. 
in Mexico City (UNAM) and Buenos Aires (UBA), produce high-level research (De la 
Fuente, 2010). In a small number of disciplines, for example Chilean crop science, 
LACs’ discoveries attract the international scientific community’s attention (Van 
Noorden, 2014). Some Latin American firms, e.g. Brazil’s aircraft producer Embraer, 
successfully compete globally. Yet, these positive examples remain “islands of 
excellence” (Dahlman, 2006) and knowledge-intensive activities are highly 
concentrated in a small set of regions. Many regions display little dynamism in 
knowledge creation (Llisteri et al., 2011). Most firms have low technological 
capabilities and the overall context retains characteristics of nascent innovation systems, 
including limited inter-organizational knowledge flows (Dutrénit and Sutz, 2014). Weak 
linkages and an important role of public research institutes generally characterize 
LACs’ innovation systems (Velho, 2005; Crespi and Zuniga, 2012). The business 
sector’s involvement in innovative activities has, however, grown in recent years in 
several LACs. It accounts for roughly half of Brazil’s R&D expenditure and circa 40% 
                                                 
42
 These descriptions rely on the aggregate sectoral groupings of the fDiMarkets database. For a more 
detailed list of the top 10 three digit NAICs sectors for both greenfield and M&A projects, see Tables 
2.A.1-2.A.3 in the appendix. 
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in Mexico’s case (IDB, 2010; OECD, 2016) – significantly below leading OECD 
members (ca. 70%). 
As the subcontinent’s major power in terms of knowledge creation, Brazil contributes 
approximately 35% of Latin America’s patenting, 50% of scientific publications, and 
60% of R&D spending (IDB, 2010; Santa and Herrero Solana, 2010).
43
 With R&D 
expenditure corresponding to 1.15% of GDP in 2012, Brazil’s R&D spending resembles 
levels of EU countries like Italy or Hungary. Although the country’s PCT patenting per 
one million inhabitants more than doubled between 2003 and 2012 (from 1.3 to 3.1) it 
continues to lag behind EU countries with similar R&D expenditure as well as China, 
South Africa, and Russia. Mexico’s R&D expenditure (0.43% of GDP in 2012) is less 
than half of Brazil’s and below the Latin American average (0.76%).44 Yet, the gap 
between Brazil and Mexico is less pronounced in terms of patenting, with Mexico 
achieving roughly 2/3 of the patenting level of Brazil despite lower R&D investments 
(see Table 2.1). In comparison to Brazil and Mexico, Colombia’s innovation system is 
smaller and less mature (OECD, 2014). Colombian firms’ contribution to total R&D 
(25%) is limited and Colombia’s R&D spending (0.2% of GDP) trails behind LACs at 
similar income levels.  
 
2.3 MNE investments and the geography of innovation 
 
Regarding both MNE investments and inventive activities there is substantial 
heterogeneity at the regional level.
45
 In this section we first take a brief look at the main 
regions regarding knowledge creation before turning our attention to the evolution of 
spatial patterns of MNE investments and patenting during our period of analysis. 
                                                 
43
 Brazil dedicates more resources to R&D than any other Latin American country - even when taking 
into account the size of its economy (IDB, 2010). Dahlman (2006) traces this characteristic back to the 
military government of the 1960s that considered technological capabilities as pivotal and heavily 
invested in R&D and higher education.    
44
 Potential reasons for Mexico’s low R&D intensity discussed in the literature include a lack of medium-
sized and large firms and the persistence of managerial strategies formed during the import substitution 
regime that ended in the mid-1980s (OECD, 2009; Torres et al., 2014). 
45
 Figures 2.A.4-2.A.6 in the appendix are maps which show the regional distribution of patenting, total 
FDI projects, and knowledge-intensive FDI projects on average during 2003-2012. 
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In Brazil knowledge creation mostly occurs in the South and Southeast but is not 
confined to the two major hubs, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janiero. The state of Santa 
Catarina (roughly 700kms south of Sao Paolo), with strong SMEs and numerous mid-
sized clusters, displays the highest share of firms conducting R&D (Llisteri et al., 2011). 
Its patenting intensity (12 PCT applications per one million inhabitants) during 2011-
2012 was more than twice as high as Rio de Janiero’s (4.7). In Mexico patenting is 
concentrated in central and northern states near the U.S. border. Mexico City accounted 
for 26% of Mexican PCT patenting during 2011-2012. It is followed by Jalisco (19%), a 
state on the Pacific coast often praised for its innovation policies (Iammarino et al., 
2008; Llisteri et al., 2011). The third major hub is Nuevo Leon. This northern state with 
close ties to the U.S. benefits from a strong manufacturing sector and a large 
agglomeration, Monterrey. These three leading states, home to a fifth of Mexico’s 
population, contributed 62% of Mexico’s PCT filings in 2011-2012. Colombia’s 
geography of patenting is highly concentrated and shaped by the central role of Bogota, 
which accounted for 58% of Colombia’s PCT applications in 2011-2012.   
With respect to the geography of MNEs’ activities, during our period of analysis Brazil 
and Colombia saw increases in the number of regions receiving FDI.
46
 Although more 
regions became connected to MNEs’ networks 47 , investment projects remained 
concentrated in key hubs. In Mexico, the three leading destinations for MNE 
investments (Mexico City, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco) attracted 42% of all greenfield FDI 
projects during 2003-2004, and their share still amounted to 37% during 2011-2012. 
Brazil’s main FDI destinations (Sao Paulo, Rio de Janiero, Minas Gerais) even 
increased their share of greenfield FDI projects in Brazil from 61% to 77% during those 
years. In Colombia, Bogota, the densely populated northern region of Atlantico, and 
Antioquia, whose capital Medellin is the country’s second largest city, accounted for 
                                                 
46
 Improving political and economic stability facilitated Colombian regions’ integration in MNE networks 
during our period of analysis. During 2003-2004 23 out of 33 regions did not receive a single investment; 
compared to 19 during 2011-2012. Whereas in 2003-2004 five (out of 27) Brazilian states did not register 
any investment project (considering both greenfield and M&A), that number dropped to three during 
2011-2012. The number of Mexican states not receiving any investments was three at the beginning 
(2003-2004) as well as at the end (2011-2012) of our period of analysis.   
47
 In Brazil, only the small (in terms of both population and GDP) state of Roraima did not register any 
investments during 2003-2012. In Mexico, there is no state that did not receive any investments during 
2003-2012. In Colombia, 11 regions did not receive any investment projects (mostly sparsely populated 
regions with a large share of rain forest, such as Amazonas and Putumayo).  
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68% of all greenfield projects in Colombia during 2011-2012 (up from 56% in 2003-
2004). It is therefore evident that opportunities to benefit from integration in global 
production networks as a source of extra-local knowledge are distributed highly 
unevenly across the regions of these three countries.  
Figures 2.A.1, 2.A.2, and 2.A.3 in the appendix illustrate the regional distribution of 
patenting and greenfield FDI in 2003-2004 and 2011-2012, focusing on the 10 regions 
with the highest patent counts. The graphs show for which share of patenting, FDI 
projects, and population the ten most patenting-intensive regions account. Particularly 
in Brazil and Mexico, there has been a slow but discernible trend towards a decrease of 
the patenting share of first-tier regions. Sao Paolo and Rio de Janiero, where one third 
of all Brazilians lives, accounted for 58% of Brazil’s PCT applications during 2011- 
2012; down from nearly 70% in 2002 and 2003. In the same period, Mexico City’s 
share of Mexican patenting fell from 41% to 26%.  
As illustrated by the graphs, this dynamism was largely driven by second-tier regions. 
Thus, Querétaro, a Mexican state that has seen the emergence of an aerospace cluster in 
recent years, has substantially increased its patenting output between 2003 and 2012. In 
Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul, home to an automotive cluster, has seen strong growth in 
patenting. Notwithstanding these encouraging examples, the graph also highlights the 
weak technological capabilities of most regions, especially in Colombia. The leading 
ten regions (where 65% of Colombians live) account for virtually all Colombian 
patenting. With respect to greenfield FDI, the figures for Brazil and Colombia 
demonstrate that investments are concentrated in the most innovative regions. 
Contrasting with the trend for patenting, the concentration of greenfield FDI has even 
grown in those two countries. In Mexico, the picture looks different, with the most 
innovative regions accounting for shares of FDI that are only slightly higher than their 
contribution to Mexico’s population. In addition, Mexico displays no clear trend 
towards increasing concentration of FDI in the most innovative regions.   
The categorization of greenfield investment projects based on business functions 
(discussed in section 5) reveals a more detailed view of concentration patterns. 
Mexico’s top three FDI destinations saw a reduction in their share of MNEs’ investment 
projects focused on production activities (manufacturing; extraction; construction) from 
23% in 2003-2004 to 16% in 2011-2012. This trend towards declining concentration in 
the top three destinations does not apply to the most knowledge-intensive activities, 
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though: the share of greenfield projects dedicated to R&D as well as key command 
functions (e.g. headquarters; management consulting) received by Mexico City, Nuevo 
Leon, and Jalisco remained stable at 65%. This observation resonates with contributions 
highlighting that, while MNEs disperse routinized production activities, they 
concentrate knowledge-intensive activities in highly connected, predominantly urban 
locations (McCann and Acs, 2011). This pattern is even more pronounced in the 
Brazilian case. The share of the most knowledge-intensive projects going to Brazil’s 
three main FDI destinations grew from 70 to 87% between 2003-2004 and 2011-2012, 
whereas it remained largely unchanged for MNE activities focused on production. In the 
Colombian case, we observe no signs of substantial reductions in concentration 
regarding production as well as knowledge-intensive investment projects.  
 
2.4 Related literature 
 
There is a growing consensus that the local and the global dimension of knowledge 
creation are “intrinsically interwoven” (Bathelt and Cohendet, 2014: 870). Particularly 
local aspects have attracted scholars’ attention. A large body of evidence shows that 
economically valuable knowledge does not diffuse easily across space, with knowledge 
spillovers displaying strong distance-decay effects (e.g. Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; 
Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; Sonn and Storper, 2008). Geographical remoteness may 
therefore constitute a structural disadvantage via reduced exposure to knowledge flows. 
Conversely, proximity to innovation hubs facilitates access to knowledge via face-to-
face contacts (Storper and Venables, 2004). It is also well-established that regional 
differences in R&D efforts, place-specific knowledge pools and capabilities, and 
network structures help to explain the geography of innovation (e.g. Storper, 1997; 
Iammarino, 2005; Feldman and Kogler, 2010). 
Notwithstanding the importance of local factors, a number of scholars have started 
placing greater emphasis on the complementarity of local and global inputs to 
knowledge creation processes (e.g. Oinas, 1999; Simmie, 2003; Bathelt, et al., 2004; 
Bathelt and Cohendet, 2014). As stressed by Maskell (2014: 1), even places with highly 
innovation-enhancing conditions would not be able to permanently “thrive in splendid 
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isolation”. The most innovative places combine vibrant, localized knowledge circulation 
and “global pipelines” (Bathelt et al., 2004). The latter are linkages – not necessarily 
based on geographical proximity – to innovative places that provide valuable 
knowledge inputs. These pipelines can act as a source of external impulses that may 
help to prevent technological stagnation (Maskell, 2014). For peripheral regions, 
pipelines may mitigate disadvantages associated with limited exposure to knowledge 
spillovers from nearby sources (Crescenzi and Jaax, 2016).
48
 
Global pipelines can take various forms, including migrant networks (e.g. Saxenian and 
Sabel, 2008; Ganguli, 2015) and personal relationships resulting from temporary 
encounters (Li, 2014). Yet, multinational enterprises act as the primary conduits for 
global knowledge flows (e.g. Narula and Zanfei, 2005; Iammarino and McCann, 
2013).
49
 They are major investors in R&D (UNCTAD, 2005) and their subsidiaries, 
simultaneously linked to their host regions and to intra-firm networks, channel 
economically valuable knowledge across large distances and national borders (Meyer et 
al., 2011). MNEs’ location choices can play a crucial role in the emergence of 
technologically advanced clusters in emerging countries, as in Bangalore in India 
(Lorenzen and Mudambi, 2013) and Heredia in Costa Rica (Ciravegna, 2012). By 
providing valuable, complementary inputs from distant places, MNEs can enhance 
regional patenting (see Fu, 2008 for China; Ford and Rork, 2010 for the USA; 
Crescenzi and Jaax, 2016 for Russia). 
Five main mechanisms for knowledge transfers from MNEs’ subsidiaries to the regional 
economy have been proposed in the literature. Demonstration effects result from local 
agents’ exposure to subsidiaries’ technology (Smeets, 2008). Labour market effects are 
mediated by former MNE employees hired by local enterprises (Görg and Strobl, 2005; 
Poole, 2013) – although MNEs’ ability to attract the best local workers may obstruct 
spillovers (Sinani and Meyer, 2004). Competition effects are induced by MNEs’ entry 
                                                 
48
 The conceptual and empirical literature on the role of global pipelines is still relatively young and 
several key aspects remain subject to debate. For example, Morrison et al. (2013) propose a formal model 
that predicts that global pipelines only generate positive effects in the presence of vibrant, localized 
knowledge circulation or in small clusters with a limited stock of knowledge. 
49 
Note that different types of global pipelines may occur simultaneously and can be intertwined, e.g. via 
MNEs’ link to migration. Thus, General Electric states on its website 
(http://www.geglobalresearch.com/locations) that 16% of the employees of its R&D centre in Rio de 
Janiero are Brazilians that returned from jobs abroad.  
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that incentivizes local firms to use resources and technology more efficiently (Blalock 
and Gertler, 2008). The fourth channel concerns export opportunities associated with 
the establishment of a subsidiary, which may facilitate knowledge spillovers based on 
imitation or collaboration (Crespo and Fontura, 2007). The fifth channel relies on 
backward and forward linkages: positive effects on local capabilities may arise when 
subsidiaries purchase inputs from or provide inputs to local firms (Markusen and 
Venables, 1999; Ernst and Kim, 2002). 
While these channels are well-documented, the corresponding empirical studies 
predominantly use productivity data to identify signs of knowledge spillovers. Although 
the empirical part of this paper will not be able to shed light on the mechanisms shaping 
knowledge flows, similar channels are likely to be of relevance to this study which 
focuses on regional patenting. Regarding competition effects, Durán (2014) argues that 
competition among Mexican automotive component producers seeking orders from 
MNE subsidiaries acts as a main incentive that motivates domestic firms’ R&D efforts 
and patenting. Moreover, numerous studies examining determinants of spatial patterns 
of patenting and knowledge diffusion (e.g. Zucker and Darby, 1996; Ganguli, 2015) 
emphasize the central role of individuals as carriers of tacit knowledge; suggesting that 
labour market effects may similarly apply to this study. In addition, indirect effects 
might also shape the link between MNE investments and regional patenting 
performance. Thus, the decision of an MNE to set up a subsidiary may motivate the 
creation of new departments and specializations at local universities. After its decision 
to open a major plant in Queretaro, Mexico, in 2005, the Canadian aircraft producer 
Bombardier formed linkages with local universities and played a central role in the 
establishment of a new technical university dedicated to aerospace-related sciences 
(Universidad Nacional Aeronáutica) (Llisteri et al., 2011; Burgos and Johnson, 2016). 
Furthermore, MNEs may increase local firms’ awareness of the potential returns to 
R&D investments (Durán, 2014).  
The ambiguity of the empirical evidence on knowledge spillovers from MNE activities 
(for a review, see Crespo and Fontura, 2007 and Keller, 2010) demonstrates that it is far 
from guaranteed that the opening of a subsidiary will result in positive effects on the 
host region’s innovative performance. A set of region- and subsidiary-specific factors 
shape the potential for knowledge spillovers. Regarding the host region, its ability to 
absorb the latest technologies is of paramount importance (e.g. Castellani and Zanfei, 
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2002; Ford et al., 2008; Narula and Dunning, 2010). For the case of Brazil, Poole 
(2013) identifies workers’ skill levels as a key determinant of the likelihood of 
spillovers. In addition to human capital, regional R&D efforts promote the build-up of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Zhou and Xin (2003) find that 
Beijing’s R&D institutes contributed to local firms’ ability to adopt foreign technology. 
Similarly, Iammarino et al. (2008) highlight strong regional R&D capacities in Jalisco 
(Mexico) as a factor shaping technological-enhancing benefits of MNE presence in the 
region’s electronics industry. The same study casts light on a further important factor: 
regional efforts to embed MNEs’ subsidiaries in the local economy. Foreign-owned 
plants operating largely without local linkages are unlikely to enhance local capabilities 
(Phelps et al., 2003; Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007). This provides a rationale for 
proactive innovation policies aimed at strengthening subsidiaries’ integration in the 
regional economy (Padilla-Pérez and Martínez-Piva, 2009). 
In addition to diverse regional conditions, one has to take into account the heterogeneity 
of pipelines. The first dimension of heterogeneity concerns the entry mode. The 
acquisition of domestic firms through MNEs is often perceived as a loss of domestic 
identity and sovereignty, contributing to a wide-spread “impression that greenfield FDI 
is ‘good’, while FDI through cross-border M&As is ‘bad’” (UNCTAD, 2000: 159). Yet, 
pre-existing local linkages of formerly domestic firms acquired by an MNE may lead to 
a greater scope for knowledge spillovers than when a subsidiary is established through 
greenfield investment (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007; Balsvik and Haller, 2010). 
Andersson et al. (1996) find that subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs are more likely to 
source intermediate inputs locally if they were created through M&A; similar results for 
Japanese MNEs are reported by Belderbos et al. (2001). It therefore seems plausible to 
assume that M&A may mitigate problems of poor integration in the local economy 
often associated with greenfield subsidiaries (Chapman, 2003). Notwithstanding this 
potentially positive aspect of M&A, the implications of the entry mode remain 
underexplored and disputed (Ashraf et al., 2015).
50
 One also has to take into account 
that costs of incorporating acquired firms in MNEs networks may negatively affect 
subsidiaries’ performance (Harris and Robinson, 2002). There might also be a post-
                                                 
50
 For example, the link between the acquiring MNEs’ level of productivity and the entry mode remains 
subject to debate (e.g. Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; Raff et al., 2012).  
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acquisition reduction in the new subsidiary’s R&D activities (Koeller and Cassiolato, 
2009), e.g. if the MNE decides to use the subsidiary primarily for sales and marketing 
purposes. 
The second major dimension of the heterogeneity of global pipelines established via 
MNEs concerns the business functions of subsidiaries. The literature no longer 
considers subsidiaries as passive, leaky containers (e.g. Marin and Bell, 2006; Narula 
and Duning, 2010; Iammarino and McCann, 2013). There is an increasing focus on the 
subsidiary’s activities, with more knowledge-intensive tasks frequently assumed to 
provide greater potential for spillovers (Keller, 2010). Traditionally concentrated in 
MNEs’ home countries, a growing share of R&D is conducted by subsidiaries 
(UNCTAD, 2005). Yet, only a small set of regions manage to attract highly knowledge-
intensive MNE activities. Cantwell and Iammarino’s (2003) analysis of MNEs’ 
patenting in Europe reveals regional hierarchies, with a limited number of regions 
accounting for a large proportion of foreign-owned research. Although emerging 
countries’ share of R&D-related MNE investments has been growing in recent years 
(UNCTAD, 2005), most projects go to a small number of leading regions in a process of 
concentrated dispersion (Huggins et al., 2007; Iammarino and McCann, 2013). Yet, 
MNEs may still deviate from these hierarchical patterns and locate knowledge-intensive 
activities in lower-tier regions, e.g. because of feedback processes between production 
and R&D or in the case of the emergence of new industries in which established 
innovation centres have limited pre-existing knowledge (Fifarek and Veloso, 2010; 
Nguyen and Revilla Diez, 2016). The numerous regions that do not receive MNE 
investments focused on R&D activities may still attract MNE investments dedicated to 
other functions, e.g. production or logistics and distribution. MNEs disaggregate the 
value chain into functions and locate each of them where it can be carried out in the 
most effective way (Iammarino and McCann, 2013).  
The distinction between different functions has mostly been applied to analyses of 
MNEs’ location choices (Defever, 2006, 2010; Basile et al., 2008; Ascani et al., 2016). 
Analysing data on non-European MNEs in EU countries, Defever (2006) concludes that 
functional aspects influence the location of service activities more than sectoral aspects. 
Crescenzi et al. (2014) distinguish five business functions and find that socioeconomic 
conditions influence location decisions regarding knowledge-intensive functions in the 
EU-25 regions. This paper extends the literature by applying a distinction between 
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major functions to the analysis of the association between MNE investments and the 
inventive performance of host regions.  
We follow Crescenzi et al. (2014) in building on Sturgeon’s (2008) classification. It 
provides a list of generic functions that all business establishments, irrespective of 
whether the main output is a tangible good or a service, must carry out or have done 
elsewhere. The classification is sufficiently flexible to allow for a categorization of 
investment projects across countries and industries. The distinction between three 
categories – (1) all investment projects, (2) the most knowledge-intensive projects, (3) 
and projects dedicated to production purposes – enables us to capture an important 
dimension of foreign affiliates’ heterogeneity: Subsidiaries have different roles within 
corporate value chains and, accordingly, possess different competencies and display 
different patterns of integration in local knowledge creation processes (Fuller and 
Phelps, 2004). One would therefore expect that “different kinds of subsidiary will 
provide different kinds of potential linkage and spillover effects” (Narula and Dunning, 
2010: 275).  
It appears plausible that an affiliate dedicated to sales may receive fewer knowledge 
transfers from the parent and is less likely to develop technological capabilities, than, 
for example, a regional HQs in charge of strategic decisions and product development. 
Concentrating on foreign affiliates in five transition economies, Jindra et al. (2009) find 
that subsidiaries with greater autonomy and stronger technological capabilities are more 
likely to establish local linkages. Findings from Argentina (Marin and Bell; 2006) and 
India (Marin and Sasidharan, 2010) suggest subsidiaries engaged in knowledge creation 
are more likely to strengthen regional technological capabilities. One would hence 
assume a strong association between the most knowledge-intensive investments (HQs 
and R&D) and regional patenting. At the same time, previous work on spillovers via 
backward and forward linkages associated with foreign-owned production activities, as 
identified by Kugler (2006) in Colombia, suggests that knowledge diffusion may not 
only run via subsidiaries dedicated to R&D or strategic functions. 
This section has highlighted that analyses of regional patterns of knowledge creation 
have to take into account the diversity of regional-level conditions as well as the 
heterogeneity of global pipelines. We must consider the region as a “localised interface 
where global and local flows of knowledge intersect” (Kroll, 2009: 1). The following 
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section will explain how the empirical analysis addresses the interplay of the local and 
the global dimension.  
 
2.5 Empirical strategy 
 
Studies examining the geography of knowledge creation mostly adopt a knowledge 
production function approach, in which the R&D-patenting link takes centre stage (e.g. 
Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; O’hUallachain and Leslie, 2007). In view of the relevance of 
local-global interactions highlighted in section 4, one has to adjust the “traditional” 
knowledge production function. This paper explores regional patenting patterns in 
Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico during 2003-2012 by ‘augmenting’ the knowledge 
production function (Charlot et al., 2015) to account simultaneously for the 
heterogeneity of MNE investments – regarding entry mode as well as business functions 
– and the heterogeneity of regional conditions.  
 
Our empirical analysis relies on variations of the following model: 
2,,32,,22,,1,, _&)1ln(   tmitmitmitmi FOREIGNKHUMANDRPAT 
tmtmitmitmi CONTROLSWFOREIGNDWR    1,,2,,52,,4 &   
tmitmTREND ,,,   
 Where: 
)1ln( ,, tmiPAT   is the natural logarithm of all PCT patent applications, counted 
according to the inventor's region of residence, of region i in macro region m in year t.
51
  
2,,& tmiDR   is a proxy for the R&D spending of the region (logarithm). 
                                                 
51
 As we use a tow-year lag for several independent variables, t ranges from 2005-2012 on the left-hand 
side. Regions i are Brazilian states (27 in total), Mexican states (32 in total). In Colombia i refers to 
Colombian departments. There are 33 Colombian departments but data constraints force us to exclude 9 
departments from the analysis (see footnote 60). For a list showing which states and departments are 
nested in which macro regions, see Table 2.A.4 in the Appendix. 
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2,,_ tmiKHUMAN  is a measure of the share of the population with higher levels of 
education. 
2,, tmiFOREIGN  is the logarithm (+1) of the count of MNE investment projects – 
either greenfield or M&A – in one of three categories: (1) all projects, (2) highly 
knowledge-intensive functions (HQs, R&D), (3) production activities.  
2,,& tmiDWR  is the spatially weighted average of R&D spending; calculated as the 
average R&D spending of the four nearest neighbours. 
2,, tmiWFOREIGN  is the spatially weighted average of MNE investment projects – 
either greenfield or M&A – in one of three categories: (1) all projects, (2) highly 
knowledge-intensive functions (HQs, R&D), (3) production activities. It is calculated as 
the average number of investment projects received by the four nearest neighbours. 
1,, tmiCONTROLS   is a vector of controls including total population and three 
sectoral controls: (1) agriculture, forestry, and fishing and (2) industry as share of total 
gross value added and (3) commodities-related investment projects as a share of all 
(greenfield and M&A) investment projects.
52
 
Time dummies t  are included to account for common shocks, e.g. macro-economic 
crises. Conversely, macro region
53
 fixed effects m  control for the time-invariant part of 
unobserved heterogeneity that is specific to macro regions encompassing a minimum of 
2 and a maximum of 9 individual regions.
54
 This includes the cross-sectional dimension 
of variation in macro regions’ institutional quality as well as long-term historical 
conditions that cannot be included explicitly in the model.
55
 Moreover, we include a 
                                                 
52
 Commodities-related investment projects as a share of all (greenfield and M&A) investment projects 
are lagged by two years, whereas all other controls are lagged by one year. 
53
 We rely on categorizations of macro regions used by the scientific and statistical agencies of the three 
countries that reflect common socio-economic characteristics (see Table 2.A.4 in the Appendix). 
54
 Limited variation over time within regions i for several key variables (incl. human capital) prevent us 
from using fixed effects at the level of regions i.  
55
 For example, Storper et al. (2007) argue that a history of slavery and top-down development policies 
favouring large enterprises has created unfavourable conditions for knowledge creation in Brazil’s 
northeast. 
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linear trend to allow macro regions to follow different trends over time. Finally, tmi ,,  is 
the idiosyncratic error term.  
Given the substantial time lag (Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2011)
56
 between R&D 
investments and patent applications, R&D intensity (and its spatial lags) enters the 
regional knowledge production function with a two-year lag. Following O’hUallachain 
and Leslie (2007), we assign the same time gap to human capital. We also apply a two-
year lag to the count of MNE investment projects, since visible effects on regional 
patenting are unlikely to materialize instantaneously. With the exception of the control 
for the share of investments dedicated to natural resources (lagged by two years), all 
controls are lagged by one year to minimise reverse causality. 
2.5.1 Dependent variable 
Capturing innovation in emerging economies is a conceptual and empirical challenge. In 
emerging countries innovations tend to be mostly new to the firm, whereas a larger 
proportion of innovations in advanced economies is new to the world as a whole (Bell, 
2007). This also applies to LACs, where imitation strategies are prevalent among firms 
(IDB, 2010). It is therefore important to acknowledge that the use of PCT applications 
as a proxy for knowledge creation is not without limitations.  
For the purpose of spatial analyses patents provide a “fairly good, although not perfect, 
representation of innovative activity” (Acs et al., 2002: 1080). Generally, not all types 
of invention are equally likely to be patented (Griliches, 1990). While one would ideally 
cover all forms of knowledge creation, in practice data limitations require scholars to 
concentrate on inventions covered by reliable data (Brenner and Broekel, 2011; Smith, 
2005). PCT’s global novelty requirement implies that our measure of knowledge 
creation does not capture imitations, minor adaptations, and innovations primarily new 
to the Brazilian, Colombian, or Mexican market. We therefore only capture a subset of 
the inventions occurring in the regions of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.   
                                                 
56
 Fischer and Varga (2003) choose a lag of two years for their analysis of knowledge production in 
Austria, while Rondé and Hussler (2005) use R&D expenditure in 1997 to explain patenting in French 
regions in the period 1998-2000. Similarly, O’hUalla-chain and Leslie (2007) relate R&D efforts in 2000 
and 2001 to average patenting per capita in U.S. states during 2002–2004. Note that choosing such a time 
gap should also mitigate reverse causality problems regarding the relationship between R&D and 
patenting. 
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Notwithstanding these limitations, three main considerations motivate us to choose PCT 
applications as a proxy for regional knowledge creation. First, it helps to avoid issues 
related to domestic patent coverage and quality. “A PCT filing can be seen as a 
‘worldwide patent application’ and is much less biased than national applications” 
(OECD, 2009a: 65). Emerging countries’ use of PCT patents is increasingly common 
and “the PCT reflects the technological activities of emerging countries quite well 
(Brazil, Russia, China, India, etc.)” (OECD, 2009a: 66). 57  PCT’s novelty standards 
ensure that PCT applications provide a measure of the ability to produce new 
knowledge. In view of the debate about the consequences of China’s rise for LACs’ 
position in the global economy (Kohli et al., 2010; de la Torre et al., 2015), this high 
level of technological capabilities is of paramount importance.  
Second, the use of PCT patents enables us to exploit a new dataset (Miguélez and Fink, 
2013; Miguélez and Raffo, 2013) encompassing information on inventors’ nationality58 
to compute three different versions of our dependent variable. This allows us to use 
three different patent application counts in our analysis. In an initial set of regressions, 
we use the total PCT count, i.e. encompassing all PCT applications assigned to a region 
based on the inventors’ residence – irrespective of the inventors’ nationality. However, 
in most regressions, we only take into account those patents where all inventors listed 
on the patent are domestic citizens. The third, most restrictive type of patent application 
count only considers patents invented by exclusively domestic inventors that, in 
addition, were applied for by organizations that reside in the respective country.
59
 The 
information on inventors’ nationality – available for PCT applications only – therefore 
enables us to address a central point raised in the existing literature on patenting in 
LACs: the role of MNEs as major patenting organizations (Abud et al., 2013; 
Montobbio and Sterzi, 2014). The use of patent counts with guaranteed domestic 
                                                 
57
 Harhoff et al. (2007: 18) state that due to “flexibility and low costs, PCT filings have become extremely 
popular”. China overtook Germany as the third-largest user of the system in 2013 (WIPO, 2014). 
58
 This new dataset incorporates information on inventors’ nationality retrieved from WIPO-administered 
databases (WIPO IPSTATS) on PCT patents. For further details, see Miguélez and Fink (2013). 
59
 Every patent lists details of the inventor(s) and the applicant(s). For example, for the Brazilian state of 
Paraná, the second type of PCT count would only consider those patents whose inventors are exclusively 
Brazilian nationals. In contrast, the most restrictive count would in addition exclude any patents that were 
invented by Brazilian citizens but applied for by foreign-based applicants. Note that the last category may 
still include elements of MNE patenting: If the MNE subsidiary (rather than the parent) files the 
application and all inventors are domestic citizens, this patent would still be included in our most 
restrictive count. 
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involvement minimizes the risk of capturing MNEs’ efforts to protect inventions created 
in “enclave” R&D labs or other countries with limited potential for spillovers to local 
agents.
60
 
Third, choosing PCT patents also facilitates comparisons with findings of relevant 
contributions in the same body of literature. PCT patents’ clear standards and their 
careful regionalisation conducted by the OECD have made this patent type the preferred 
choice of several recent studies examining patterns of patenting in advanced and 
emerging economies (Usai, 2011; Crescenzi et al., 2012; D’Agostino et al., 2013; 
Fagerberg et al., 2014; Crescenzi and Jaax, 2016). 
2.5.2 Explanatory variables 
(a) MNE investment projects. Data on greenfield FDI come from fDi Markets, a 
database maintained by a division of the Financial Times, which monitors greenfield 
investments covering all sectors and countries. Each investment is listed as a project, for 
which the dataset provides information regarding location and, importantly, type of 
activity (business function) conducted by the subsidiary. The same database is used to 
inform UNCTAD investment reports (e.g. UNCTAD, 2015). Crosschecks with 
independent databases demonstrate its reliability (Crescenzi et al., 2014). In addition, 
our analysis incorporates information on M&A projects from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr 
database. Zephyr provides – among other things – information on target companies’ 
location and sector as well as a description of the nature and rationale of the deal based 
on various media sources. The description of the deal (where available) has been 
complemented by a manual internet search for additional information on the nature of 
the operations of the target company following the deal in order to identify the business 
function of the new foreign subsidiary in line with the fDi Markets classification.
61
. 
                                                 
60
 Referring to patenting trends in six Central American countries during 1995-2005, Padilla-Pérez and 
Martínez -Piva (2009) highlight patenting growth driven by MNEs’ efforts to protect their intellectual 
property. In view of simultaneously low patenting by domestic residents, limited linkages between MNEs 
and local agents, and weak local absorptive capacity, the authors suggest that the MNE-driven increase in 
overall patenting is unlikely to indicate improved local technological capabilities. It is therefore important 
that we test our results are based on patent counts with a guaranteed involvement of domestic inventors.   
61
 This step started from a thorough examination of the way projects are classified in fDiMarkets. We 
then proceeded to exploit information on the deal rationale for M&A projects in the Zephyr database in 
order to apply the same classification to M&A projects. Information on the operations of the new foreign 
subsidiaries was also obtained by means of manual Internet searches (in English and in the local 
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Table 2.2 Classification of business functions 
fDi Markets  classification Classification in this paper 
Core functions 
Headquarters HQ&INNO 
R&D; Design, Development and Testing HQ&INNO 
Sales, Marketing and Supports; Retail (part of ALL) 
Manufacturing; Construction; Extraction PROD 
Logistic, Distribution and Transportation (part of ALL) 
Support functions 
Business Services and Shared Service Centres  HQ&INNO 
Education & Training HQ&INNO 
Technical Support Centres; Maintenance and Servicing (part of ALL) 
Electricity; ICT & Internet Infrastructures (part of ALL) 
Customer Contact Centres; Recycling (part of ALL) 
 
This paper’s distinction between different functions of subsidiaries draws inspiration 
from Sturgeon’s (2008) work on the categorization of generic functions that all business 
establishments, irrespective of whether the main output is a tangible good or a service, 
must carry out or have done elsewhere. We follow Crescenzi et al. (2014)
62
 in 
exploiting the description of subsidiaries’ activities provided by fDiMarkets in order to 
assign investment projects to functions. M&A projects from Zephyr are categorized in 
the same way, as discussed above. The regressions are based on three main categories: 
(1) all projects (ALL), (2) production activities (PROD), and (3) headquarters and 
innovative activities (HQ&INNO). Table 2.2 presents a description of the classification 
adopted in this paper, relating it to the descriptions of subsidiary activities provided by 
fDiMarkets.
63
 
We use the count of investment projects, rather than the investment value. Regional 
counts are the most reliable and conservative proxy for local FDI flows, in particular in 
                                                                                                                                               
languages), leveraging and triangulating Zephyr information on the name of the acquiring and acquired 
companies, their location and sector in order to retrieve additional data on the specific activity of the 
subsidiary.  
62
 Crescenzi et al. (2014) distinguish five functions, including commercial activities and logistics and 
distribution. Compared to Crescenzi et al. (2014), our analysis draws on fewer observations and focuses 
on the link between investments and patenting (rather than on location choices). We therefore enter a 
narrower set of functions in our regressions. 
63
 For an overview of the distribution of FDI projects across functions, see Table 2.A.5 in the appendix. 
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the context of emerging countries where reporting and statistical standard are sometimes 
still in development.
64
 The use of counts is common in the literature (e.g. Haskel et al., 
2007). While counts cannot capture differences in the size of projects, Narula and 
Dunning (2010) underscore that a subsidiary’s potential regarding spillovers and 
linkages is not necessarily reflected in its investment value. A large manufacturing plant 
performing low-skilled assembly tasks might not provide more valuable knowledge 
inputs than a small R&D lab engaged in advanced activities that are deeply integrated 
into the parent’s network. 
(b) Regional R&D expenditure and human capital. The relevance of regional 
heterogeneity regarding inputs to knowledge production is well-documented (e.g. 
Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; O’hUallachain and Leslie, 2007). However, reliable regional 
level statistics for innovation expenditure are often difficult to find for both advanced
65
 
and emerging countries. For Brazil, we rely on total wages paid to R&D employees, 
based on Brazilian social security data, as a proxy for R&D efforts. We follow 
Goncalves and Almeida (2009) in using the share of population with eleven or more 
years of education (provided by Brazil’s statistical agency) to proxy human capital. In 
the absence of data on total R&D expenditure for Mexican states, we follow OECD 
(2009b) and use the number of researchers that are members of the national system of 
researchers.
66
 The share of population with tertiary degrees is our proxy for human 
capital in the Mexican case. In the Colombian regressions, we use total R&D 
expenditure and the share of population with tertiary education (both variables come 
from Colombia’s statistical agency). Data constraints force us to exclude nine out of 33 
Colombian regions from the analysis.
67
 
                                                 
64
 As stressed by Castellani and Pieri (2015), part of the investment values reported in initial versions of 
fDiMarkets relied on estimates, implying an inevitable measurement error. Moreover, M&A values are 
disclosed to the public and/or included in Zephyr for only roughly 45% of the projects in our dataset. 
65
 For the USA – generally considered as the innovation system on the technological frontier – the 
empirical literature has been forced to rely on sub-state level proxies computed on the basis of firm-level 
data from commercial data providers (e.g. Crescenzi et al., 2007). 
66
 Note that this measure, provided by Mexico’s science and innovation agency CONACYT, 
predominantly (but not exclusively) captures public R&D. Although not ideal, it is the best proxy for 
subnational R&D available for Mexico (OECD, 2009b).  
67
 These nine regions (Amazonas, Arauca, Casanare, Guainía, Guaviare, Putumayo, San Andrés y 
Providencia, Vaupés, Vichada) jointly accounted for 2.8% of the total Colombian population in 2012. 
These regions include sparsely populated areas shaped by forest (e.g. Amazonas) and islands (San Andrés 
y Providencia).  
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(c) Controls. We add total population to control for a region’s size, as more populous 
regions are more likely to file large numbers of patent applications. Given the relevance 
of sectoral specialization to patenting propensity (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997), we rely 
on the OECD regional database to calculate controls for the GVA share of agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing as well as industry
68
. Since our classification of production 
activities also encompasses projects dedicated to natural resource extraction, it is crucial 
that we also control for the share of all investment projects (greenfield plus M&A) that 
focus on natural resources. LACs’ resource wealth has been a factor attracting MNE 
activities (UNCTAD, 2015), but such projects are frequently assumed to provide limited 
opportunities for localized technological spillovers (Narula and Dunning, 2010; Phelps 
et al., 2015).
69
 This control is lagged by two years (in accordance with the lag applied to 
investment projects), while all other controls are lagged by one year.
70
 
d) Spatially lagged variables and absorptive capacity. In order to investigate whether 
regional knowledge creation benefits from inter-regional knowledge diffusion, we 
calculate spatially lagged variables of the three MNE investment types as well as R&D 
and population. We use spatially weighted averages of the corresponding variable in the 
four nearest neighbouring regions (i.e. excluding region i).
71
 While the relevance of 
face-to-face contacts to knowledge diffusion (Storper and Venables, 2004) suggests that 
proximity to innovation hubs constitutes a strategic advantage, previous research shows 
that the prevalence of inter-regional spillovers varies vastly across contexts (Crescenzi 
et al., 2007 and 2012; Crescenzi and Jaax, 2016).  
After the main analysis, which relies on the specification described by equation (1), we 
explore the role of absorptive capacity. Since R&D efforts are considered as crucial for 
the build-up of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), in this ancillary step 
                                                 
68
 Due to data constraints, we are unable to control for the share of industry in total GVA in Colombian 
regions. 
69
 In exploratory regressions, we also entered the logarithm of natural resource investment projects as an 
explanatory variable. Not surprisingly, the coefficient was statistically insignificant.  
70
 For descriptive statistics, see tables 2.A.6-2.A.11 in the appendix. 
71
 Since the regions in the three countries included in our analysis differ vastly in area, a weight-matrix 
based on a distance-threshold would be problematic. A low threshold might create unconnected 
observations, whereas a distance chosen to guarantee a minimum of one neighbour might inflate the 
number of small regions’ neighbours (Anselin, 2002). Simple contiguity weights may introduce bias due 
to heterogeneity in the number of neighbours. The k-neighbours scheme is therefore the most suitable 
choice.  
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we add interactions of MNE investment projects with regional R&D. Furthermore, 
human capital has been highlighted, e.g. for the case of Brazil (Poole, 2013), as a key 
determinant of the ability to absorb knowledge inputs from MNEs. We therefore also 
test interactions of MNE investment projects with regional human capital in auxiliary 
regressions.  
2.6 Results of the main empirical analysis 
 
We start our analysis by examining the link between patenting, regional R&D efforts, 
human capital endowment, and all FDI projects, i.e. all greenfield and M&A projects 
combined. Table 2.3 presents the results of these first exploratory regressions for all 
three countries. We use three different dependent variables: all PCT applications 
(columns 1, 4), PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors (columns 2, 5), 
and PCT applications where all inventors are domestic citizens and all applicants (i.e. 
owners of patents) are domestic residents (columns 3, 6).
 72
   
2.6.1 Regional characteristics and FDI projects as a whole 
Table 2.3.1 presents the results for Brazil. There is a clear positive link between R&D 
efforts and patenting. Although this association is stronger than the one observed in 
China and India (Crescenzi et al., 2012), it is only marginally statistically significant in 
most specifications. This may indicate that a substantial share of R&D is dedicated to 
activities – including build-up of absorptive capacity – that are not directly generating 
patents. We also identify signs of an important role played by human capital; 
statistically significant (10%-level) in columns 1-3. While this result resonates with 
research emphasizing human capital’s relevance to Brazilian regions’ economic growth 
(Mendes Resende, 2011; Özyurt and Daumal, 2013), the low level of significance in 
columns 1-3 and lack of statistical significance once we add total FDI projects (columns 
4-6) points to a potential suboptimal use of human capital in local innovative processes.  
                                                 
72
 As we move from the total PCT count towards more restrictive counts, the average number of 
applications at the regional level becomes smaller. In Brazil, the mean count of total PCT applications is 
14.3, for the count with exclusively domestic inventors it is 12.98, and for the most restrictive count that 
excludes patents with foreign-based applicants it is 10.96. Mexico (4.58, 4.10, 3.32) and Colombia (1.10, 
1.04, 0.89) display similar patterns. 
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Table 2.3 Regional R&D efforts, human capital, and all FDI projects 
2.3.1 Brazil 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All PCT 
patents 
Excluding 
foreign 
inventors 
Excluding 
foreign 
inventors 
and 
foreign 
applicants 
All PCT 
patents 
Excluding 
foreign 
inventors 
Excluding 
foreign 
inventors 
and 
foreign 
applicants 
R&D 0.074** 0.065* 0.072* 0.062* 0.054 0.061* 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) 
Human capital 0.027* 0.026* 0.025* 0.017 0.017 0.016 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
FDI (Greenfield +     0.275*** 0.262*** 0.248*** 
M&A)    (0.086) (0.087) (0.082) 
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Adjusted R-squared 0.874 0.875 0.873 0.883 0.883 0.881 
 
2.3.2 Mexico 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D 0.270*** 0.287*** 0.284*** 0.243*** 0.261*** 0.259*** 
 (0.090) (0.085) (0.087) (0.072) (0.070) (0.072) 
Human capital 0.067*** 0.065** 0.075*** 0.054** 0.053** 0.063** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) 
FDI (Greenfield +     0.333*** 0.319*** 0.309*** 
M&A)    (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) 
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 
Adjusted R-squared 0.698 0.691 0.643 0.733 0.725 0.677 
 
2.3.3 Colombia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Human capital 0.094*** 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
FDI (Greenfield +     0.043 0.057 0.034 
M&A)    (0.094) (0.092) (0.089) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Adjusted R-squared 0.759 0.758 0.706 0.758 0.758 0.704 
All regressions include the following additional variables: total population, sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region 
dummies, linear trends. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at regional level) in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Full tables of results available upon request. 
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Overall, we find that regional-level heterogeneity in local inputs to knowledge 
generation processes helps to explain Brazilian regions’ patenting performance. This 
result is in line with recent bibliometric findings that highlight the growing importance 
of domestic resources to Brazil’s knowledge creation (Ponomariov and Toivanen, 
2014). Yet, we find a considerably stronger link between patenting and FDI projects 
(columns 4-6), suggesting that connections to global pipelines via MNEs enhance 
Brazilian regions’ patenting performance. As one would expect, the coefficient size 
becomes smaller when we exclude foreign inventors (column 5) and exclude foreign 
inventors as well as foreign-based applicants (column 6). However, even when we 
choose the most restrictive dependent variable, the coefficient is still of a roughly 
similar size and highly statistically significant: This suggests that we are not simply 
capturing the registration of inventions made by foreigners working for MNEs in Brazil. 
This result corroborates the importance of extra-local linkages (Maskell, 2014) but 
seems at odds with sceptical discussions of MNEs’ contribution to knowledge 
production in Brazil that draw on data for the late 1990s and early 2000s. According to 
Zucoloto and Toneto (2005) and Hiratuka (2007), subsidiaries and industries with large 
MNE presence in Brazil display limited involvement in innovative activities. However, 
Kannebley et al. (2005) report signs of a growing role of MNEs in Brazil’s knowledge 
creation. A recent study (Lema et al., 2015: 1384) focused on automotive clusters 
concludes that MNEs “have delegated major innovation functions to their subsidiaries”.  
Table 2.3.2 shows the results of the same regressions for Mexico. The broad picture is 
similar, although there are several differences. Regarding local aspects, there is a highly 
significant, positive link between R&D efforts
73
 and patenting. While we cannot rule 
out differential data quality as a factor explaining the higher significance compared to 
Brazil, this result is noteworthy in view of frequent references to Brazil’s substantially 
higher R&D intensity (IDB, 2010). The type of R&D captured by our Mexican data 
seems to be allocated in an innovation-enhancing way. The strength of the association is 
similar to the one observed in advanced economies, e.g. the U.S. (Crescenzi et al., 
2007). Similarly, regional human capital displays a strong association with regional 
patenting. The role of global pipelines is clearly visible; the corresponding coefficient of 
                                                 
73
 R&D efforts are proxied by the number of members of the national Mexican system of researchers. 
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all FDI projects is highly significant and slightly larger in size compared to Brazil. 
Similar to Brazil’s case, the coefficient of FDI becomes slightly smaller but does not 
lose significance when we use more restrictive dependent variables (columns 5, 6). In 
view of the sceptical voices that cast doubt on MNEs’ contribution to knowledge 
generation in Mexico (e.g. Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007; Keller, 2010), this strong link is 
surprising.  
While the Mexican results include signs of a relatively mature innovation system, the 
situation is different in the Colombian case (Table 2.3.3). Regional R&D efforts are not 
a statistically significant predictor of patenting performance, resembling findings for 
China and India (Crescenzi et al., 2012). Enterprises’ share of total Colombian R&D 
has fallen from 30% in the late 1990s to 25% in 2011-2012.
74
 Salazar (2008) 
emphasizes insufficient integration of private firms in public R&D projects as a factor 
hampering Colombia’s innovative performance. A substantial share of the resources that 
businesses dedicate to R&D is not performed as intramural R&D but outsourced to 
external partners (OECD, 2014). The disadvantages of an organizational separation of 
innovative activities from production, especially obstacles to knowledge diffusion, are 
well-documented (Radošević, 1997). Furthermore, the allocation of public R&D 
resources is increasingly linked to regional patterns of economic deprivation in 
Colombia. This implies that regions with high poverty or unemployment rates receive 
larger financial support regarding R&D. As highlighted by Salazar et al. (2014), in most 
cases, these are the regions with the lowest technological capabilities. It therefore 
appears plausible that a considerable share of Colombian public R&D primarily 
promotes absorptive capacity and fundamental R&D infrastructure, rather than 
inventions near the technological frontier that could lead to PCT patents. The 
insignificant coefficient of R&D may simultaneously reflect that the use of patents to 
protect intellectual property is still less common in Colombia than in more advanced 
LACs (Montobbio, 2007).  
Yet, regional endowment with human capital displays a strong and highly significant 
link with patenting performance at the regional level in Colombia. Science and 
                                                 
74
 With a growing part of Colombia’s innovative activities carried out by public and quasi-public 
agencies, the OECD (2014: 84) highlights that “Colombia has been moving in the opposite direction from 
that followed by some of the more dynamic Asian economies in the late 20th century”. 
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engineering degrees as a share of all Colombian tertiary degrees are close to OECD 
levels (IDB, 2010). However, apart from leading universities, few lecturers hold PhDs 
(OECD, 2014). According to our results, regional human capital is nevertheless well-
connected to innovation processes and recent governmental efforts to improve 
universities are therefore addressing an important and promising lever.  
Regarding MNEs’ activities, we do not detect a statistically significant association 
between patenting and FDI projects (columns 4-6). This may partly reflect the type of 
MNE activities that Colombia attracts. While Mexico (and Costa Rica) display deep 
integration into GPNs via manufacturing (especially in electronics), Colombia 
predominantly acts as an exporter of resource-based intermediates (ECLAC, 2013). Its 
domestic market and natural resource endowments are important aspects motivating 
MNEs to invest in Colombia, whereas the share of high-tech products in Colombia’s 
manufacturing exports is only roughly half of Brazil’s and about a third of Mexico’s.75  
2.6.2 Disaggregating MNE projects by mode of entry and subsidiary 
function 
Having taken a look at the aggregate picture, we now explore the role of global 
pipelines in more detail. Table 2.4 displays results of regressions for three categories of 
greenfield projects and three categories of M&A projects. The table’s structure is 
symmetric: we first look at ALL greenfield (column 1), PROD greenfield (column 2), 
and HQ&INNO greenfield (column 3), before replicating the same steps for M&A. All 
regressions use PCT applications with purely domestic inventors as the dependent 
variable.
76
  
 
 
                                                 
75
 More specifically, 10.5% of Brazil’s manufacturing exports, 16.3% of Mexico’s manufacturing exports, 
and 5.2% of Colombia’s manufacturing exports were categorized as high-tech exports in 2012 according 
to the World Bank (WDI, 2016). This categorization is based on the R&D intensity of individual 
products. Note that high-tech exports from emerging countries, especially in the context of expanding 
GPNs, are not always a precise indicator of the country’s level of technological capabilities (Baldwin, 
2011). 
76
 Given the central role of individuals as carriers of knowledge (Zucker at al., 1998), this variable 
appears highly relevant to potential effects of MNE activities on regional innovation capabilities. In line 
with the results presented in Table 2.3, regressions using either all PCT or PCT application without 
foreign inventors and without foreign applicants provide very similar results.  
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Table 2.4 Disaggregation of MNE projects by entry mode and business function 
 
Table 2.4.1 Brazil 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ALL Greenfield 0.234**      
 (0.089)      
PROD Greenfield  0.213**     
  (0.077)     
HQ&INNO Greenfield   0.402***    
   (0.093)    
ALL M&A    0.299***   
    (0.100)   
PROD M&A     0.275***  
     (0.097)  
HQ&INNO M&A      0.554*** 
      (0.148) 
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Adjusted R-squared 0.881 0.880 0.890 0.884 0.883 0.883 
 
 
Table 2.4.2 Mexico 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ALL Greenfield 0.293***      
 (0.063)      
PROD Greenfield  0.252***     
  (0.063)     
HQ&INNO Greenfield   0.336***    
   (0.105)    
ALL M&A    0.312***   
    (0.075)   
PROD M&A     0.302***  
     (0.073)  
HQ&INNO M&A      0.385* 
      (0.196) 
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 
Adjusted R-squared 0.720 0.711 0.708 0.715 0.712 0.697 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1. All regressions also include R&D, 
human capital, population, sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region dummies, linear trends. A constant is included 
but not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at regional level) in parentheses. 
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Table 2.4.3 Colombia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ALL Greenfield 0.056      
 (0.093)      
PROD Greenfield  -0.004     
  (0.106)     
HQ&INNO Greenfield   0.311**    
   (0.127)    
ALL M&A    0.274***   
    (0.078)   
PROD M&A     0.205***  
     (0.071)  
HQ&INNO M&A      0.081 
      (0.134) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Adjusted R-squared 0.758 0.757 0.768 0.768 0.761 0.757 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1. All regressions also include 
population, R&D, human capital, sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region dummies, linear trends. A constant is 
included but not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at regional level) in parentheses. 
 
Table 2.4.1 presents the results for Brazil. While all categories of MNE projects are 
positively associated with patenting and statistically significant, there are discernible 
differences across functions and entry modes. The coefficient of ALL (column 1) is 
similar to the one of PROD (column 2); this can be explained by the fact that 
production-related projects account for 45.9% of all MNE greenfield projects in Brazil 
during 2003-20012. The coefficient of the most knowledge-intensive type of greenfield 
projects, HQ&INNO (column 3), is nearly twice as large as the one of projects 
dedicated to production activities (column 2). With respect to the advanced 
technological capabilities proxied by PCT patenting, the establishment of subsidiaries 
dedicated to production activities appears to be associated with a smaller likelihood of 
knowledge spillovers than the activities of subsidiaries focusing on the most 
knowledge-intensive functions.  
The same pattern emerges from the regressions using different categories of M&A 
projects, with the point estimate of HQ&INNO (column 6) roughly twice as large as the 
one of PROD (column 5). These estimates strongly suggest that knowledge-intensive 
FDI boosts regional patenting in Brazil. This echoes earlier research that identified 
greater spillover potential when subsidiaries conducted innovative activities (Marin and 
Bell, 2006; Marin and Sasidharan; 2010). Importantly, the dependent variable excludes 
patents listing any non-Brazilian investors. We therefore capture Brazilian inventions 
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owned by Brazilian firms and Brazilian inventions owned by local MNE affiliates. The 
latter case corresponds to Lema et al.’s (2015) description of autonomous, knowledge-
intensive subsidiaries in Brazil’s automotive sector. According to Jindra et al. (2009), 
this type of subsidiary is most likely to form innovation-enhancing local linkages. 
Moreover, the coefficient sizes for M&A projects are larger than the corresponding 
coefficients of greenfield projects – in all three categories. Our findings are in line with 
a situation where M&A projects, compared to greenfield projects, provide a more direct 
channel for knowledge flows to local agents. This resonates with Narula and Dunning’s 
(2010) surmise that M&A projects’ deeper local embeddedness, compared to “fresh” 
greenfield investments, may provide greater spillover potential. Our findings also 
suggest that M&A projects during 2003-2012 played a different role from the one 
described by Koeller and Cassiolato (2009: 47) for the1990s, when “local innovative 
firms were acquired by subsidiaries of MNEs that, as part of their strategies, 
downgraded the technological activities carried out locally”. While our data do not 
capture post-acquisition changes in firm-level R&D intensity, our findings suggest that 
M&A projects enhanced regional patenting in Brazil during 2003-2012.  
The results for Mexico (Table 2.4.2) are broadly similar to the Brazilian findings. 
Again, all categories of MNE activities are positive and statistically significant 
predictors of regional patenting. Against the backdrop of the debate about foreign-
owned production facilities in Mexico, it is noteworthy that MNE projects dedicated to 
production activities (columns 2, 5) emerge as factors contributing to regional patenting 
performance in Mexico. Export-oriented assembly plants heavily relying on imported 
inputs (mostly from the U.S.), known as maquiladoras, are often cited as an example of 
foreign-owned activities unlikely to generate substantial technological spillovers 
(Keller, 2010). The first maquiladoras were set up in the 1960s. There is a wide-spread 
view that their mandate still barley goes beyond basic assembly tasks. Interpreting 
interviews conducted in Jalisco during 2003-2005, Gallagher and Zarsky (2007: 146) 
conclude that “foreign IT firms in Guadalajara occupy a relatively low-skilled niche in 
the global electronics value chain”. Contrasting Mexico’s experience with that of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, Hanson (2010: 1000) deplores “Mexico's failure to graduate from 
export assembly”.  
Yet, there are important nuances in the literature. Several contributions identify 
potential signs of increasingly technology-intensive, embedded subsidiaries. Iammarino 
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et al. (2008: 1980) diverge from Gallgher and Zarsky’s (2007) judgement and identify 
strong linkages of MNE affiliates in Jalisco’s electronics sector. These authors infer that 
a “process of cumulative causation involving MNE subsidiaries as a major actor has 
stimulated the upgrading of technological capabilities”. Similarly, Llisteri et al. (2011) 
report that a manufacturing plant opened by Canadian aircraft producer Bombardier in 
Querétaro played a key role in the emergence of a local aerospace cluster.
77
 
Furthermore, China’s emergence as a manufacturing powerhouse may have influenced 
the knowledge-intensity of foreign-owned production activities in Mexico. Sargent and 
Matthews (2006), examining subsidiary roles in the northern border state of 
Tamaulipas, report examples of subsidiary managers successfully lobbying for the 
upgrading of their plant after transfers of routinized activities to low-wage Asian 
locations (mostly China). Their findings suggest that China’s rise may have triggered a 
reshuffling of global production networks (GPNs): While relocations from Mexico to 
Asia forced many maquiladoras to shut down in the early 2000s, a part of the foreign-
owned facilities in Mexico received new mandates to produce increasingly complex 
products that had previously been manufactured in the U.S. Further evidence in line 
with upgrading of foreign-owned production facilities in Mexico comes from Utar and 
Ruiz (2013). Analysing plant-level data for 1990-2006, they find that exposure to 
Chinese competition causes maquiladoras to increase productivity, skill-intensity, and 
R&D efforts. If this trend similarly applies to newly established production plants of 
MNEs, the highly significant coefficient of PROD may reflect that production-focused 
subsidiaries in Mexico increasingly adopt more sophisticated roles within corporate 
networks.  
The differences in coefficient sizes between PROD (columns 2, 5) and HQ&INNO 
(columns 3, 6) are less pronounced than in the Brazilian case. Given Mexico’s relatively 
sophisticated manufacturing exports
78
, and the above-mentioned tentative signs of 
upgrading, it seems that foreign-owned production activities in Mexico during our 
period of analysis (2003-2012) might be more knowledge-intensive than frequently 
                                                 
77
 In addition, numerous aerospace suppliers linked to large MNEs (including Boeing) have established 
production facilities in Querétaro, Baja California, and Chihuahua, driving the rapid rise “of an aerospace 
industry that was close to non-existent one and half decades ago” in Mexico (González, 2014: 300).  
78
 After Costa Rica, Mexico’s manufacturing exports contain the highest share of products categorized as 
high-technology (16.3% in 2012) in Latin America (WDI, 2016). 
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assumed in the literature and possibly more sophisticated than in Brazil’s case. 
Although the difference in coefficient sizes for PROD between Brazil and Mexico is 
relatively small, one way of reading it relates to the countries’ trade patterns. Several 
authors argue that innovative capabilities are shaped by the sophistication of exports 
and the technological development stage of target markets (Hausmann et al., 2007; de la 
Torre et al., 2016). Mexico’s exports encompass a larger share of high-tech goods and 
the U.S. are Mexico’s main trading partner. Conversely, Brazil increasingly exports 
commodities and China is the main recipient (Costa et al., 2016). 
Conversely, the large coefficient size for HQ&INNO in the Brazilian case – slightly 
larger than in the Mexican results – might be related to the fact that Brazil is often 
described as the frontrunner in terms of innovation within Latin America (IDB, 2010). 
This reputation may enable Brazil to attract particularly knowledge-intensive projects in 
the HQ&INNO category, such as the new R&D lab of General Electric in Rio de 
Janiero. Interestingly, the differences between the coefficients of greenfield and M&A 
are smaller in Mexico than in Brazil. While this point requires more thorough 
examination future research, it may relate to Mexico’s extensive experience as a host of 
foreign-owned production activities: regional policies to align the activities of domestic 
agents and integrate MNEs in the regional economy, as described by Iammarino et al. 
(2008) in the case of MNEs in Jalisco’s electronics sector, may help Mexican regions to 
lower the gap between greenfield projects and M&A projects in terms of embeddedness.  
The Colombian results (Table 2.4.3) shed light on the importance of taking into account 
subsidiaries’ heterogeneity. Greenfield FDI as a whole (ALL, column 1) does not seem 
to enhance regional innovation capabilities in Colombia; the coefficient of PROD is not 
statistically significant, either. Regarding greenfield projects, only the coefficient of 
HQ&INNO FDI is statistically significant and positive. As mentioned above, this 
pattern is likely to be shaped by the type of MNE activities that Colombia attracts. 
Subsidiaries dedicated to sales, marketing and retail accounted for nearly half of all 
greenfield projects during 2003-2012 (see Table 2.A.5 in the Appendix). The share of 
projects focused on production activities is substantially lower in Colombia (23%) than 
in Brazil (46%) and Mexico (58%). While electronics and automotive account for a 
large share of greenfield PROD projects in Brazil and Mexico, oil and gas extraction 
and telecommunications play an important role with respect to production-related 
greenfield projects in Colombia (see Table 2.A.3 in the Appendix). Aspects related to 
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the sectoral composition of FDI are hence potential reasons why ALL greenfield 
projects and PROD greenfield projects do not appear to contribute to regional 
knowledge generation in Colombia.  
Interestingly, we observe the opposite pattern for M&A projects in Colombia: The 
coefficients of ALL (column 4) and PROD (column 5) are positive and statistically 
significant, whereas the most knowledge-intensive category is not statistically 
significant. A closer look at the composition of the projects in these categories provides 
further insights: the sectoral background of ALL M&A as well PROD M&A projects in 
Colombia is different form the greenfield projects in the same categories, with chemical 
manufacturing and electronics accounting for a larger share of the M&A projects. In 
addition, the HQ&INNO category for M&A projects incorporates many projects in 
financial services, media, and retail, making it plausible that we do not observe a strong 
link with patenting (compare Table 2.A.3 in the Appendix).  
 
2.6.3 Results regarding inter-regional knowledge spillovers 
In the third step of our main analysis, we explore the role of inter-regional knowledge 
spillovers. We extend equation (1) by adding spatially weighted variables (based on a 4-
nearest neighbours matrix)
79
 for neighbouring regions’ R&D efforts, MNE investment 
projects, and population (to capture proximity to large regional economies). The macro 
region dummies used in the previous steps of our analysis are likely to capture part of 
the inter-regional spillovers that we intend to explore by entering the spatially weighted 
variables. We therefore do not include macro region dummies in the regressions focused 
on inter-regional spillovers. 
                                                 
79
 We also experimented with alternative numbers of neighbours. The overall pattern is similar for 3-
nearest neighbours, whereas signs of spillovers become weaker when using 5-nearest and largely 
disappear when using 6 or more neighbours to calculate the spatial weights (which is in line with 
distance-decay effects).  
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Table 2.5 Inter-regional spillovers 
Table 2.5.1 Greenfield 
 
 Brazil Mexico Colombia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
W R&D 0.174* 0.194* 0.205** 0.017 0.066 0.059 0.028* 0.029* 0.023* 
 (0.090) (0.099) (0.088) (0.194) (0.163) (0.157) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) 
W ALL  0.070**   0.036   0.016   
Greenfield (0.030)   (0.131)   (0.126)   
W PROD   0.270**   -0.080   -0.016  
Greenfield  (0.126)   (0.169)   (0.192)  
W HQ&INNO    0.529**   0.013   -0.182 
Greenfield   (0.197)   (0.065)   (0.247) 
Observations 216 216 216 256 256 256 192 192 192 
Adj. R-squ. 0.826 0.821 0.841 0.697 0.689 0.682 0.744 0.742 0.763 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1. All regressions include the following 
additional variables: total population, R&D, human capital, non-spatially lagged MNE investment counts of the corresponding 
category, spatially weighted population, sectoral controls, year dummies, linear trends. A constant is included but not reported. 
Robust standard errors (clustered at regional level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.5.2 M&A. 
 
 Brazil Mexico Colombia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
W R&D 0.216*** 0.229*** 0.242** 0.037 0.042 0.055 0.024* 0.026* 0.030** 
 (0.076) (0.079) (0.104) (0.174) (0.169) (0.159) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
W ALL M&A 0.370**   -0.073   -0.055   
 (0.142)   (0.202)   (0.185)   
W PROD   0.387**   -0.089   -0.032  
M&A  (0.147)   (0.187)   (0.177)  
W HQ&INNO    0.231   -0.065   -0.136 
M&A   (0.292)   (0.244)   (0.242) 
Observations 216 216 216 256 256 256 192 192 192 
Adj. R-squ. 0.842 0.839 0.819 0.681 0.680 0.668 0.758 0.748 0.746 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1. All regressions include the following 
additional variables: total population, R&D, human capital, non-spatially lagged MNE investment counts of the corresponding 
category, spatially weighted population, sectoral controls, year dummies, linear trends. A constant is included but not reported. 
Robust standard errors (clustered at regional level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.5.1 provides the results for neighbours’ R&D and spatially weighted greenfield 
projects for all three countries, while Table 2.5.2 lists the findings for spatially weighted 
M&A projects. In the Brazilian case, we obtain statistically significant, positive 
coefficients for neighbours’ R&D (columns 1-3 Table 2.5.1 and Table 2.5.2). This 
suggests that knowledge flows across regional boundaries contribute to knowledge 
generation in Brazilian regions. The coefficients of the spatially weighted variables of 
all types of MNE investments are also positive and – with the exception of neighbours’ 
HQ&INNO M&A (column 3, Table 2.5.2) – statistically significant. Overall, we find 
that interregional knowledge spillovers resulting from MNEs’ investments play a 
significant role in shaping Brazil’s geography of patenting. 
Interestingly, when using macro region dummies, we do not detect any significant signs 
of spillovers from neighbours’ R&D and MNE projects across regional boundaries (not 
reported). In Brazil regional spillovers therefore appear to operate within macro regions. 
This finding resonates with the study conducted by Goncalves and Almeida (2009), who 
find evidence that inter-regional spillovers diffusing via a dense network of medium-
sized cities are a key factor in Brazil’s southeast. 
The situation looks substantially different in Mexico. Irrespective of whether we enter 
macro region dummies, we do not find evidence of inter-regional spillovers. Our 
finding is in accordance with very limited co-patenting across regional boundaries in 
Mexico highlighted by the OECD (2009b). Proximity to neighbours receiving high 
numbers of production-focused FDI or M&A projects (of all three categories) is even 
negatively correlated with patenting. Although these negative coefficients are not 
statistically significant, they resemble the picture identified in China, where strong 
innovation hubs appear to attract resources from nearby regions and thereby cause 
shadow effects (Crescenzi et al., 2012). In the Colombian case, we find – similar to the 
Brazilian results – signs of knowledge diffusion within macro regions. Proximity to 
regions with large R&D investments is positively correlated with patenting 
performance. There is no evidence of positive spillovers from MNE projects in 
neighbouring regions, though.  
A multifaceted picture hence emerges from our analysis of inter-regional knowledge 
spillovers: Brazil displays strong signs of knowledge circulation within macro regions, 
potentially providing a mechanism for the diffusion of knowledge obtained from global 
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pipelines. Macro regions are also a relevant level for knowledge diffusion in Colombia 
– although predominantly for spillovers from R&D efforts. In Mexico the innovation 
system appears to be highly fragmented, with few signs of interactions and knowledge 
diffusion across regional borders. 
2.6.4 Results regarding absorptive capacity 
In an ancillary part of our analysis, we explore the role of regional R&D efforts and 
human capital in mediating regions’ capacity to translate inputs received via global 
pipelines into enhanced patenting performance. We first interact all categories of MNE 
investment projects with regional R&D. In the Brazilian case (Table 2.A.12, in the 
Appendix) a positive and statistically significant association is identified for all 
categories of MNE projects, suggesting that larger regional R&D efforts facilitate the 
absorption of new inputs obtained via global pipelines. When using Mexican data 
(Table 2.A.13), the interaction is only statistically significant in the case of ALL 
greenfield and PROD greenfield. The lack of statistical significance for HQ&INNO 
might point to threshold effects, as the average level of R&D efforts is 23% higher 
among those Mexican regions that attract HQ&INNO projects. Regarding M&A 
projects in Mexico, the fact that the interaction with R&D is not significant is 
surprising. A deep local embeddedness of Mexican firms that get acquired by or merge 
with MNEs could explain this result. If these target firms are very well-connected to 
regional agents, including other firms and research institutes, this might reduce the 
relative importance of regional R&D efforts for the absorption of foreign technology. 
The Colombian results (Table 2.A.14) resemble the Brazilian findings, indicating that 
regional R&D efforts influence a region’s likelihood to benefit from access to extra-
local knowledge. As a second way of shedding descriptive light on the relevance of 
absorptive capacity, we interact all types of MNE investment projects with regional 
human capital (Tables 2.A.15, 2.A.16, 2.A.17 in the Appendix). The coefficients of 
these interactions are also positive. However, they are less precisely estimated and not 
always statistically significant, especially in the Mexican case (Table 2.A.16).  
Overall, the findings of this ancillary part of our analysis are in harmony with 
contributions stressing the importance of absorptive capacity, i.e. complementary 
knowledge required to decipher and utilize new knowledge. This interpretation of our 
findings is grounded on conceptual (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and empirical (e.g. 
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Zhou and Xin, 2003; Poole, 2013) literature. At the same time, one must bear in mind 
that the coefficient of these interaction terms may simultaneously reflect MNEs’ 
tendency to locate more knowledge-intensive activities in technologically advanced 
regions (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2003; Iammarino and McCann, 2013). 
2.6.5 Additional check: production activities in manufacturing 
industries 
As discussed in section 5, our categorization of business functions is not tied to a 
specific set of sectors. Therefore, the regression results regarding production activities 
presented in Table 2.4 rely on counts of MNE projects that also consider non-
manufacturing activities, e.g. construction, as part of the business function “production” 
(PROD). Given that a large share of the relevant literature focuses on the manufacturing 
sector, we test the robustness of our results for PROD investment projects to the 
exclusion of non-manufacturing investments. The findings (see Table 2.A.18 in the 
Appendix) are, overall, similar to the ones presented in Table 2.4. Particularly for M&A 
projects dedicated to production activities, the coefficient size is larger when we 
exclude non-manufacturing projects. While this aspect requires further investigation in 
future research, it may indicate that non-manufacturing investments in the PROD 
category are of limited relevance to the technological capabilities measured by PCT 
applications.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
This paper set out to explore the interplay of diverse regional conditions and access to 
heterogeneous global pipelines in shaping the geography of patenting in Brazil, Mexico, 
and Colombia. These three large economies account for a substantial share of 
knowledge production in Latin America and simultaneously represent different levels of 
technological development and types of integration in the global economy. Drawing on 
a large dataset covering a period (2003-2012) characterized by a deepening of many 
Latin American regions’ integration in global production networks, our analysis 
identified important similarities as well as differences between these three countries. 
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Regional endowment with human capital plays a crucial role in shaping regional 
knowledge creation – this link is clearly visible even in the least mature innovation 
system, Colombia. With macroeconomic stability having dominated the policy debate in 
many LACs for a long time (Mendoza-González et al., 2013), the promotion of human 
capital should be considered as an essential element of the efforts to improve innovative 
performance in Latin American regions. Recent initiatives, such as Brazil’s Science 
without Borders programme to promote the international mobility of students and 
researchers (WEF, 2015), certainly go in the right direction. 
Indigenous R&D acts as a strongly significant predictor of patenting in Mexico only. In 
addition to weak inter-organizational linkages and an emphasis on public R&D 
(especially in Colombia’s case), this finding may reflect the importance of R&D 
investments dedicated to the build-up of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990) in less mature innovation systems. The role of regional R&D efforts is likely to 
evolve as regional economies pass through different stages of technological 
development, with strong direct effects on the creation of new knowledge more 
common at relatively advanced stages (Goñi and Maloney, 2014; Navarro et al., 2016).  
Our results suggest that multinational enterprises act as global channels for knowledge 
flows, providing Latin American regions with valuable technological inputs. Important 
details were identified regarding the relevance of subsidiary mandates and MNEs’ entry 
mode. Adopting a categorization of business functions inspired by Sturgeon (2008), we 
identify patterns indicating that the heterogeneity of subsidiaries is a key factor 
influencing the likelihood of positive effects on regional technological capabilities. 
MNE investment projects as a whole (i.e. irrespective of function and entry mode) are 
strong predictors of patenting in Mexico and Brazil only. In line with previous research 
on subsidiary roles (Jindra et al., 2009), we find in all three countries that the most 
knowledge-intensive functions of greenfield as well as M&A investment projects – 
R&D and strategic activities typically conducted by HQs – are most likely to enhance 
regional patenting. In view of these findings, the persistent concentration of the most 
knowledge-intensive MNE activities in the leading regions in these countries can be 
expected to contribute to diverging trajectories of technological development at the 
regional level. As the spatial concentration of economic activities in many LACs is 
increasingly perceived as an impediment to growth (Atienza and Aroca, 2013), our 
results indicate that efforts to increase second- and third-tier regions’ attractiveness as 
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locations for knowledge-intensive MNE investments should be part of the set of policies 
aimed at reducing regional disparities.   
M&A projects – although often unpopular among patriots and politicians – display a 
strongly positive, statistically significant association with patenting in all three 
economies. In most cases, this link is stronger than the one observed for greenfield 
projects dedicated to the same function. As suggested by Narula and Dunning (2010), 
the deeper local embeddedness may facilitate the diffusion of knowledge inputs via this 
type of global pipelines. Our findings differ considerably from descriptions of M&A 
during earlier waves of FDI in Latin America (Koeller and Cassiolato, 2009) that 
observed negative effects on regional technological capabilities. In the light of our 
findings, policy-makers intending to ameliorate the sluggish innovative performance of 
many Latin American regions should take into account the potential benefits of M&A 
projects. While more detailed research into the underlying micro-level dynamics is still 
required, our results suggest that the “organic” embeddedness of M&A projects may 
help to address the well-known problem of insufficient linkages of foreign-owned plants 
to regional economies in LACs (Padilla-Pérez and Martínez-Piva, 2009).  
Foreign-owned activities dedicated to production activities act as a particularly strong 
predictor of patenting in the Mexican case. Although we do not intend to claim that 
foreign-owned enclaves (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007) no longer exist in Mexico, our 
findings clearly demonstrate that both regional resources and global pipelines contribute 
to knowledge creation in Mexican regions. These results also resonate with research 
suggesting that foreign-owned production plants in Mexico may have entered a process 
of technological upgrading after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 (Utar and Ruiz, 
2013). Our findings can simultaneously be interpreted as support for the literature that 
emphasizes the importance of a country’s export composition and trading partners 
(Hausmann et al., 2007; de la Torre et al., 2015). Mexico is deeply integrated into cross-
border production networks linked to the U.S., particularly in electronics (OECD, 
2016). In contrast, Colombia and Brazil appear to attract production activities for 
different reasons. Natural resources play an important role in Colombia, whereas Brazil 
receives market-seeking investments in plants serving the local as well as the broader 
Latin American market (ECLAC, 2013). Especially in Colombia, the type of production 
activities conducted by MNEs may provide limited potential for positive effects on the 
advanced technological capabilities measured by our dependent variable. In addition to 
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considering the heterogeneous functions and entry modes of subsidiaries, one therefore 
also has to take into account a country’s position in global production networks and 
export specialization when assessing the potential technological benefits associated with 
MNEs’ investments (Dahlman, 2006). 
Furthermore, our analysis casts light on weak channels for the diffusion of knowledge 
across regional boundaries in these three LACs. Particularly in the Mexican case, the 
absence of significant signs of localized spillovers resembles findings from the U.S. 
(Crescenzi et al., 2007), where large distances between major innovation hubs impede 
knowledge spillovers between regions. Efforts to create platforms for greater 
collaboration among regions - e.g. via a stronger institutionalizations of meso regions 
(OECD, 2009b) – should form part of the design of innovation policies in Latin 
American regions.  
An ancillary step of our analysis also sheds light on the factors mediating regions’ 
ability to translate knowledge obtained via global pipelines into enhanced patenting 
performance. Regional R&D efforts appear to act as a key determinant of the capacity 
to absorb foreign technology. Particularly in the Brazilian case, we also find clear signs 
that regional human capital shapes a region’s capacity to technologically benefit from 
MNE investment projects. In combination with our findings regarding the direct link 
between human capital and regional knowledge creation, this insight provides a strong 
rationale for policy-makers to further improve access to education and the quality of 
universities. The build-up of absorptive capacity is of pivotal importance to ensure that 
Latin American regions maximise the benefits associated with access to global 
pipelines.  
The results and the limitations of this paper provide ample inspiration for future 
research. Our analysis only captures new MNE investments. Data on the activities of 
existing subsidiaries would allow for additional research questions to be explored. 
Moreover, the methodology used in this study is not without its limitations. The 
innovative use of micro-level data on inventors’ nationality and the use of lags allow us 
to uncover insightful relationships. Yet, future research exploiting quasi-experimental 
settings might be able to come closer to the identification of causal relationships. As 
stressed in section 5, PCT applications only capture a subset of knowledge creation. 
Studies relying on firm-levels surveys, such as Brazil’s PINTEC survey, can help to 
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shed light on the micro dynamics and types of innovation that are not covered in this 
contribution.  
Moreover, we have only briefly considered sectoral aspects and export patterns. The 
growing interest in modern interpretations of industrial policy (Padilla-Pérez, 2014) 
warrants a closer examination of this dimension of heterogeneity. Related to the 
previous point, several national and regional governments in Latin America have moved 
from a linear approach to innovation towards an interactive, non-linear 
conceptualization of innovation processes (Rivas and Rovira, 2014; Navarro et al., 
2016) in the 2000s. Research linking the questions investigated in this paper to recent 
policy changes could reveal important insights regarding the effectiveness of new 
approaches to innovation policies.These aspects are on our agenda for future research.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 2.A.1 Evolution of greenfield investments and patenting in the top-10 
patenting regions in Brazil 
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Figure 2.A.2 Evolution of greenfield investments and patenting in the top-10 
patenting regions in Mexico 
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Figure 2.A.3 Evolution of greenfield investments and patenting in the top-10 
patenting regions in Colombia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
to
ta
l 
p
a
te
n
ti
n
g
 /
 F
D
I 
/ 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Region's ranking (in terms of share of total Colombian PCT patenting) 
Patenting 2003-2004 Patenting 2011-2012
 Greenfield FDI 2003-2004 Greenfield FDI 2011-2012
Population
 177 
 
Figure 2.A.4 Brazil: Maps showing distribution of key variables (averages 2003-2012) 
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Figure 2.A.5 Mexico: Maps showing distribution of key variables (averages 2003-2012) 
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Figure 2.A.6 Colombia: Maps showing distribution of key variables (averages 2003-2012) 
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Table 2.A.1  Sectoral composition of MNE investments in Brazil         
Greenfield  M&A 
      ALL  ALL 
NAICS code Description % of ALL  NAICS code Description % of ALL 
541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 9.6  541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 10.6 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 9.5  325 Chemical Manufacturing 5.3 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 8.0  311 Food Manufacturing 4.3 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 7.4  331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 4.3 
511 Publishing Industries (except Internet) 6.7  424 Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 3.8 
52 Finance and Insurance 6.7  333 Machinery Manufacturing 3.7 
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 5.9  336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 3.2 
311 Food Manufacturing 3.7  315 Apparel Manufacturing 3.0 
331  Primary Metal Manufacturing 3.7  332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 2.9 
517 Telecommunications 3.4  322 Paper Manufacturing 2.9 
PROD  PROD 
NAICS code Description % of PROD  NAICS code Description % of PROD 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 15.9  541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 8.1 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 11.2  325 Chemical Manufacturing 6.1 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 10.2  311 Food Manufacturing 5.1 
311 Food Manufacturing 6.9  331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 5.0 
331  Primary Metal Manufacturing 6.6  333 Machinery Manufacturing 4.3 
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 6.4  424 Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 4.2 
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 5.8  336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 3.6 
212 Mining and Quarrying (except Oil and Gas) 4.3  315 Apparel Manufacturing 3.5 
221 Utilities 4.0  332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 3.4 
721 Accommodation Services 3.2  322 Paper Manufacturing 3.4 
HQ&INNO  HQ&INNO 
NAICS code Description % of HQ&INNO  NAICS code Description % of HQ&INNO 
541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 36.0  541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 33.3 
52 Finance and Insurance 17.6  812 Personal and Laundry Services 13.1 
511 Publishing Industries (except Internet) 7.7  522 Credit Intermediation and Related Activities 6.1 
561 Administrative and Support Services 7.0  523 Securities, Commodity Contracts, Financial Investments  5.1 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 4.5  488 Support Activities for Transportation 5.1 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 4.3  512 Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 5.1 
611 Educational Services 3.6  561 Administrative and Support Services 5.1 
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 3.6  524 Insurance Carriers and Related Activities 4.0 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 2.6  423 Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 3.0 
517 Telecommunications 2.3  519 Other Information Services 3.0 
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Table 2.A.2 Sectoral composition of MNE investments in Mexico 
Greenfield  M&A 
      ALL  ALL 
NAICS code Description % of ALL  NAICS code Description % of ALL 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 16.3  331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 9.2 
541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 6.6  333 Machinery Manufacturing 6.7 
335 Electrical Equipment and Component Manufacturing 6.1  325 Chemical Manufacturing 4.8 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 5.6  336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 4.6 
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 4.9  332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 4.0 
511 Publishing Industries (except Internet) 4.3  424 Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 4.0 
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 4.2  423 Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 3.4 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 4.0  721 Accommodation Services 3.1 
212 Mining and Quarrying (except Oil and Gas) 3.9  311 Food Manufacturing 3.1 
52 Finance and Insurance 3.6  334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 3.0 
PROD  PROD 
NAICS code Description % of PROD  NAICS code Description % of PROD 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 26.4  331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 14.0 
335 Electrical Equipment and Component Manufacturing 9.5  333 Machinery Manufacturing 10.2 
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 7.2  325 Chemical Manufacturing 7.2 
212 Mining and Quarrying (except Oil and Gas) 7.1  336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 7.0 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 6.4  332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 6.2 
721 Accommodation Services 6.0  721 Accommodation Services 4.7 
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 5.0  311 Food Manufacturing 4.7 
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 4.3  334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 4.5 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 4.0  339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 4.0 
311 Food Manufacturing 3.4  111 Crop Production 3.8 
HQ&INNO  HQ&INNO 
NAICS code Description % of HQ&INNO  NAICS code Description % of HQ&INNO 
541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 36.3  541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 23.6 
52 Finance and Insurance 18.0  522 Credit Intermediation and Related Activities 20.8 
511 Publishing Industries (except Internet) 5.4  561 Administrative and Support Services 12.5 
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 5.1  425 Wholesale Electronic Markets and Brokers 12.5 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 4.8  523 Securities,  Financial Investments 8.3 
561 Administrative and Support Services 4.5  611 Educational Services 5.6 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 3.9  525 Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles 5.6 
335 Electrical Equipment and Component Manufacturing 2.3  519 Other Information Services 4.2 
517 Telecommunications 2.0  551 Management of Companies and Enterprises 1.4 
311 Food Manufacturing 2.0  517 Telecommunications 1.4 
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Table 2.A.3 Sectoral composition of MNE investments in Colombia 
Greenfield  M&A 
ALL  ALL 
NAICS code Description % of ALL  NAICS  Description % of ALL 
52 Finance and Insurance 9.3  311 Food Manufacturing 7.8 
541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 8.3  325 Chemical Manufacturing 7.3 
511 Publishing Industries (except Internet) 6.1  322 Paper Manufacturing 7.0 
445 Retail: Food and Beverage Stores  5.4  331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 6.3 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 5.3  315 Apparel Manufacturing 4.8 
517 Telecommunications 4.8  488 Support Activities for Transportation 4.6 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 4.6  111 Crop Production 3.9 
561 Administrative and Support Services 4.4  423 Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 3.4 
448 Retail: Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 4.0  522 Credit Intermediation and Related Activities 2.7 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 3.6  211 Oil and Gas Extraction 2.7 
PROD  PROD 
NAICS code Description % of PROD  NAICS  Description % of PROD 
211 Oil and Gas Extraction 10.4  322 Paper Manufacturing 16.8 
517 Telecommunications 9.5  311 Food Manufacturing 12.3 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 8.5  325 Chemical Manufacturing 10.2 
721 Accommodation Services 7.0  111 Crop Production 9.4 
212 Mining and Quarrying (except Oil and Gas) 6.5  331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 9.0 
324 Petroleum and Coal Product Manufacturing 6.0  332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 6.1 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 6.0  326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 5.7 
311 Food Manufacturing 5.0  211 Oil and Gas Extraction 4.5 
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 4.5  334 Computers, Electronic Product Manuf. 3.7 
221 Utilities 4.5  336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 3.7 
HQ&INNO  HQ&INNO 
NAICS code Description % of HQ&INNO  NAICS  Description % of HQ&INNO 
52 Finance and Insurance 32.8  331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 18.3 
541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 30.6  522 Credit Intermediation and Related Activities 9.8 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 6.5  512 Motion Picture and Sound Recording  8.5 
561 Administrative and Support Services 5.9  444 Building Material and Garden Equipment 8.5 
511 Publishing Industries (except Internet) 4.3  541 Professional, Scientific and Techn. Services 6.1 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 2.7  311 Food Manufacturing 6.1 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 2.2  211 Oil and Gas Extraction 4.9 
611 Educational Services 2.2  442 Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 4.9 
448 Retail: Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 1.6  312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 3.7 
237 Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 1.1  515 Broadcasting (except Internet) 3.7 
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Table 2.A.4 List of macro regions 
Brazil 
Macro region States 
North Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins 
Northeast Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio Grande 
Do Norte, Sergipe 
Central-West Federal District, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul 
Southeast Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janiero, São Paulo 
South Paraná, Rio Grande Do Sul, Santa Catarina 
 
Mexico 
Macro region States 
Northwest Baja California, Baja California Sur, Durango, Sinaloa, Sonora 
Northeast Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas 
West Aguascalientes, Colima, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit 
Southwest Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Varacruz 
Centre Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Morelos, México, Querétaro, San 
Luis Potosi 
South Campeche, Chiapas, Quinta Roo, Tabasco, Yucatán 
 
Colombia 
Macro region Departments 
Amazonia Oriental Amazonas, Guaviare, Guainia, Vaupes 
Bogota Cundinamarca Bogota, Cundinamarca 
Caribe Atlantico, Bolivar, Cesar, Cordoba, Guajira, Magdalena, San Andres y 
Providencia, Sucre 
Centro Oriente Arauca, Boyaca, Casanare, Meta, Norte de Santander, Santander, Vichada 
Eje Cafetero Antioquia, Caldas, Risaralda, Quindio 
Pacifico Cauca, Choco, Narino, Valle del Cauca 
Sur Macizo Caqueta, Huila, Tolima, Putumayo 
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Table 2.A.5 Distribution of MNE investment projects across business functions 
Brazil: Greenfield projects 
Period 
# All greenfield 
projects 
PROD (%) HQ&INNO (%) SALES (%) 
LOG&DIST 
(%) 
Natural 
resources 
(%) 
Whole period 
(2003-2012) 2555 45.9 21.7 29.3 3 4.3 
2003-2006 758 62.4 12.3 22.3 3 6.9 
2007-2010 936 42.5 24 30.3 3.1 3.7 
2011-2012 861 35.2 27.5 34.4 2.9 2.6 
Brazil: M&A projects 
Period 
# All M&A 
projects 
PROD (%) HQ&INNO (%) SALES (%) 
LOG&DIST 
(%) 
Natural 
resources 
(%) 
Whole period 
(2003-2012) 790 84.1 10.1 4.3 1.5 0.8 
2003-2006 245 90.6 6.9 0.8 1.6 0.6 
2007-2010 285 82.8 11.6 4.2 1.4 1.5 
2011-2012 260 79.2 11.5 7.7 1.5 0.4 
 
Mexico: Greenfield projects 
Period 
# All greenfield 
projects 
PROD (%) HQ&INNO (%) SALES (%) 
LOG&DIST 
(%) 
Natural 
resources 
(%) 
Whole period 
(2003-2012) 1988 57.5 13.4 23.4 5.6 5.7 
2003-2006 499 64.1 8.6 22.2 5.0 14.4 
2007-2010 980 53.6 14.9 25.4 6.1 2.7 
2011-2012 509 58.5 15.3 20.8 5.3 2.9 
Mexico: M&A projects 
Period 
# All M&A 
projects 
PROD (%) HQ&INNO (%) SALES (%) 
LOG&DIST 
(%) 
Natural 
resources 
(%) 
Whole period 
(2003-2012) 444 70.3 10.8 15.3 3.6 2.7 
2003-2006 230 77.0 9.1 11.3 2.6 2.6 
2007-2010 160 65.6 10.6 19.4 4.4 1.9 
2011-2012 54 55.6 18.5 20.4 5.6 5.2 
 
Colombia: Greenfield projects 
Period 
# All greenfield 
projects 
PROD (%) HQ&INNO (%) SALES (%) 
LOG&DIST 
(%) 
Natural 
resources 
(%) 
Whole period 
(2003-2012) 544 23.0 25.7 46.5 4.8 4.4 
2003-2006 104 29.8 12.5 53.8 3.8 4.8 
2007-2010 254 23.6 21.7 50.4 4.3 5.1 
2011-2012 186 18.3 38.7 37.1 5.9 3.2 
Colombia: M&A projects 
Period 
# All M&A 
projects 
PROD (%) HQ&INNO (%) SALES (%) 
LOG&DIST 
(%) 
Natural 
resources 
(%) 
Whole period 
(2003-2012) 189 40.2 22.2 19.0 18.5 9.0 
2003-2006 61 44.3 34.4 11.5 9.8 4.9 
2007-2010 81 40.7 8.6 23.5 27.2 11.1 
2011-2012 47 34.0 29.8 21.3 14.9 10.6 
 
Note that in the empirical analysis the share of total investment projects categorized as “Natural resources” is entered 
as a control. The counts of “SALES” and “LOG&DIST” are part of “ALL”. “Natural resources” is not a business 
function, therefore only columns 3 (PROD), 4 (HQ&INNO), 5 (SALES), and 6 (LOG&DIST) should add up to 
100%.  
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Table 2.A.6 Descriptive statistics Brazil 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total PCT applications 1.28 1.48 0 5.61 
PCT applications (dom. inventors only) 1.22 1.45 0 5.54 
PCT applications (dom. inventors; dom. 
applicants only) 1.15 1.41 0 5.33 
R&D 0.54 1.87 -5.68 4.04 
Human capital 36.35 9.27 15.95 65.77 
Count all FDI projects (greenfield + 
M&A) 1.43 1.28 0 5.83 
Count ALL greenfield 1.25 1.23 0 5.55 
Count PROD greenfield 1 1.04 0 4.42 
Count HQ&INNO greenfield 0.38 0.82 0 4.38 
Count ALL M&A 0.67 0.92 0 4.43 
Count PROD M&A 0.62 0.88 0 4.19 
Count HQ&INNO M&A 0.13 0.39 0 2.4 
Population 1.4 1.07 -1.03 3.74 
Agriculture 9.48 6.9 -0.05 35.35 
Industry 18.19 9.22 1.86 46.67 
Share FDI natural resources 0.07 0.17 0 1 
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Table 2.A.7 Pairwise correlations Brazil 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13 (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Total PCT applications 1 
               (2) PCT (dom. inventors only) 1 1 
              (3) PCT (dom. inventors; dom. applicants 
only) 0.99 1 1 
             (4) R&D 0.61 0.61 0.61 1 
            (5) Human capital 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 1 
           (6) Count all FDI projects (greenfield + 
M&A) 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.58 0.4 1 
          (7) Count ALL greenfield 0.81 0.81 0.8 0.59 0.41 0.98 1 
         (8) Count PROD greenfield 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.51 0.27 0.93 0.96 1 
        (9) Count HQ&INNO greenfield 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.52 0.45 0.79 0.8 0.68 1 
       (10) Count ALL M&A 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.5 0.35 0.87 0.79 0.74 0.79 1 
      (11) Count PROD M&A 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.48 0.32 0.86 0.78 0.73 0.77 0.99 1 
     (12) Count HQ&INNO M&A 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.44 0.39 0.65 0.64 0.55 0.8 0.73 0.67 1 
    (13) Population 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.54 0.09 0.8 0.78 0.75 0.6 0.7 0.68 0.49 1 
   (14) Agriculture -0.37 -0.36 -0.36 -0.55 -0.42 -0.33 -0.34 -0.26 -0.33 -0.29 -0.27 -0.29 -0.28 1 
  (15) Industry 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.34 0.01 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.28 0.42 0.42 0.22 0.62 -0.29 1 
 (16) Share FDI natural resources -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.05 1 
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Table 2.A.8 Descriptive statistics Mexico 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total PCT applications 1 1.02 0 4.29 
PCT applications (dom. inventors only) 0.93 1 0 4.23 
PCT applications (dom. inventors; dom. 
applicants only) 0.8 0.96 0 4.03 
R&D 5.22 1.15 2.71 8.83 
Human capital 19.07 4.21 10.11 37.17 
Count all FDI projects (greenfield + 
M&A) 1.6 1.04 0 4.28 
Count ALL greenfield 1.43 1.02 0 4.11 
Count PROD greenfield 1.14 0.87 0 3.56 
Count HQ&INNO greenfield 0.3 0.6 0 3.33 
Count ALL M&A 0.56 0.69 0 3 
Count PROD M&A 0.47 0.6 0 2.56 
Count HQ&INNO M&A 0.07 0.29 0 1.95 
Population (log) 0.93 0.76 -0.74 2.78 
Agriculture 5.09 3.19 0.05 14.03 
Industry 26.64 15.42 3.42 87.9 
Share FDI natural resources 0.1 0.24 0 1 
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Table 2.A.9 Pairwise correlations Mexico 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13 (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Total PCT applications 1 
               (2) PCT (dom. inventors only) 0.99 1 
              (3) PCT (dom. inventors; dom. 
applicants only) 0.96 0.97 1 
             (4) R&D 0.71 0.71 0.69 1 
            (5) Human capital 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.41 1 
           (6) Count all FDI projects (greenfield + 
M&A) 0.7 0.68 0.65 0.56 0.5 1 
          (7) Count ALL greenfield 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.55 0.52 0.97 1 
         (8) Count PROD greenfield 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.35 0.32 0.86 0.89 1 
        (9) Count HQ&INNO greenfield 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.57 0.55 0.66 0.67 0.37 1 
       (10) Count ALL M&A 0.63 0.61 0.6 0.46 0.38 0.69 0.55 0.41 0.48 1 
      (11) Count PROD M&A 0.52 0.5 0.48 0.34 0.28 0.62 0.47 0.39 0.36 0.94 1 
     (12) Count HQ&INNO M&A 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.39 0.13 0.55 0.6 0.41 1 
    (13) Population (log) 0.61 0.6 0.56 0.63 0.02 0.49 0.47 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.34 0.35 1 
   (14) Agriculture -0.35 -0.33 -0.33 -0.3 -0.37 -0.28 -0.3 -0.2 -0.33 -0.23 -0.14 -0.3 -0.09 1 
  (15) Industry -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 0 -0.13 -0.09 -0.02 -0.11 -0.2 -0.17 -0.13 -0.08 -0.37 1 
 (16) Share FDI natural resources -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 -0.24 -0.15 -0.05 -0.07 0 -0.12 -0.04 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 0.31 0.08 1 
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Table 2.A.10 Descriptive statistics Colombia 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total PCT applications 0.29 0.69 0 3.62 
PCT applications (dom. inventors only) 0.28 0.68 0 3.54 
PCT applications (dom. inventors; dom. 
applicants only) 0.24 0.64 0 3.37 
R&D 15.43 8.58 0 24.29 
Human capital 14.63 5.58 5.99 39.76 
Count all FDI projects (greenfield + 
M&A) 0.5 0.86 0 4.19 
Count ALL greenfield 0.44 0.78 0 3.87 
Count PROD greenfield 0.2 0.43 0 2.08 
Count HQ&INNO greenfield 0.14 0.46 0 3.14 
Count ALL M&A 0.19 0.52 0 2.94 
Count PROD M&A 0.11 0.35 0 2.08 
Count HQ&INNO M&A 0.06 0.27 0 2.3 
Population -0.41 1.37 -3.38 2.02 
Agriculture 25.21 13.04 0.61 67.87 
Share FDI natural resources 0.03 0.16 0 1 
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Table 2.A.11 Pairwise correlations Colombia 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13 (14) (15) 
(1) Total PCT applications 1 
              (2) PCT (dom. inventors only) 1 1 
             (3) PCT (dom. inventors; dom. applicants 
only) 0.98 0.98 1 
            (4) R&D 0.35 0.35 0.33 1 
           (5) Human capital 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.25 1 
          (6) Count all FDI projects (greenfield + 
M&A) 0.8 0.8 0.77 0.41 0.79 1 
         (7) Count ALL greenfield 0.8 0.8 0.77 0.39 0.79 0.98 1 
        (8) Count PROD greenfield 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.29 0.59 0.8 0.83 1 
       (9) Count HQ&INNO greenfield 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.27 0.76 0.8 0.82 0.58 1 
      (10) Count ALL M&A 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.31 0.73 0.83 0.74 0.52 0.76 1 
     (11) Count PROD M&A 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.28 0.62 0.74 0.65 0.44 0.68 0.91 1 
    (12) Count HQ&INNO M&A 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.19 0.65 0.61 0.56 0.36 0.63 0.78 0.63 1 
   (13) Population 0.53 0.53 0.5 0.63 0.62 0.6 0.57 0.45 0.42 0.48 0.43 0.31 1 
  (14) Agriculture -0.59 -0.59 -0.56 -0.12 -0.68 -0.6 -0.6 -0.46 -0.51 -0.49 -0.41 -0.39 -0.58 1 
 (15) Share FDI natural resources 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.27 0 0.02 0.06 0 0.06 -0.07 1 
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Table 2.A.12 Interaction with R&D: Brazil 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D 0.093*** 0.078*** 0.078** 0.071** 0.073** 0.099** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) (0.026) (0.026) (0.038) 
ALL Greenfield 0.177*      
 (0.091)      
ALL Greenfield x R&D 0.118***      
 (0.018)      
PROD Greenfield  0.164*     
  (0.083)     
PROD Greenfield x R&D  0.115***     
  (0.021)     
HQ&INNO Greenfield   0.171    
   (0.169)    
HQ&INNO Greenfield x R&D   0.097*    
   (0.053)    
ALL M&A    0.228**   
    (0.106)   
ALL M&A x R&D    0.090**   
    (0.038)   
PROD M&A     0.203*  
     (0.103)  
PROD M&A x R&D     0.089**  
     (0.040)  
HQ&INNO M&A      -0.519 
      (0.461) 
HQ&INNO M&A x R&D      0.438** 
      (0.185) 
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Adjusted R-squared 0.899 0.893 0.892 0.889 0.887 0.887 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1. All regressions include the following additional 
variables: human capital, total population, sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region dummies, linear trends. Variables included in 
an interaction are mean-centred. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at regional level) in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.A.13 Interaction with R&D: Mexico 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D 0.281*** 0.338*** 0.250*** 0.243*** 0.258*** 0.261*** 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.084) (0.076) (0.077) (0.084) 
ALL Greenfield 0.275***      
 (0.060)      
ALL Greenfield x R&D 0.113**      
 (0.046)      
PROD Greenfield  0.273***     
  (0.065)     
PROD Greenfield x R&D  0.164**     
  (0.062)     
HQ&INNO Greenfield   0.262**    
   (0.124)    
HQ&INNO Greenfield x R&D   0.054    
   (0.068)    
ALL M&A    0.285***   
    (0.074)   
ALL M&A x R&D    0.063   
    (0.051)   
PROD M&A     0.289***  
     (0.071)  
PROD M&A x R&D     0.087  
     (0.058)  
HQ&INNO M&A      0.470* 
      (0.259) 
HQ&INNO M&A x R&D      -0.039 
      (0.091) 
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 
Adjusted R-squared 0.736 0.726 0.708 0.717 0.715 0.695 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1 All regressions include the following additional 
variables: human capital, total population, sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region dummies, linear trends. Variables included in 
an interaction are mean-centred. A constant is included but not reported. . Robust standard errors (clustered at regional level) in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.A.14 Interaction with R&D: Colombia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D 0.002 -0.008 0.015 0.020** 0.008 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
ALL Greenfield -0.106      
 (0.100)      
ALL Greenfield x R&D 0.035**      
 (0.013)      
PROD Greenfield  -0.113     
  (0.093)     
PROD Greenfield x R&D  0.024**     
  (0.010)     
HQ&INNO Greenfield   -0.784    
   (0.508)    
HQ&INNO Greenfield x R&D   0.139**    
   (0.060)    
ALL M&A    -0.607***   
    (0.183)   
ALL M&A x R&D    0.126***   
    (0.029)   
PROD M&A     -0.695*  
     (0.390)  
PROD M&A x R&D     0.127**  
     (0.057)  
HQ&INNO M&A      -0.632** 
      (0.305) 
HQ&INNO M&A x R&D      0.090* 
      (0.051) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Adjusted R-squared 0.769 0.760 0.772 0.780 0.767 0.757 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1. All regressions include the following additional 
variables: human capital, total population, sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region dummies, linear trends. Variables included in 
an interaction are mean-centred. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at regional level) in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.A.15 Interaction with human capital: Brazil 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Human capital 0.016 0.023** 0.016 0.018* 0.020** 0.019 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
ALL Greenfield 0.210**      
 (0.086)      
ALL Greenfield x Human capital 0.015***      
 (0.003)      
PROD Greenfield  0.208**     
  (0.078)     
PROD Greenfield  x Human capital  0.019***     
  (0.004)     
HQ&INNO Greenfield   0.322**    
   (0.131)    
HQ&INNO Greenfield  x  Human capital   0.008    
   (0.007)    
ALL M&A    0.237***   
    (0.074)   
ALL M&A  x  Human capital    0.019***   
    (0.003)   
PROD M&A     0.211***  
     (0.074)  
PROD M&A  x  Human capital     0.019***  
     (0.003)  
HQ&INNO M&A      0.229 
      (0.175) 
HQ&INNO M&A  x  Human capital      0.036*** 
      (0.013) 
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Adjusted R-squared 0.891 0.892 0.890 0.894 0.891 0.887 
All regressions also include: R&D, total population, sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region dummies, linear 
trends. Variables included in interactions are mean-centred. A constant is included but not reported. Dependent variable: 
log of PCT applications with excl. domestic inventors +1. Robust standard errors (clustered at regional level) in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.A.16 Interaction with human capital: Mexico 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Human capital 0.041 0.071*** 0.038 0.035 0.044 0.043 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) 
ALL Greenfield 0.289***      
 (0.064)      
ALL Greenfield x Human capital 0.015      
 (0.012)      
PROD Greenfield  0.253***     
  (0.064)     
PROD Greenfield  x Human capital  0.011     
  (0.017)     
HQ&INNO Greenfield   0.300**    
   (0.130)    
HQ&INNO Greenfield  x  Human capital   0.008    
   (0.019)    
ALL M&A    0.298***   
    (0.077)   
ALL M&A  x  Human capital    0.014   
    (0.014)   
PROD M&A     0.299***  
     (0.075)  
PROD M&A  x  Human capital     0.014  
     (0.017)  
HQ&INNO M&A      0.259 
      (0.206) 
HQ&INNO M&A  x  Human capital      0.020 
      (0.023) 
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 
Adjusted R-squared 0.722 0.711 0.707 0.716 0.712 0.696 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1. All regressions include the 
following additional variables: R&D, total population, sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region dummies, linear 
trends. Variables included in an interaction are mean-centred. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard 
errors (clustered at regional level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.A.17 Interaction with human capital: Colombia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Human capital 0.058** 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.057*** 0.074*** 0.084*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
ALL Greenfield 0.021      
 (0.093)      
ALL Greenfield x Human capital 0.020***      
 (0.006)      
PROD Greenfield  -0.073     
  (0.109)     
PROD Greenfield  x Human capital  0.025**     
  (0.011)     
HQ&INNO Greenfield   0.181    
   (0.204)    
HQ&INNO Greenfield  x  Human capital   0.011    
   (0.012)    
ALL M&A    0.157   
    (0.093)   
ALL M&A  x  Human capital    0.017**   
    (0.007)   
PROD M&A     0.099  
     (0.094)  
PROD M&A  x  Human capital     0.018  
     (0.014)  
HQ&INNO M&A      -0.232* 
      (0.121) 
HQ&INNO M&A  x  Human capital      0.025 
      (0.016) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Adjusted R-squared 0.773 0.764 0.768 0.774 0.765 0.759 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1. All regressions include the 
following additional variables: R&D, total population, sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region dummies, linear 
trends. Variables included in an interaction are mean-centred. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard 
errors (clustered at regional level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.A.18 Production investments: all industries vs. manufacturing only 
Table 2.A.18.1. Brazil 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PROD Greenfield (all industries) 0.213**    
 (0.077)    
PROD Greenfield (manufacturing only)  0.246***   
  (0.075)   
PROD M&A (all industries)   0.275***  
   (0.097)  
PROD M&A (manufacturing only)    0.451*** 
    (0.111) 
Observations 216 216 216 216 
Adjusted R-squared 0.880 0.882 0.883 0.890 
 
Table 2.A.18.2. Mexico 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PROD Greenfield (all industries) 0.258***    
 (0.065)    
PROD Greenfield (manufacturing only)  0.218***   
  (0.066)   
PROD M&A (all industries)   0.305***  
   (0.073)  
PROD M&A (manufacturing only)    0.357*** 
    (0.075) 
Observations 256 256 256 256 
Adjusted R-squared 0.711 0.705 0.712 0.715 
 
Table 2.A.18.3. Colombia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PROD Greenfield (all industries) -0.004    
 (0.106)    
PROD Greenfield (manufacturing only)  -0.068   
  (0.110)   
PROD M&A (all industries)   0.205***  
   (0.071)  
PROD M&A (manufacturing only)    0.210** 
    (0.083) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 
Adjusted R-squared 0.757 0.758 0.761 0.761 
Dependent variable: log of PCT applications with exclusively domestic inventors +1. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at regional level) in parentheses. All regressions also include population, R&D, human capital, 
sectoral controls, year dummies, macro region dummies, linear trends. A constant is included but not reported. 
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3 PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND PROVINCIAL 
PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION IN 
VIETNAM 
3.1 Introduction  
 
New economic opportunities that may help to reduce poverty often take centre stage in the 
debate about reforms changing the relationship between the state and the economy in 
developing countries. A pivotal role in the alleviation of economic deprivation is often 
assigned to the private sector (Fields et al., 2003; Hasan et al., 2007; Pietrobelli, 2007). 
Urging policy-makers to improve the conditions for private firms, the World Bank (2011a: 
16) argues that “a vibrant private sector—with firms making investments, creating jobs and 
improving productivity—promotes growth and expands opportunities for poor people.” 
However, the way changes in the relative weight of the private sector in the economy 
affects economically deprived areas remains imperfectly understood in the empirical 
literature.  
This paper focuses on the case of Vietnam, a major developing country that has 
implemented fundamental reforms transforming the conditions for state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and private firms since the late 1980s. As real GDP grew at an average annual rate 
of seven percent during the period 1986-2008, the country saw a large fall in poverty. Yet, 
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not all parts of the country benefited to the same extent (Lanjouw et al., 2013). Subnational 
heterogeneity also characterizes changes in the relative economic weight of private firms. 
Provincial leaders were often left with some freedom in their interpretation of reforms 
(Malesky, 2004). Several studies have highlighted province-level variation in the regulatory 
and administrative conditions for private domestic as well as foreign-owned businesses 
(Malesky, 2004; 2008; Dang, 2013; Schmitz et al., 2015). At the same time, differences 
across provinces in the changes in the size of the private sector relative to the state-owned 
sector have been mentioned as potential drivers of economic disparities across provinces 
(Beresford, 2008; Ishizuka, 2009, 2011). The present paper empirically explores if such a 
link exists.  
This study examines whether subnational differences in the evolution of private firms’ 
employment share during 2000-2009 can help explain changes in the geography of 
economic deprivation – as proxied by province-level poverty rates. The year 2000 marks a 
turning point, as the introduction of Vietnam’s enterprise law sparked a huge increase in 
private activity and province-level policy experimentation was encouraged in the 2000s 
(Schmitz et al., 2015). In the absence of precise measures of province-level differences in 
the implementation of reforms for our period of analysis, 1999-2009, the empirical analysis 
focuses on changes in the employment share of private firms – i.e. firms with less than 50% 
state ownership – as a measure of the extent to which the role of the state in the economy 
changed in a province.  
Particularly reform-oriented provinces occasionally moved beyond the central line, whereas 
more conservative province-level governments only slowly enforced reforms. 
Consequently, similar enterprises can be treated differently by provincial authorities 
depending on where they are located (Malesky and Taussig, 2009). The relative size of the 
private sector varies across Vietnam’s territory. These differential patterns of progress of 
private sector development provide a fruitful setting for the empirical investigation of the 
link between enterprise reforms and economic deprivation. 
Relying on the Vietnamese enterprise survey, independent poverty estimates, two rounds of 
population censuses, and several additional data sources, the econometric analysis employs 
a wide range of controls and an instrumental variable approach. While an examination of 
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the underlying channels is beyond this paper’s scope, a discussion of related empirical work 
illuminates mechanisms that might explain the association between province-level changes 
in private firms’ employment share and province-level changes in poverty rates. The results 
suggest that larger increases in private firms’ employment share are associated with larger 
reductions of the province-level poverty rate. This analysis therefore supports contributions 
arguing that the private sector has a central role to play in the alleviation of economic 
deprivation (Hasan et al., 2007; Pietrobelli, 2007). We identify tentative evidence 
suggesting that multinational enterprises (MNEs) shape the picture emerging from our 
analysis.  
Previous research has shed light on agricultural reforms and trade as drivers of poverty 
reduction in Vietnam (Ravallion and van de Walle, 2008; McCaig, 2011; McCaig and 
Pavcnik, 2014). This paper adds a further dimension to our understanding of the factors 
influencing differences across space in Vietnam’s recent development. This analysis 
contributes to the debate about the role of enterprise reforms in Vietnam’s recent 
development (Beresford, 2008; Phan and Coxhead, 2013; Tran, 2013; Vu, 2014) and to the 
literature on subnational heterogeneity in the conditions for private businesses in emerging 
countries (Fujita and Hu, 2001; Berkowitz and DeJong, 2011; Bruhn, 2011; Yakovlev and 
Zhuravskaya, 2013).  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes major changes in state-business 
relations in Vietnam in the 1990s and 2000s and explains how subnational governments 
influence these changes. Section 3 briefly reviews the related literature on the facilitation of 
private sector growth and the debate on the strategic role of state ownership in Vietnam. 
Section 4 discusses potential channels between private firms’ employment share and 
economic deprivation. Section 5 presents the data and the empirical strategy. Section 6 
discusses the results, whilst section 7 concludes and discusses limitations as well as 
implications for future research. 
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3.2 Background: Enterprise reforms in Vietnam  
 
By the late 1970s, Vietnam was among the world’s fifteen poorest countries (Miguel and 
Roland, 2011). In 1986 the government initiated reforms (Doi Moi; “renovation”) aimed at 
gradual economic liberalization. In addition to paving the way for the opening to trade and 
reforming the agricultural sector, Doi Moi introduced changes in the regulation of SOEs 
and the conditions for private domestic and foreign firms. The reforms led to a prolonged 
period of economic growth. While Vietnam achieved middle-income status in the late 
2000s, areas near the two major cities, Hanoi and Ho Chih Min City (HCMC), saw bigger 
reductions in poverty than the central highlands and northern mountainous areas (Kozel, 
2014).  
3.2.1 Major enterprise reforms in 1990s and 2000s  
Vietnam’s economic policies since Doi Moi largely correspond to the “Beijing consensus” 
characterized by a gradualist approach, export-led growth, and a strong state (Halper, 2010; 
Malesky and London, 2014).
80
 Reforms implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
halved the number of SOEs
81
 and resulted in the loss of roughly 800,000 jobs during 1990-
1992 (Painter, 2003; Glewwe, 2004). National programmes provided lump sum cash 
compensation to redundant SOE workers (Rama, 2002; Rama, 2008).
82
 Although the early 
1990s marked a shift towards the encouragement of private firms, the reforms hardly 
weakened the state sector. SOEs’ share in GDP climbed from 39% in 1992 to circa 41% 
during 2000-2003 (Fforde, 2007: xxiii).
83
 Akin to the Chinese approach of “keeping the big 
and releasing the small” (Hsieh and Song, 2015), smaller SOEs were often dissolved 
                                                 
80
 Contradictions and ambiguities have shaped the reform process (Gainsborough, 2010). This “murkiness” 
may reflect a trial-and-error strategy (Tran, 2013) as well as efforts of the Communist party to seek consensus 
and accommodate diverging opinions about the right speed of modernization (Painter, 2005; Fforde, 2007; 
Malesky, 2009; Rama, 2014). 
81
 The empirical analysis in section 5 considers SOEs as enterprises with at least 50% percent state ownership. 
82
 Note that these large-scale layoffs occurred before the beginning of our period of analysis (1999-2009).  
83
 Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003: 126) estimate that SOEs dissolved or privatized during that phase 
accounted for less than four percent of total SOE assets. Most dissolved SOEs were small and had less than 
100 employees (Nguyen, 2009). 
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whereas larger ones were scaled up. Inspired by South Korea’s chaebols, the government 
created state-owned conglomerates in the mid-1990s (Lan Nguyen, 2007).
84
 Scaled-up 
SOEs accessed new technology via joint ventures with MNEs and exploited new business 
opportunities (e.g. in real estate). While making inroads into new activities, SOEs often 
directly competed with private firms.
85
 
Reforms during 1990-1992 legalized private activities and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Yet, private entrepreneurs continued to face obstacles, e.g. regarding trade and access to 
credit and land (Richards et al., 2002). In contrast, SOEs generally operated under soft 
budget constraints and enjoyed preferential access to export markets (Malesky, 2009). 
Against this backdrop, private firms displayed sluggish growth in the 1990s (Schaumburg-
Müller, 2005). Under the impression of private firms’ weak performance and the Asian 
financial crisis, Vietnam’s government passed a new Enterprise Law in 1999. This bundle 
of reforms constituted a major turning point marking the beginning of the period covered 
by our empirical analysis. Considered as a breakthrough for the private sector’s 
development, it streamlined bureaucratic procedures and eliminated over 100 licence 
requirements for private firms (Hakkala and Kokko, 2008). The time needed to register an 
enterprise decreased from roughly a month in 1999 to 15 days in 2000 (Malesky and 
Taussig, 2008: 256).  
These improvements spurred rapid growth in the number of registered private firms. By the 
end of 2006, roughly 120,000 registered private firms were operating – nearly a sixfold 
increase compared to 1999 (Malesky and Taussig; 2008: 255).
86
 Overall, private sector 
growth and privatization of SOEs – especially in the early 2000s – caused SOEs’ share in 
GDP to decrease from nearly 40 percent in 2000 to circa 33 percent in 2010. Private firms 
started playing an increasingly important role as providers of formal employment 
                                                 
84
 The Vietnamese approach differs significantly from the policies implemented in South Korea, though. For 
example, government support was tied to strict export performance targets in South Korea – which was not 
the case in Vietnam. For details, see Cheong et al. (2010), Pincus et al. (2012), and Smith et al. (2014). 
85
 For the tourism sector, Gillen (2010) describes the example of a private entrepreneur whose client roster 
was confiscated by the police and who subsequently discovered that SOEs had started poaching his clients 
with lower prices. 
86
 SOEs’ number shrank from 5,579 in 2000 to 3,364 in 2009. 
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opportunities. In the mid-2000s privatization efforts slowed down and SOE conglomerates 
grew stronger again (Malesky and London, 2014; Baccini et al., 2015). Fearing 
international competition could reduce SOEs to a marginal role, the government renewed 
efforts to create national champions in the mid-2000s (Vu Thanh, 2014).
87
  
3.2.2 Vietnamese firms: stylized facts  
Formal employment in private domestic firms grew rapidly after 2000, with 3.02 million 
new jobs added during 2000-2009 (own calculation based on Vietnamese enterprise 
survey). Yet, most domestic private firms remain small and the majority of new private 
enterprises founded in the 2000s are micro firms and SMEs (Hakkala and Kokko, 2007; 
Tran et al., 2008). The majority of larger Vietnamese enterprises are SOEs, privatized 
SOEs or MNEs (Sakata, 2013). Although the business environment improved following the 
Enterprise Law of 1999 and its subsequent reform in 2005, several authors still identify 
disadvantages for private firms relative to SOEs (Van Thang and Freeman, 2009; Cheong et 
al., 2010; Zhou, 2014; Baccini et al., 2015). Informal linkages with state actors are often 
essential for access to land or credit and private firms face difficulties in hiring skilled 
workers (Painter, 2005; Tran et al., 2008). Characterized by low capital intensity and a low 
likelihood of turning into large enterprises, domestic private firms face many challenges 
commonly observed in developing countries, such as limited access to capital and 
technology (Rand, 2007; Tran et al., 2008).   
Compared to domestic private firms as well as SOEs, MNEs in Vietnam have lower debt 
levels (World Bank, 2011). They mostly engage in labour-intensive manufacturing 
production for export markets, such as textiles. Particularly since the second half of the 
2000s, assembly activities in electronics have gained importance for MNEs in Vietnam 
(Athukorala and Tien, 2012). While joint ventures with SOEs were dominant in the 1990s, 
                                                 
87
 In an attempt to reconcile the benefits of WTO membership with a continued emphasis on SOEs as central 
players in the socialist market economy, the government provided state economic groups (SEGs) with 
substantial resources. SEGs are conglomerates, i.e. large combinations of firms that form one corporate group 
typically operating in multiple industries. New forms of intra-conglomerate lending replaced classic subsidies 
in order to circumvent WTO rules (Vu Thanh, 2014). 
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most MNEs have preferred 100% foreign ownership since the abolition of foreign 
ownership limitations in 2000 (Beresford, 2008). Particularly in industries that are new to 
Vietnam (especially electronics), MNEs increasingly set up production facilities outside 
Vietnam’s traditional economic centres (Nguyen and Revilla-Diez, 2016). They pay higher 
wages than domestic firms (Fukase, 2014) and accounted for more than half of Vietnam’s 
total exports in 2009 (GSO, 2016). Formal employment in MNEs has been growing even 
faster than employment in private domestic firms; 3.88 million new jobs in MNEs were 
created during 2000-2009.  
Although the 2000s saw major steps towards equal treatment of all firms in Vietnam 
irrespective of ownership, SOEs still enjoy advantages regarding access to capital, land, 
skilled labour, and protection from foreign competition (Vu Thanh, 2014; Zhou, 2014; 
Baccini et al., 2015). Cheong et al. (2010: 72) describe this situation as an “institutionally 
engineered uneven playing field with SOEs enjoying the upper hand in every transaction”. 
They continue to act as key players in the Vietnamese economy, influencing the conditions 
and opportunities for other economic agents. Despite SOEs’ ongoing importance, total SOE 
employment decreased by 475,000 jobs during 2000-2009. In addition to actual lay-offs, 
privatization of SOEs contributed to this reduction. 
Reflecting efforts to create national champions, Vietnam’s remaining SOEs are often part 
of large conglomerates with activities in numerous sectors. They typically operate in more 
capital-intensive sectors and are larger in employment and capital endowment than private 
firms in equivalent industries.
88
 Despite attempts to limit their activities to core sectors 
(Ishizuka, 2013), SOEs operate in nearly all parts of today’s Vietnamese economy – 
including food processing, logistics, retail, and tourism. SOE conglomerates often resemble 
non-transparent collections of many small firms, rather than centrally managed 
“champions” (Pincus et al., 2012).89 Drawing on preferential access to land, SOEs have 
                                                 
88
 In 2009 they accounted for high shares of turnover in textiles (21%), fertilizer (99%), insurance (88%), 
cement (51%), refined sugar (37%), beer (21%), and chemicals (21%). 
89
 Vietnamese conglomerates are more diversified than similar groups in other Asian countries. On average, a 
Vietnamese conglomerate operates in 6.4 two-digit industries, whereas comparable economic groups in 
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developed major operations in real estate and financial services. Conglomerates such as 
EVN (electricity), Vinatex (textiles), Vinacomin (mining) have opened banks, leasing 
companies, and insurers (Pincus, 2009). Large SOEs are able to use revenue from sectors 
with formal access restriction for non-SOEs to cross-subsidize operations in other sectors 
where they compete with private firms (Baccini et al., 2015).
90
 The combination of SOEs’ 
privileged access to factors of production and high levels of autonomy resembles a “carrot 
without stick situation” (Beresford, 2008: 233).  
3.2.3 Subnational autonomy  
The governments of Vietnam’s 63 provinces (58 provinces and 5 municipalities with 
province status) have strong influence on the conditions for businesses and the relation 
between the private sector and SOEs (Schmitz et al., 2015). Vietnam has a long history of 
relative subnational autonomy and subnational policy experiments (Probert and Young, 
1995; Kerkvliet, 2005). Fforde and Vylder (1997) describe violations of the central party 
line (“fence breaking”) by provincial authorities in the 1970s. Through cases of fence 
breaking in the 1990s and 2000s, provinces acted as drivers of modernization. In the 2000s 
the central government actively encouraged province-level testing of policies and fiscal 
decentralization was deepened, providing provincial governments with greater incentives to 
optimize economic policies (World Bank, 2011). Schmitz et al. (2015: 187) conclude that 
“Vietnam is learning by experimenting in 63 laboratories”. 
Progressive subnational governments were at the forefront of designing policies tailored to 
SMEs (Tran et al., 2008), especially regarding land use rights, and micro-economic 
reforms, such as steps towards universal auditing procedures for all enterprises irrespective 
                                                                                                                                                    
Thailand, China, Indonesia, and South Korea operate in in 3.5, 2.3, 2.1, and 1.7 two-digit industries 
respectively (OECD, 2013). 
90
 The shipbuilding conglomerate Vinashin had 445 subsidiaries and 20 joint ventures, including in real estate, 
tourism and karaoke bars, when it entered financial restructuring in 2011 (Malesky and London, 2014). 
Vinashin’s debt amounted to US$ 4.4 billion – more than 4 percent of Vietnam’s GDP (Vu, 2014). Similarly, 
Vietnam Airlines diversified into a wide range of activities through affiliated companies, including in auto 
repair, fish sauce production, banking, and taxi services (Pincus, 2009). Due to a lack of rigorous financial 
reporting requirements, financial flows associated with such endeavours often remain in the dark (Smith et al., 
2014).   
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of ownership. Further examples of province-level experimenting include special economic 
zones and the acceleration of business registration procedures (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 
2003; Fforde, 2007).  
Subnational governments also influence the economic conditions via their role as owners of 
SOEs. Vietnamese SOEs are either owned by the national government (“central SOEs”) or 
by provincial governments (“local SOEs”). In 2000, 66 percent of all SOEs were owned by 
subnational government; by 2009 this percentage amounted to only 48. In 2000 Hanoi 
(351) and HCMC (311) had the highest number of local SOEs, whereas Binh Phuoc in the 
Southeast – often praised for its progressive economic policies – had the lowest (16).91 
While the total number of SOEs declined in the 2000s, several provinces concentrated 
economic resources in large-scale SOEs (Ishizuka, 2013). As a further effect of increasing 
fiscal decentralization in the 2000s, some subnational leaders increased the size of SOEs 
owned by their province as sources of revenue or partners for infrastructure projects (Vu 
Thanh, 2014b). 
Beyond the design of policies and decisions regarding SOEs under their management, 
subnational leaders also shape the conditions for private firms indirectly. Provincial 
governments often own banks and can therefore influence the allocation of capital (Vu 
Thanh, 2014a). Local authorities are also in charge of the enforcement of court decisions 
and may decide not to enforce a court decision in order to protect an SOE with strong local 
ties (Pincus et al., 2012). 
As a result of diverse province-level starting conditions and decentralization, similar firms 
can face different regulatory conditions depending on where they are located (Malesky and 
Taussig, 2009). The annual Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) survey of 7,800 private 
enterprises documents this heterogeneity. In 2005, the average share of respondents that 
considered favouritism towards SOEs as an obstacle to their business ranged from 33% to 
                                                 
91
 In 2009, HCMC (211) and Hanoi (155) had the highest numbers of local SOEs, whereas Hà Giang in the 
Northeast had the lowest (3). These numbers were calculated based on the Vietnamese enterprise survey. 
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79% across Vietnam’s provinces (Malesky, 2005).92 The enterprise survey of Vietnam’s 
General Statistical Office (GSO) reveals that private firms’ share in formal employment 
ranged from less than 23.8% to more than 78.3% in 2000 across provinces. 
The factors influencing the reform-mindedness of subnational leaders are imperfectly 
understood. While cases of fence-breaking were more common in the South in early reform 
years (Rama, 2008), Malesky (2004) finds that a province’s involvement in fence-breaking 
cannot be fully explained by geographic location or the South’s capitalist legacy. He 
identifies several fence-breaking provinces in Northern Vietnam, such as Vinh Phuc.
93
 
Foreign investors appear to have encouraged province-level reforms (Malesky, 2004, 2008; 
Dang, 2013), using their importance as sources of fiscal revenue to lobby for regulatory 
improvements.
94
 Schmitz et al.’s (2015) analysis of drivers of reforms in four provinces 
also points to a strong role of well-organized domestic private firms acting in alliances with 
proactive provincial governments.
95
  
While several authors have examined reasons for province-level variation in the approach 
to state-business relations (Malesky, 2004; 2008; Dang, 2013; Schmitz et al., 2015), the 
implications of differential province-level changes in the relative economic weight of 
private firms for the geography of poverty reduction remain underexplored. Growing 
private firms may generate employment opportunities and new sources of income, but 
changes of the role of the state in the economy may also carry social risks (Ravallion and 
van de Walle, 2008).  
                                                 
92
 The PCI data are unfortunately only available for all Vietnamese provinces from 2006 onwards and 
therefore cannot be included in our empirical analysis. 
93
 Among provinces that were part of South Vietnam before reunification, Da Nang in central Vietnam is a 
well-known example of a province that improved conditions for private domestic firms and MNEs 
substantially (Vu-Thanh, 2014b). 
94
 Malesky’s (2004) analysis of fence-breaking in the 1990s and early 2000s also suggests that province’s 
with lower levels of representation in the central government were more likely to adopt progressive measures. 
In contrast, Schmitz et al.‘s (2015) study focussed on the mid-2000s finds that stronger support by the centre 
is associated with higher propensity to pursue reforms.  
95
 Far from being anti-Communist rebels, progressive political leaders are generally deeply rooted in the 
Communist party (Rama, 2008). Their motivation to initiate reforms may derive from a number of sources, 
including a strong belief in the potential to improve the province’s level of development, the Communist 
Party’s incentives for promotion (which are often tied to fiscal revenue figures), and the hope for greater 
opportunities for rent-seeking in a prospering economy (Malesky, 2004, 2008; Schmitz et al., 2015). 
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3.3 Related literature on state-business relations and economic 
deprivation 
 
This paper is related to three main bodies of literature: first, the literature on state-
ownership in transition economies; second, the literature dedicated to the facilitation of 
private sector growth through streamlining of administrative and regulatory procedures; and 
third, the academic debate on strategic industrial policy and social policy relying on state 
ownership, particularly in the Vietnamese context. 
In the literature on firm ownership in transition economies, theoretical arguments in favour 
of a reduction of state ownership focus on the assumption that state ownership is associated 
with an inefficient allocation of resources. Soft budget constraints, ill-defined property 
rights, and agency problems are assumed to create incentives that undermine profit 
maximization and may allow SOE managers to appropriate rents (Berglof and Roland, 
1998; Shleifer, 1998; Kornai et al., 2003). As incumbents and potential losers from liberal 
reforms, SOEs are assumed to exploit political linkages to slow down institutional change 
in transition economies (Kornai, 1992). Even if the government succeeds in enforcing hard 
budget constraints and eliminates rent seeking by SOE managers, the absence of 
entrepreneurial incentives and managerial decisions’ politicization may cause differences in 
performance between state-owned and private enterprises (Estrin et al., 2009). With the 
exception of the provision of public goods and natural monopoly industries, these 
arguments have led to a near consensus that private entrepreneurs are more efficient users 
of factors of production than SOE managers (Megginson and Netter, 2001).
96
  
Applying this line of reasoning to the Vietnamese case, Hakkala and Kokko (2007) argue 
that a reduction of the prevalence of state ownership in the economy is likely to result in 
                                                 
96
 There are, however, important strategic considerations related to technological progress that go beyond a 
relatively narrow focus on efficiency comparisons between different ownership categories. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the state’s role in promoting technological development, see Mazzucato (2015). 
Wacker (2016) applies a similar reasoning to his discussion of SOEs’ role in the Vietnamese economy.   
 209 
 
productivity gains and employment growth.
 97
 Promoting Vietnam’s private sector is often 
considered as the main way of creating jobs in order to mitigate economic deprivation 
(Cheong et al., 2012). Urging the government not to favour SOEs, Tran et al. (2008: 327) 
highlight private SMEs’ role as “a main vehicle for poverty alleviation”.  
Potential advantages of the encouragement of private entrepreneurship also take centre 
stage in the literature on streamlining of administrative procedures for businesses and 
reductions of entry costs (Djankov, 2009). Shaped by de Soto’s (1989, 2000) interpretation 
of the role of entrepreneurs and property rights in the Peruvian context and by the World 
Bank’s work on “ease of doing business”, this body of literature has inspired numerous 
reforms of the administrative and regulatory conditions for businesses, especially in 
emerging countries (Djankonv, 2009). A crucial aspect in this literature, which has 
influenced the debate about firms’ conditions in Vietnam (Malesky and Taussig, 2008; 
2009; Bai et al., 2016), is the necessity to reduce the administrative costs of setting up a 
private enterprise. Private entrepreneurs are assumed to play a key role in ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources (Acs et al., 2008) and lower start-up costs are expected to 
reduce unproductive firms’ chances of survival (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Caselli and 
Gennaioli, 2008).  
Efforts to facilitate the establishment of new businesses typically focus on reducing license 
requirements, the number of authorities involved in permit issuance, and the quantity of 
paperwork to be completed.
98
 Vietnam’s enterprise reforms of 2000 and 2005 (discussed in 
section 2.1) are therefore examples of such measures. The annual Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (PCI) survey, conducted by the Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative 
and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry since 2006, ranks provincial 
governments according to the regulatory environments for private sector development. It 
                                                 
97
 One of the most vocal proponents of this view is the World Bank. Wary of SOEs’ preferential access to 
economic resources, the World Bank (2011b: 39) emphasizes that “Vietnam, still being a relatively poor 
country from a global perspective, needs to use its precious resources (…) more efficiently”. 
98
 For a critical discussion of the potential social benefits of business regulation neglected by proponents of 
far-reaching deregulation, see Arrunada (2007). 
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can be regarded as a further sign that the literature on entry costs and business regulation 
has influenced the policy debate in Vietnam.  
The arguments linked to the literature on state ownership and business regulation suggest 
that, in order to generate new economic opportunities, the government should primarily act 
as a market facilitator and reduce distortive effects associated with preferential treatment of 
SOEs. Conversely, Vietnam’s government assigns a leading role in the country’s economic 
development to SOEs. Official declarations portray large-scale SOEs as the main vehicle 
for Vietnam’s integration into the global economy and the development of strategic 
industries (World Bank, 2011; Vu Than, 2014a).
99
 SOEs are simultaneously expected to 
soften social effects of economic volatility and provide stability for those at the bottom of 
the social pyramid (Taussig et al., 2015). Several scholars have expressed sympathy for this 
vision – while simultaneously criticizing its translation into policies (Masina, 2006; 
Beresford, 2008; Wacker, 2016). 
The success of the developmental state in Southeast Asian economies (Wade, 1990), 
especially Taiwan and South Korea, acts as a source of inspiration for supporters of a 
strong role for SOEs. Beresford (2004, 2008) suggests SOEs could be central agents in 
Vietnam’s industrialization. She regards SOEs and private firms as mutually dependent: 
“Investing in better performing SOEs is therefore likely to (…) create more, not fewer, 
opportunities for private sector SME employment” (Beresford, 2004: 83). This resonates 
with Tran’s (2004: 160) description of a “symbiotic relationship” between Vietnamese 
SOEs and private domestic enterprises via subcontracting linkages in the textile industry. 
Wacker (2016), despite finding evidence that SOEs might crowd out private firms via 
differential access to credit, argues that measures to “level the playing field” would fail to 
take into account that private firms might benefit from potential spillover effects associated 
with SOEs’ greater ability to conduct R&D. As a developmental tool, SOEs are thus 
expected to support the growth of private firms and contribute directly and indirectly to the 
                                                 
99
 References to Singaporean SOEs and Korean chaebols indicate that Vietnam’s government is looking 
eastwards for policy lessons (Pincus, 2009). However, SOEs’ objectives are not precisely defined and are 
constantly evolving (Chia, 2013). 
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generation of new opportunities for disadvantaged individuals. It is important to bear in 
mind, though, that there are major discrepancies between the typical Southeast Asian 
developmental state and Vietnam’s approach – most notably the low accountability of 
Vietnamese SOEs and the lack of a well-defined industrial policy (Masina, 2006; Cheong et 
al., 2010).
100
  
Proponents of a strong state have also described SOEs as anchors of social stability in times 
of rapid change. In a comprehensive effort to conceptualize the role of SOEs in the case of 
China
101, Bai et al. (2000: 736) consider it as “inevitable that SOEs continue to play their 
multitask role during the transition” in order to guarantee social stability. In a context 
where social safety institutions are not developed yet and private firms have little incentives 
to provide a public good, Bai et al. (2000) suggest that SOEs play an important social role 
for a limited period. By providing social services and keeping surplus labour on their 
payroll, SOEs are assumed to safeguard social stability, thereby protecting all firms’ 
business environment (Bai et al., 2006). In line with this framework, Beresford (2008) 
claims that in the Vietnamese case SOEs cushioned the effects of economic restructuring 
and used revenue from new business activities to avoid layoffs. Similarly, Vu Thanh 
(2014a: 7) argues that Vietnam’s “SOEs are still required to help ensure social security and 
contribute to poverty alleviation”. 
3.4 Potential drivers of changes in private firms’ employment 
share and channels with economic deprivation 
 
The review of the related conceptual literature revealed two opposing views on the link 
between state-business relations and economic deprivation. Proponents of equal treatment 
of all firms irrespective of ownership see the promotion of private firms as a principal 
instrument to alleviate poverty. In contrast, advocates of strong SOEs emphasize their role 
as guarantors of social stability mitigating the social impact of rapid economic change. In 
                                                 
100
 In contrast to the case of Taiwan, Vietnamese SOEs were neither disciplined by the market nor by the 
government (Beresford, 2008). Masina (2006) argues that the foundations of a developmental state, especially 
strategic planning and a system of checks and balances, are missing in the case of Vietnam. 
101
 For a recent comparison of the reform processes in Vietnam and China, see Malesky and London (2014). 
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this paper’s empirical part, the change in private firms’ share in formal employment 
(henceforth Π) serves as a measure of the extent to which the role of the state in a 
province’s economy changed druing 2000-2009. The conceptual considerations outlined 
above and related empirical studies point to several potential channels between Π and 
economic deprivation. 
First, it is useful to consider the factors that may drive changes in Π. The employment share 
of private firms (Π) can be decomposed as follows: 
Π= 
𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒
(𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒+ 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒)
 , where 𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 +  𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 
Holding 𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  constant, Π will change if 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 changes. This could happen if SOEs alter 
their staffing levels or cease to operate as SOEs (through closure or privatization).  
Holding 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒constant, changes in Π can be driven by the entry and exit of private firms 
(domestic or foreign) and changes in the employment levels of existing private firms. 
 
Figure 3.1 Formal employment growth 2000-2009 by sector (Vietnam as a whole) 
   
-15.0
95.4
122.6
203.0
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 f
o
rm
a
l 
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
9
re
la
ti
v
e
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
fo
rm
a
l 
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
in
 a
ll 
s
e
c
to
rs
 i
n
 2
0
0
0
State Domestic private
Foreign Total employment
 213 
 
As illustrated by Figure 3.1, there was a sharp increase in formal employment between 
2000 and 2009. Total formal employment increased by 203%. This growth was largely 
driven by MNEs and, to a smaller extent, private domestic firms. As discussed in section 
3.2, this rapid growth, especially regarding private domestic firms, is closely linked to the 
simplification of business registration procedures through the enterprise law (2000) and 
simultaneously reflects Vietnam’s rapid GDP growth during this period.  
From the perspective of contributions in favour of a strong state sector (Bai et al., 2006; 
Beresford, 2008), an increase in Π driven by reductions of 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 might aggravate poverty. 
This view focuses on the loss of employment opportunities which may exacerbate poverty 
if the private sector is not capable of absorbing the released labour. Beresford (2008) and 
Ishizuka (2009, 2011) argue that province-level variation in the reduction of SOE 
employment opportunities may have contributed to growing spatial disparities within 
Vietnam. Measures causing SOEs to abandon business activities may also have negative 
multiplier effects on private firms because SOEs are often integrated into supply chains 
involving private firms (Hakkala and Kokko, 2007) – as highlighted by Tran (2004) for the 
textile sector.  
Furthermore, poverty may increase if SOEs stop providing social services in the absence of 
alternatives. While it has been argued that, since the launch of DoiMoi in 1986, Vietnam’s 
government has tried to avoid the harsh social effects of economic restructuring observed in 
Russia (London and Malesky, 2014), descriptions of SOEs’ social mandates are rare and 
imprecise. Beresford (2008: 232) mentions “health, education, social security and childcare 
needs, as well as providing jobs”, while Pincus et al. (2012) refer to the provision of cheap 
electricity. Most social mandates of SOEs have been transferred to subnational 
governments, with the exception of a few large SOEs predominantly operating in extractive 
industries.  
Recent evidence points to a further indirect channel via which changes in Π may hamper 
efforts to tackle economic deprivation: several authors have highlighted Vietnamese private 
firms’ tendency to underreport revenue (Taussig et al., 2015). SOEs continue to constitute a 
major source of revenue for subnational governments (Ishizuka, 2013), as Vietnamese 
authorities’ ability to monitor private firms’ cash flows is still limited (Beresford, 2008). 
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Tran and Nguyen (2015) find that following privatization, former SOEs over-report costs 
and under-report sales, resulting in lower tax payments. Reforms decreasing SOEs’ share of 
the economy without accompanying measures to improve tax collection from private firms 
may hence jeopardize provincial governments’ ability to fund measures to alleviate 
poverty. 
Notwithstanding the plausibility of the arguments regarding consequences of an increase in 
Π driven by reductions of 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 , SOE closures associated with large-scale shedding of SOE 
jobs were rare in the 2000s (Sakata et al., 2013). Absolute SOE employment still declined 
in most provinces between 2000 and 2009. On average, SOE employment declined by 
7,900 jobs during 2000-2009 – corresponding to 15 percent of the average province-level 
total formal employment at the beginning of our period of analysis in 2000.  
If we consider the implications of changes in Π driven by growth of 𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒, the literature 
on efficiency gains from private sector growth (Djankov, 2009; Pincus et al., 2012) points 
to several channels for poverty-reducing effects. Higher entry rates of private firms should 
increase competition in provincial markets and may improve allocative efficiency, and, 
under specific conditions, spur innovation (Aghion et al., 2005). Descriptive statistics on 
Vietnamese enterprises’ productivity (World Bank, 2011) appear to confirm theoretical 
arguments that private enterprises are more efficient users of factors of production (Kornai 
et al., 2003). Malesky and Taussig (2008) provide evidence that SOEs enjoy preferential 
access to credit (often provided by state-owned banks), while private enterprises are 
frequently credit-constrained (Rand, 2007). SOEs also enjoy privileges in the access to 
land, as private enterprises often have to purchase land usage rights from SOEs (Pincus et 
al., 2012; Zhou, 2014). Phan and Coxhead (2013) and Coxhead and Phan (2013) link the 
capital market segmentation to firms’ access to skills. They find that SOEs’ preferential 
access to capital created a two-track market for skills, in which SOEs offer the highest 
salaries for skilled workers and crowd out skill-intensive private activities. Potential 
productivity gains via the re-allocation of factors associated with increases in Π driven by 
growth of 𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  could translate into employment growth and possibly higher 
remuneration of workers and lower prices, contributing to poverty alleviation.  
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An increase in Π may also help to alleviate poverty if private firms are more likely than 
SOEs to generate economic gains associated with Vietnam’s integration in the global 
economy. McCaig (2011) finds that increased export opportunities reduce poverty levels in 
Vietnamese provinces. According to research conducted by Baccini et al. (2015), 
Vietnamese industries dominated by private firms respond to increased trade intensity with 
productivity increases, whereas SOEs lobby for continued protection from competition and 
manage to sustain low productivity levels because they operate under soft budget 
constraints. Income gains relating from Vietnam’s integration in trade flows would 
therefore be higher in provinces with a relatively larger private sector.  
It is important to emphasize that an increase in Π may be driven by growth of 𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛. Due 
to their knowledge of export opportunities, superior technology, and access to foreign 
capital, MNEs may contribute to productivity gains, employment growth, and higher wages 
(Lall and Narula, 2009). In Vietnam MNEs frequently engage in labour-intensive 
production of goods for export markets (Athukorala and Tien, 2012). Given the relevance 
of labour-intensive industries to the creation of opportunities in order to reduce poverty in 
Vietnam (Fritzen, 2002), trade and MNEs may play a key role in shaping the potentially 
poverty-reducing effect of growth in private firms’ employment share. MNEs pay higher 
salaries than domestic firms; particularly for women MNEs appear to offer positions at 
salary levels that could not be found in SOEs or private domestic firms (Fukase, 2014). 
Their ability to pay high salaries and access export markets makes it plausible to assume 
that they affect poverty rates more than growth in the frequently credit-constrained private 
domestic firms (Rand, 2007; Tran et al., 2008). 
Based on the conceptual and empirical literature reviewed in this section, the overall 
association between changes in Π and poverty in the Vietnamese context remains 
ambiguous. We address this empirical question in the econometric analysis presented in the 
next section. Since an examination of the potential channels is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we concentrate on the identification of the direction of the association.  
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3.5 Data and empirical strategy 
 
3.5.1 Data 
This paper relies on data from several sources; the most important ones will be briefly 
described here. 
Poverty rate as measure of economic deprivation 
To measure province-level economic deprivation, we rely on the percentage of the 
population whose disposable income falls below the level considered essential to cover 
basic needs. A distinction is commonly made between absolute and relative poverty. 
Absolute poverty refers to deprivation of basic needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter 
(Beaudoin, 2007). Mostly used in developed countries, relative poverty is based on a 
comparison to the median or average of a society. Vietnam still being a country with 
significant remaining deprivation of basic needs, the poverty measure used in the empirical 
part of this paper refers to absolute poverty.  
The measurement of poverty is notoriously difficult (Ravallion, 1998). There are two major 
sources of poverty data from Vietnamese authorities: The Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and 
Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the Vietnam’s General Statistical Office (GSO). MOLISA 
combines information from local surveys and village-level consultations. Drawing on 
household survey data, the GSO relies on two different methods. First, it uses official, 
inflation-adjusted poverty lines applied to incomes per capita. Jointly developed with the 
World Bank, the GSO’s second method is based on a basket of essential food 
(corresponding to a daily per capita intake of 2390 kilocalories) and additional non-food 
consumption. Individuals lacking the resources to afford this basket are categorized as poor 
(Kozel, 2014).  
Particularly the MOLISA poverty rate’s suitability for research purposes has been 
questioned; e.g. regarding the incomplete adjustment for inflation (Tran and Nguyen, 2014; 
Demombynes and Vu, 2015). While the GSO poverty line does correct for inflation, it is 
not available for 1999 and 2009 and methodological changes after 2008 limit its value for 
comparisons across time (Demombynes and Vu, 2015). We therefore instead rely on 
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detailed poverty estimates from two independent poverty mapping projects (Minot et al., 
2003; Lajouw et al., 2013). As these data are not directly linked to any Vietnamese policy, 
they are less likely to be subject to manipulation by policy-makers. The approach adopted 
by Minot et al. (2003) and Lanjouw et al. (2013) corresponds to the methodology 
underlying the GSO-World Bank poverty line, i.e. it relies on a reference basket of essential 
food and non-food consumption. This income-centred measure is not designed to capture 
intangible dimensions of poverty, such as powerlessness or indignity. Lanjouw et al. (2013) 
build upon the work of Minot et al. (2003) and rely on the same methodology. Both studies 
employ a micro-level estimation technique (Elbers et al., 2003) which combines rich 
information of household surveys with the comprehensive coverage of population 
censuses.
102
 Several poverty-related studies on Vietnam (e.g. Roland and Miguel, 2006; 
Nguyen et al., 2010; Kozel, 2014) rely on data using the approach developed by Elbers et 
al. (2003). 
While the second mapping project (Lanjouw et al., 2013) was designed to enable 
researchers to examine changes in the geography of poverty during 1999-2009 based on 
comparison with the estimates of Minot et al. (2003), adjustments of the sampling frame 
and consumption module of Vietnam’s household survey impose constraints on precise 
comparisons of the 1999 and 2009 poverty rates. However, any measurement error 
resulting from these modifications should be symmetric across provinces. As stressed by 
Lanjouw et al. (2013), the data allow for a comparison of the geographic pattern of poverty 
in the two years. Rather than focusing on the precise estimation of marginal effect sizes, 
this paper concentrates on the identification of the overall direction of the association 
between the change in the poverty rate and the change in Π during 1999-2009.  
 
 
                                                 
102
 Minot et al. (2003) combine the 1998 Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) and a 33% sample of the 
1999 population census to create a poverty map for 1999. Lanjouw et al. (2013) use a 15% sample of the 2009 
population census in combination with the 2010 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) to 
create a poverty map for 2009. 
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Employment share of private firms  
Our key variable of interest, Π, is based on the annual Vietnamese enterprise survey (VES) 
conducted by the GSO. It covers all registered enterprises with at least 30 employees and 
includes information on ownership and sectoral identifiers. Firms with at least 50 percent 
state ownership are defined as SOEs. The VES data are “as complete a record as possible 
on the economic activities of firms in Vietnam” (Howard et al., 2015: 7) and have been 
used in several recent studies related to economic geography and trade (Baccini et al., 2015; 
Ha and Kiyota, 2014, 2015; Howard et al., 2015). Yet, this dataset is not without its 
limitations. It only captures a 15% subsample of firms with fewer than 30 employees. We 
therefore undercount the full extent of private formal employment, as many private 
domestic firms are small. Most importantly, it does not cover the informal sector. There is a 
general scarcity of information on Vietnam’s informal sector. Cling et al. (2011) draw on 
labour force and household surveys and estimate that informal activities account for 20 
percent of GDP.  
Controls 
We primarily rely on the VES and two rounds of Vietnamese population censuses (1989, 
1999) to construct controls. Table 3.A.1 in the Appendix provides a complete list of data 
sources for all variables.  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the province-level variation in both poverty and private firms’ 
employment share that we use for our empirical analysis. Poverty levels were lowest in 
2009 in the Mekong Delta and the Red River Delta, but remained substantially higher in the 
northern mountains and central highlands. Private employment shares are highest near 
HCMC in 2009. The private employment rose on average by 53.4 percentage points (Table 
3.1), while the poverty rate fell on average by 16.2 percentage points. Poverty fell in nearly 
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all provinces.
103
 Table 3.A.2 (in the Appendix) provides descriptive statistics for all 
variables included in the analysis.
104
 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistic of key variables (at level of 60 provinces) 
 
Figure 3.2 plots the two variables at the core of the empirical analysis of this study. This 
descriptive visualization of the unconditional relationship between the province-level 
change in the poverty rate and the change in Π suggests that there is a negative association.  
Larger drops in the provincial poverty rate appear to be accompanied by larger increases in 
Π.  
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 Two southern provinces, Binh Duong and Dong Nai, saw marginal increases in poverty (by 0.20 and 0.71 
percentage points respectively) from relatively low starting levels of poverty (7.62% and 11.02% 
respectively). All other provinces saw reductions in poverty. 
104
 Figure 3.A.1, Figure 3.A.2, Figure 3.A.3 and Figure 3.A.4 in the Appendix map the levels of poverty and 
the private employment share in 1999 and 2009. In addition, Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix provides a list of 
the levels of poverty and the private employment share for all provinces in 1999 and 2009.  
Variable Mean  Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
∆Poverty rate, 1999-2009 -16.22 -18.11 7.72 -32.97 0.71 
∆Private employment share, 
2000-2009 
50.99 53.40 13.30 23.76 78.23 
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Figure 3.2 Change in poverty rate and change in private employment share
 
3.5.2 Empirical strategy 
We now turn our attention to the estimation of the relationship between province-level 
changes in poverty and changes in Π. Variation in our key variable of interest – the 
province-level change in Π during 2000-2009 – is not randomly assigned. This study 
addresses endogeneity and reverse causality concerns through the inclusion of a wide range 
of controls and an instrumental variable strategy. 
The province-level poverty data described above are only available for 1999 and 2009. We 
regress changes in poverty on changes in Π, while controlling for initial conditions. We 
employ a long-difference specification described by the following equation: 
 19992009,iPOVERTY  20002009,  i   1999,'iX r i  
Where 
 20002009,i  
𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒,2009 
(𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒,2009+ 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,2009)
  − 
𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒,2000 
(𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒,2000+ 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,2000)
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The subscript i corresponds to 60 provinces i.
105
 1999,' iX   is a vector of control variables 
measured either in 1999 or 2000 (depending on availability). In addition to the initial level 
of per capita consumption expenditure as a measure of a province’s general level of 
development,
106
 we also add several control variables to capture factors that figure 
prominently in the debate on poverty in Vietnam and poverty in general: urbanization, 
literacy, ethnic majority share, and share of territory at high altitudes. Regarding the role of 
Vietnam’s two main cities (Hanoi and HCMC), we control for the distance to the nearest 
one of the two.
107
 r  are dummies for three macro regions.
108
 They partially control for the 
different conditions and legacies in different parts of Vietnam.  
To control for pre-existing trends, we calculate several variables to capture the 
development in the years before 1999: location in former South Vietnam, bombardment 
during the U.S.-Vietnamese war, net migration 1984-1999, change in urbanization 1989-
1999, and change in the share of households with access to electricity 1989-1999.  
Despite the controls for starting-level conditions and pre-trends, one may still worry about 
omitted variables and reverse causality in this setting. More specifically, we would 
overestimate the poverty-reducing effect of an increase in Π if decreases in poverty cause 
increases in Π (not vice versa). Income growth contributes to aggregate demand and 
therefore enhances the growth prospects of firms, including private firms. In such a case, 
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 The number of provinces changed between 1999 and 2009. One province (Hà Tây) was merged with 
Hanoi, whereas three new provinces were created after being split from their “mother” province. We maintain 
the merger of Hà Tây and Hanoi but re-aggregate the new provinces with their three “mother” provinces in 
2009 based on population weights.  
106
 The initial level of per capita consumption expenditure is meant to capture convergence effects. This  
variable comes from Migueal and Roland (2011) and is based on a combination of information from the 1999 
Population and Housing Census data – which has extensive geographic coverage but limited household-level 
variables – with detailed 1998 Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) household data.  
107
 Note that Hanoi and HCMC are located at opposite ends of the country. Creating two variables for the 
distance to both cities is therefore likely to introduce multicollinearity. We instead created a variable that 
equals the distance to the nearest of the two major cities. For provinces close to Hanoi, this will be the 
distance to Hanoi. For provinces closer to HCMC, this will be the distance to HCMC.  
108
 These three macro regions are aggregations of the seven regions frequently used by Vietnam’s General 
Statistical Office (GSO). We aggregate two (Red River Delta, Northern Uplands) of the GSO’s macro region 
into the first macro region. Our second macro region encompasses three of the GSO’s macro regions (North 
Central Coast, South Central Coast, Central Highlands). Our third macro region is composed of two of the 
GSO’s macro regions (North Southeast, Mekong Delta). Given our limited number of observations (60) the 
use of seven macro regions would be inappropriate.  
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our OLS coefficient would be biased due to reverse causality. Similarly, if policy-makers 
allocate state activities to the most disadvantaged areas with particularly persistent poverty, 
the coefficient of Π would be biased downwards.109 Conversely, the OLS estimates would 
underestimate the poverty-reducing effect of an increase in Π (i.e. the coefficient will be 
upward biased) if poverty caused increases in Π. For example, structural disadvantages 
associated with high levels of poverty may induce provincial governments to adopt 
measures facilitating the entry of private firms. Similarly, if state employment is assigned 
to places with favourable conditions and declining poverty (e.g. Hanoi)
110
, our OLS 
estimates might underestimate the poverty-reducing effect of increases in private firms’ 
employment share.  
To address these concerns, we employ an instrumental variable strategy. We use a shift-
share instrument of the type generally attributed to Bartik (1991) and frequently used in 
studies related to migration (Barone et al., 2016) and labour economics (Card, 2007; 
Moretti, 2010). Faggio and Overman (2014) employ this approach to analyse the effect of 
public sector employment on local labour markets in the UK. For the purpose of this paper, 
the instrument relies on private firms’ initial share of total formal employment and the 
national change – excluding the province under observation – in private formal 
employment over the period of analysis to predict the change in the province-level private 
employment share. Specifically, we construct our instrument as:  
IV_  20002009,i ( 2000,i *
2000,,
2000,,2009,,
privateVNM
privateVNMprivateVNM
e
ee 
) 
Where 2000,i  is the initital formal private employment share of province i, while the term 
to its right captures the national growth rate of formal private sector employment. The 
subscript VNM refers to Vietnam as a whole – apart from province i: the national growth in 
                                                 
109
 As discussed in section 3.2.3, several authors mention SOEs as a regional development instrument (Fujita, 
2013; Vu, 2014). Vu (2014) describes political factors’ influence on the decision to locate a state-owned 
refinery in the province of Quang Ngai in central Vietnam. 
110
 The activities of numerous large SOEs are concentrated in Hanoi. We tested the robustness of our 
empirical results to the exclusion of Hanoi and HCMC; the results hold. 
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private employment is calculated without taking into account the specific province under 
observation and therefore varies across provinces. Excluding a province’s own change in 
private employment helps address the concern that national changes might be driven by 
events in the same province (Faggio and Overman, 2014). The intution behind this IV is 
that, in the abscence of province-specific shocks, all provinces would have received a share 
of the increase in national formal private employment during 2000-2009 in proportion to 
their initial private employment share. As stressed by Baum-Snow and Ferreira (2014), one 
might still worry that starting-level shares are correlated with unobservables that might 
affect changes in poverty. We address this concern through the inclusion of a large number 
of starting-level controls and proxies for pre-trends in our IV estimations.
111
 
3.6 Results and discussion 
 
Table 3.2 presents the main OLS results. The simple univariate regression (column 1) 
indicates that provinces that saw a larger increase in the private sector’s employment share 
(Π) experienced a larger drop in poverty. In column 2, we add the logarithm of per capita 
consumption expenditure in 1999 to control for convergence effects; the coefficient of our 
key variable of interest remains highly significant (1% level). In column 3, we add further 
controls. We enter distance to Hanoi and HCMC, as the country’s two biggest cities act as 
growth engines and nodes of global connectivity (Dang, 2013). To take into account the 
relevance of Vietnam’s increasing integration in trade flows to poverty alleviation 
(McCaig, 2011), we also add a dummy equalling one if the region hosts a major port. All 
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 In addition, we also experimented with a second IV relying on distance to the 17th parallel, i.e. the line that 
was rather arbitrarily chosen in 1954 to mark the border between North and South Vietnam. Bombardments 
during the war were most intense near that border, as U.S. military forces shied away from attacking places 
near the Chinese border in North Vietnam. Miguel and Roland (2006) find that bombing intensity is not 
significantly related to poverty in the early 2000s. Kocher et al. (2011) show that more heavily bombed areas 
displayed greater support for the Viet Cong. Malesky and Taussig (2009) argue that this support later 
translated into greater ideological adherence to Communist views and a conservative, hesitant approach 
during the reform period. It therefore appears plausible that proximity to the 17th parallel is uncorrelated with 
initial poverty and may simultaneously predict a province’s reform-mindedness. However, when we tried to 
use distance to the 17th parallel as an IV, the first-stage F-statistics unfortunately failed to meet acceptable 
minimum levels.   
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specifications from column 3 onwards also include dummies for the three macro regions in 
order to capture the different social and economic conditions in these three parts of 
Vietnam. The coefficient is marginally smaller but remains highly statistically significant. 
In columns 4-8, we enter alternative controls that are expected to capture the initial extent 
of province-level economic deprivation. As these variables are all highly correlated, we 
enter them separately. While column 4 simply controls for the initial level of poverty in 
1999, column 5 instead enters the initial rate of urbanization. Poverty in Vietnam is a 
predominantly rural phenomenon (Nguyen, 2014; Kozel, 2014). We then proceed to control 
for literacy in 1999 (column 6) and the percentage of the population claiming membership 
of the majority ethnicity Kinh (column 7): poverty is particularly common in areas 
predominantly populated by Vietnam’s ethnic minorities (Demombynes and Vu, 2015). 
The existing literature also highlights that mountainous areas, where many members of 
ethnic minorities live, display the most persistent levels of economic deprivation (Kozel, 
2014). We therefore control for the share of the province’s territory’s that is at an altitude 
of 501-1000m as well as for the share at more than 1000m of altitude. The inclusion of 
these controls reduces the size of the coefficient, but we still find a statistically significant 
negative association between increases in Π and the change in the poverty rate. 
The OLS results listed in Table 3.2 might be afflicted by reverse causality. To address this 
concern, we extend our analysis and use the instrumental variable based on the shift-share 
methodology. Table 3.3 presents the results of IV regressions corresponding to the OLS 
specifications of Table 3.2. The first-stage F statistic indicates that the instrumental variable 
has satisfactory explanatory power. The results are generally similar to the OLS findings. 
Yet, the coefficients of the key variable of interest are larger in absolute terms; this may, for 
example, be due to measurement error in our measure of the private sector’s employment 
share. 
Overall, both the OLS and IV results point in the same direction: larger increases in Π are 
associated with larger poverty reduction. This finding resonates with contributions 
dedicating a major role to private-sector firms in the alleviation of poverty (Hasan et al., 
2007; Pietrobelli, 2007; Hipsher, 2013). They can also be read as support for those who call 
for greater efforts to create equal conditions for all firms in Vietnam irrespective of 
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ownership (Hakkala and Kokko, 2007; Smith et al., 2014). In view of our findings, 
measures facilitating the entry of private domestic firms and the establishment of MNE 
subsidiaries are likely to constitute important steps towards poverty reduction.   
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Table 3.2 OLS regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
∆Private employment share,  -0.309*** -0.287*** -0.285*** -0.308*** -0.272*** -0.240*** -0.215*** -0.207** 
2000-2009 (0.065) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.074) (0.082) (0.076) (0.086) 
Log per capita expenditure, 1999  3.455 10.159*      
  (4.121) (5.782)      
Poverty rate, 1999    -0.101     
    (0.078)     
Urbanization (%), 1999     0.120    
     (0.086)    
Literacy (%), 1999      -0.311**   
      (0.118)   
Kinh (%), 1999       -0.131***  
       (0.032)  
Area (% of province) at 501-1000m         0.107* 
altitude        (0.061) 
Area (% of province) at > 1000m         0.199* 
altitude        (0.101) 
Distance Hanoi/HCMC   0.012* 0.009 0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Major port in province   -6.994* -5.280 -7.064* -0.554 0.212 0.354 
   (3.751) (4.158) (3.853) (3.880) (3.330) (3.456) 
Macro region 2   -6.129** -5.009* -3.714 1.841 3.500 -0.780 
   (2.897) (2.727) (2.221) (2.653) (2.292) (2.042) 
Macro region 3   -1.596 -0.838 0.577 2.576 5.897** 5.181* 
   (2.571) (2.440) (2.458) (2.430) (2.567) (2.741) 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
R-squared 0.284 0.295 0.362 0.334 0.344 0.366 0.454 0.432 
Dependent variable: Change in poverty rate, 1999-2009. A constant is included but not reported. Pairwise correlations of the variables 
included in this table are presented in Table 3.A.7 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3 IV regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
∆Private employment share,  -0.355*** -0.299* -0.321** -0.367*** -0.366*** -0.394*** -0.386*** -0.370*** 
2000-2009 (0.123) (0.157) (0.136) (0.128) (0.141) (0.138) (0.130) (0.135) 
Log per capita expenditure, 1999  3.243 9.828*      
  (4.807) (5.651)      
Poverty rate, 1999    -0.104     
    (0.072)     
Urbanization (%), 1999     0.093    
     (0.088)    
Literacy (%), 1999      -0.189   
      (0.139)   
Kinh (%), 1999       -0.101***  
       (0.037)  
Area (% of province) at 501-1000m         0.066 
altitude        (0.069) 
Area (% of province) at > 1000m         0.161 
altitude        (0.109) 
Distance Hanoi/HCMC   0.011* 0.009 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Major port in province   -7.253** -6.020 -7.121* -2.989 -2.235 -2.119 
   (3.598) (4.081) (3.762) (4.369) (3.966) (4.109) 
Macro region 2   -6.103** -5.249** -3.672* -0.215 1.708 -1.538 
   (2.715) (2.501) (2.032) (2.609) (2.236) (1.944) 
Macro region 3   -1.908 -1.606 -0.280 0.554 3.062 2.456 
   (2.498) (2.531) (2.476) (2.576) (2.927) (2.953) 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F 48.14 24.47 23.73 28.15 16.85 24.43 23.29 21.91 
Dependent variable: Change in poverty rate, 1999-2009. A constant is included but not reported. First-stage results are presented in Table 
3.A.5 in the Appendix. Pairwise correlations of the variables included in this table are presented in Table 3.A.7 in the Appendix. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 228 
 
Yet, one should not jump to the conclusion that arguments in favour of strong SOEs (Bai et 
al., 2006; Beresford, 2008) are not valid. As discussed in section 3.4, the period covered by 
this analysis saw few cases of large-scale layoffs of SOE employees – a potentially 
poverty-increasing factor that may have played a greater role in the early 1990s. In 
addition, our analysis is not able to identify threshold effects. Although SOE employment 
declined in absolute as well as relative terms in most provinces during the 2000s, the 
remaining SOE employment may still have an important function in economically deprived 
areas.  
Although our results reveal a clear picture regarding the overall association between 
changes in Π and changes in the poverty rate, the underlying channels remain in the dark. 
The related literature discussed in section 3.4 provides valuable hints, especially related to 
productivity increases associated with free entry and equal access to factors and production. 
Similarly, poverty-reducing effects are assumed to result from greater integration in global 
production networks via MNEs. An in-depth examination of the relevant mechanisms 
would require substantial extensions with a different set of methods and at other levels of 
analysis (households and firms); these extensions are beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, we run three ancillary regressions (Table 3.4) to shed some preliminary, 
descriptive light on some of the “suspects” emerging from the related literature. Both 
contributions calling for lower obstacles to the formalization of firms (de Soto, 2000; 
Djankov, 2009) as well as voices critical of privileges enjoyed by SOEs (Smith et al., 2014) 
argue that increased entry will lead to productivity gains. Via lower prices, and growth of 
employment and wages these competition-induced productivity gains may alleviate 
economic deprivation. In column 1 of Table 3.4, we choose our main specification 
(corresponding to column 3 of Table 3.2) but also control for the change (between 2000 and 
2009) in the number of all (i.e. of any ownership) formal firms per 1,000 inhabitants.
112
 The 
corresponding coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that increases in 
the number of firms were associated with lower reductions in poverty. This somewhat 
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 We obtain very similar results if we instead normalize the number of firms by the number of formal 
employees in the province in thousands. 
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surprising finding may point to the growth of numerous formal but relatively small firms of 
limited longevity and capital intensity in the 2000s (Tran et al., 2008). It may also reflect 
greater growth in the number of firms in places that already had relatively low levels of 
poverty, leaving little scope for further poverty reduction. In the light of the results shown 
in column 1, it does not appear likely that the results of our main analysis are driven by 
productivity increases associated with greater entry. 
In columns 2 and 3 we drop the key variable of interest of our main analysis (changes in Π) 
and instead enter the change in the private domestic employment share (column 2) and the 
change in the MNE employment share (column 3). The coefficient of the private domestic 
employment share is close to zero and not statistically significant. Although these 
exploratory OLS results must be read in a careful way, this finding suggests that the 
dramatic increase in the number of formal private domestic firms in the 2000s contributed 
little to poverty alleviation. In contrast, the coefficient of the change in MNEs’ employment 
share (column 3) is strongly significant and negative. The coefficient’s magnitude is similar 
to the one identified for changes in Π in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. While an instrumental variable 
strategy
113
 for changes in MNEs employment share would be required to draw profound 
conclusions, this finding suggests that MNEs may be the key actors behind the general 
picture emerging from our main analysis. MNEs generally possess superior technology 
(Iammarino and McCann, 2013), pay higher salaries than local Vietnamese firms (Fukase, 
2014), and may act as intermediaries linking Vietnamese provinces to far-away export 
markets. They play a key role as drivers of Vietnam’s increasing integration in global 
production networks (Athukorala and Tien, 2012). MNEs’ share of Vietnam’s total exports 
increased from 40.6% of all Vietnamese exports in 1999 to 53.2% in 2009 (GSO, 2016). It 
therefore appears likely that our key variable of interest, the change in Π, to some extent 
captures poverty-reducing effects associated with MNE activities and MNE-related export-
oriented manufacturing.  
                                                 
113
 The fact that many provinces had zero MNE employment in 2000 prevents us from constructing a similar 
shift-share IV for changes in MNEs’ employment share. In addition, in the 2000s MNEs often entered 
Vietnam to operate in sectors with limited previous domestic activities (e.g. electronics), complicating 
attempts to rely on initial sectoral structures to construct an IV. 
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Table 3.4 Ancillary OLS regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆Private employment share, 2000-2009 -0.268***   
 (0.071)   
Log per capita expenditure, 1999 7.678 13.196* 14.332** 
 (5.806) (7.174) (6.145) 
∆ Number of formal firms per 1,000 inhabitants,  0.119**   
2000-2009 (0.055)   
∆Private domestic employment share, 2000-2009  0.023  
  (0.108)  
∆MNE employment share, 2000-2009   -0.280*** 
   (0.063) 
Distance Hanoi/HCMC 0.010 0.014* 0.011* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Major port in province -6.512* -4.885 -6.955** 
 (3.452) (3.640) (3.426) 
Macro region 2 -5.774* -6.458* -7.524** 
 (2.949) (3.514) (2.859) 
Macro region 3 1.299 0.922 -1.749 
 (3.095) (2.703) (2.644) 
Constant -64.385 -121.357** -119.084** 
 (45.803) (56.096) (47.457) 
Observations 60 60 60 
R-squared 0.398 0.171 0.368 
Dependent variable: Change in poverty rate, 1999-2009. NOTE: Joint ventures between domestic firms and MNEs are 
counted as MNEs. Pairwise correlations of the variables included in this table are presented in Table 3.A.8 in the 
Appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
3.6.1 Robustness checks 
To test the robustness of the main results presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, we run several 
additional regressions incorporating variables intended to capture province-specific 
trajectories. We control for whether a province belonged to former South Vietnam and for 
U.S. bombardment
114
 during 1965-1975 (columns 1 and 2 Table 3.A.4 in the Appendix) to 
take into account potential long-run effects of the U.S.-Vietnamese war. We then proceed 
to enter three proxies for pre-1999 poverty trends: changes in access to electricity, net 
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 Although Miguel and Roland (2006) find that province-level U.S. bombing intensity was not a significant 
predictor of poverty levels in 2002, Malesky and Taussig (2009) argue that this finding reflects the efforts of 
Vietnam’s government to offset bombing-related damages through public investment.    
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migration, and urbanization (columns 3-5 of Table 3.A.4 in the Appendix).
115
 While the 
coefficients of our key variable of interest become somewhat smaller in absolute terms in 
the OLS as well as in the IV estimates, the general picture remains unchanged. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Potential gains for economically deprived areas figure prominently in the debate about 
enterprise reforms in developing countries. However, the implications of changes in the 
relative size of the private sector with respect to regional disparities remain imperfectly 
understood in the empirical literature. This study sheds light on the link between increases 
in private firms’ employment share and the prevalence of poverty in the provinces of 
Vietnam.  
Particularly since the introduction of the Enterprise Law in 2000, Vietnam has taken large 
steps towards a more equal treatment of all firms irrespective of ownership. With provinces 
acting as policy “laboratories” (Schmitz et al., 2015), differential patterns of progress of 
private sector development provide a fruitful setting for the empirical investigation of the 
link between province-level changes in the relative weight of the private sector in the 
economy and the geography of economic deprivation.  
Our results suggest that during 1999-2009 provinces with larger increases in private firms’ 
formal employment share saw bigger reductions of poverty. This finding is robust to the 
inclusion of a wide range of controls and instrumental variable estimations. Our empirical 
strategy and data do not allow for the precise identification of the channels in operation. We 
therefore leave this challenge for further work. A set of exploratory, auxiliary regressions 
suggests that increased entry of firms – frequently highlighted as a potential driver of 
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  In the case of the variables for changes in electricity and urbanization, we only have 35 unique values. 
Due to changes in the number of provinces between the population censuses in 1989 and 1999, we have to 
assign the values of 35 larger provinces to our 60 provinces. While this will certainly cause measurement 
error, the high level of significance of both controls suggests that their inclusion is still meaningful.  
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income gains via productivity increases (Djankov, 2009) – is unlikely to drive our results. 
Conversely, we find tentative signs that multinational enterprises (MNEs) may be key 
actors behind our findings, whereas private domestic firms’ contribution appears limited. 
These ancillary results merit further investigation in future research. MNEs increasingly set 
up plants outside Vietnam’s established economic centres (Nguyen and Revilla Diez, 
2016); research investigating their location choices may lead to important insights 
regarding provincial differences in progress in poverty reduction. At the same time, the 
absence of clear signs of a link between increases in private domestic firms’ employment 
share and changes in provincial poverty rates highlights the necessity to improve our 
understanding of the obstacles faced by this category of Vietnamese firms.  
Our results are in line with contributions assigning a major role to the private sector in the 
alleviation of economic deprivation in developing countries. In the specific setting of 
Vietnam during 1999-2009, private sector dynamism appears to have created new 
opportunities that benefited economically deprived areas. Yet, context-specific factors limit 
the generalizability of our findings. Vietnam’s government adopted a gradualist approach to 
mitigate socially adverse effects of rapid structural change (Rama, 2008, 2014; Malesky 
and London, 2014). As we are unable to detect threshold effects, the results of this study 
should not be interpreted as support for radical, fast-paced dismantling of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in emerging countries with a high share of SOE employment. Vietnam’s 
remaining SOE employment may still be of relevance to economically deprived areas. Our 
results do, however, provide support for policies that reduce obstacles to private firms’ 
growth. 
This study shows that regional differences in changes in the relative economic weight of the 
private sector can help to explain changes in regional patterns of economic deprivation in 
emerging and developing countries. Prominent differences in subnational governments’ 
attitudes towards private sector development have been observed in several countries, 
including China (Jin et al., 2005) and Russia (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2011; Yakovlev and 
Zhuravskaya, 2013). In light of the widespread trend towards decentralization in recent 
years (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010), regional variation in private sector policies and 
the relative size of the private sector in the economy may become even more pronounced.  
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This study has several limitations that indicate potential directions for future research. The 
number of observations is limited; access to comparable poverty data over a long period 
may enable future studies to conduct a panel analysis. This analysis also relies on only one 
dependent variable and one level of analysis. Investigations using related dependent 
variables at the household and firm-level might lead to important additional insights, 
especially regarding the different roles of MNEs and domestic private firms in shaping the 
channels behind the general picture identified in this study. In addition, detailed 
information on province-level differences in approaches to business reforms and social 
policies could improve our understanding of the generalizability of experiences from 
Vietnam’s “learning by experimenting” at the province-level (Schmitz et al., 2015: 187). 
We intend to explore some of these aspects in future work. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 3.A.1 Map of Vietnamese provinces: poverty rate in 1999  
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Figure 3.A.2 Map of Vietnamese provinces: poverty rate in 2009 
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Figure 3.A.3 Map of Vietnamese provinces: private firms‘ employment share in 2000 
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Figure 3.A.4 Map of Vietnamese provinces: private firms‘ employment share in 2009 
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Table 3.A.1 Description of variables and data sources 
Variable Description Source 
Main variables 
Poverty rate Percentage of province-level population 
with insufficient income to cover basic 
needs as defined by basket of essential 
food and additional non-food 
consumption 
Minot et al. (2003) for 1999, Lanjouw et 
al. (2013) for 2009. 
Minot et al. (2003) combine 1998 Vietnam 
Living Standard Survey (VLSS) and 1999 
population census. Lanjouw et al. (2013) 
use 2009 population census in combination 
with 2010 Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey (VHLSS). 
Private 
employment 
share 
Employment in private domestic and 
foreign-owned enterprises as a 
percentage of total formal employment 
in province 
Vietnamese Enterprise Survey, 2000 and 
2009 
Per capita 
expenditure 
Logarithm of per capita consumption 
expenditure 
Miguel and Roland (2006); based on 1998 
Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) 
and 1999 population census 
Urbanization 
Percent of province-level population 
living in areas designated as urban 
3% subsample of Vietnamese population 
census 1999, accessed via IPUMS 
Literacy 
Percent of province-level population 
able to read and write in any language 
3% subsample of Vietnamese population 
census 1999, accessed via IPUMS 
Kinh 
Percent of province-level population 
claiming membership of main ethnicity 
in Vietnam (Khin) 
3% subsample of Vietnamese population 
census 1999, accessed via IPUMS 
Area at 501-
1000m 
altitude 
Percentage of province’s total territory 
located at 501-1000m altitude 
Miguel and Roland (2006) 
Area at > 
1000m 
altitude 
Percentage of province’s total territory 
located at >1000m altitude 
Miguel and Roland (2006) 
Distance 
Hanoi/HCMC 
Distance in kilometres to the nearest of 
the two biggest Vietnamese cities 
Schmitz (2016) 
Major port in 
province 
Dummy that equals 1 if province is 
location of one of Vietnam’s 5 major 
ports (HCMC, Hai Phong, Da Nang, 
Binh Dinh, Quang Ninh) 
Own calculation 
Macro region 
1 
Dummy that equals 1 if province is 
located in Red River Delta or Northern 
Uplands 
Own calculation 
Macro region 
2 
Dummy that equals 1 if province is 
located in North Central Coast, South 
Central Coast, or Central Highlands 
Own calculation 
Macro region 
3 
Dummy that equals 1 if province is 
located in North Southeast or Mekong 
Delta 
Own calculation 
Variables for ancillary regressions 
# of formal 
firms per 
1,000 
inhabitants 
 
Number of firms in the province 
captured by Vietnamese enterprise 
survey in 2000 divided by province’s 
population in 1,000 
 
 
Vietnamese enterprise survey and 15% 
subsample of Vietnamese population census 
2009, accessed via IPUMS 
 
 248 
 
Variable Description Source 
Private 
domestic 
employment 
share 
Employment in formal firms that do not 
have any state capital or foreign capital, 
divided by total formal employment in 
the province, multiplied by 100. 
Vietnamese enterprise survey, 2000 and 
2009 
MNE 
employment 
share 
Employment in formal firms with 
foreign capital (including joint 
ventures), divided by total formal 
employment in the province, multiplied 
by 100. 
Vietnamese enterprise survey, 2000 and 
2009 
Controls for pre-trends 
South 
Dummy that equals one if province was 
part of former South Vietnam 
Own calculation 
Bombs per 
square 
kilometre 
Total U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets 
per square kilometre dropped during 
1965-1975 
Miguel and Roland (2006) 
Change 
households 
with access to 
electricity, 
1989-1999 
Percentage of province-level 
households with access to electricity in 
1999 minus same measure in 1989 
3% subsample of Vietnamese population 
census 1999 and 5% subsample of 
Vietnamese population census 1989, 
accessed via IPUMS 
Net migration 
1984-1999 as 
% of 1999 
population 
Net migration received by province 
during 1984-1999 as percentage of 
province’s population in 1999. 
National Human Development Report 
(National Centre for Social Sciences and 
Humanities, 2001) and 3% subsample of 
Vietnamese population census 1999, 
accessed via IPUMS 
Change 
urbanization 
1989-1999 
Percent of province-level population 
living in areas designated as urban in 
1999 minus same measure in 1989 
3% subsample of Vietnamese population 
census 1999 and 5% subsample of 
Vietnamese population census 1989, 
accessed via IPUMS 
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Table 3.A.2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
∆Poverty rate, 1999-2009 -16.22 7.72 -32.97 0.71 
∆Private employment share, 2000-2009 50.99 13.3 23.76 78.23 
Log per capita expenditure, 1999 7.8 0.25 7.25 8.6 
Distance Hanoi/HCMC 251.3 220.86 0 835 
Major port in province 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Macro region 1 0.4 0.49 0 1 
Macro region 2 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Macro region 3 0.33 0.48 0 1 
Poverty rate, 1999 40.85 15.97 5.35 79.76 
Urbanization (%), 1999 20.89 15.49 5.64 83.6 
Literacy (%), 1999 89.19 7.87 54 97.2 
Kinh (%), 1999 79.88 28.02 4.41 99.99 
Area (% of province) at 501-1000m altitude 13.62 17.26 0 60.7 
Area (% of province) at > 1000m altitude 4.93 9.75 0 37.61 
Instrumental variable 119.09 99.78 10.55 416.39 
∆Number of formal firms per 1,000 inhabitants, 2000-2009 10 16.06 -51.35 39.26 
∆Private domestic employment share, 2000-2009 20.75 10.55 -11.5 47.18 
∆MNE employment share, 2000-2009 30.23 13.26 9.38 64.57 
Former South 0.53 0.5 0 1 
Total U.S. bombs per km², 1965-1975 28.81 50.15 0.01 335.47 
∆Households (%) with access to electricity, 1989-1999 63.5 18.33 12.2 98.1 
Net migration 1984-1999 as % of population in 1999 -0.35 5.38 -8.24 17.2 
∆Urbanization, 1989-1999 3.92 3.99 -4.23 18.93 
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Table 3.A.3 List of provinces and levels of poverty and private employment share in 
1999 and 2009 
Province number on 
maps (Fig. 3.A.1-
3.A.4) 
Province Poverty 
rate (%) 
1999 
Poverty 
rate (%) 
2009 
Private 
employment 
share (%), 2000 
Private 
employment 
share (%), 2009 
1 Hà Nội 26.7 4.9 22.8 76.6 
2 Hà Giang 74.9 71.5 59.1 83.8 
4 Cao Bằng 67.1 53.1 11.5 56.3 
6 Bắc Kạn 60.4 46.0 3.3 64.4 
8 
Tuyên 
Quang 
57.2 40.0 6.0 70.7 
10 Lào Cai 69.7 56.8 17.7 72.4 
12 Lai Châu 79.8 73.7 1.7 44.1 
14 Sơn La 73.2 63.6 1.7 44.1 
15 Yên Bái 57.1 45.3 14.9 67.8 
17 Hòa Bình 58.5 47.3 12.3 77.6 
19 Thái Nguyên 42.7 22.0 8.7 68.3 
20 Lạng Sơn 62.3 45.7 21.5 73.2 
22 Quảng Ninh 34.7 12.1 6.3 40.9 
24 Bắc Giang 45.6 23.8 9.2 87.5 
25 Phú Thọ 45.2 23.6 20.3 85.7 
26 Vĩnh Phúc 45.0 12.0 26.9 85.9 
27 Bắc Ninh 38.0 10.2 24.7 83.6 
30 Hải Dương 32.6 14.8 19.3 81.9 
31 Hải Phòng 29.2 7.9 36.1 76.4 
33 Hưng Yên 37.0 12.8 15.9 89.7 
34 Thái Bình 34.2 19.0 20.2 81.9 
35 Hà Nam 38.2 16.6 14.8 84.2 
36 Nam Định 34.8 14.0 12.4 77.4 
37 Ninh Bình 38.1 15.3 7.0 61.7 
38 Thanh Hóa 45.9 26.5 18.8 76.1 
40 Nghệ An 46.0 26.7 7.4 71.6 
42 Hà Tĩnh 45.0 21.6 4.7 69.5 
44 Quảng Bình 46.6 23.2 13.4 67.5 
45 Quảng Trị 50.5 29.6 17.9 66.6 
46 
Thừa Thiên 
Huế 
47.1 19.4 10.7 58.5 
48 Đà Nẵng 16.0 2.4 22.9 78.1 
49 Quảng Nam 41.5 23.5 19.4 77.4 
51 Quảng Ngãi 45.0 23.7 11.3 67.6 
52 Bình Định 38.5 16.7 30.7 75.6 
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Province number on 
maps (Fig. 3.A.1-
3.A.4) 
Province 
Poverty 
rate (%) 
1999 
Poverty 
rate (%) 
2009 
Private 
employment 
share (%), 2000 
Private 
employment 
share (%), 2009 
54 Phú Yên 40.9 22.1 4.8 73.0 
56 Khánh Hòa 33.0 15.5 37.4 70.2 
58 Ninh Thuận 52.9 34.5 13.7 69.7 
60 Bình Thuận 44.6 21.4 19.2 67.8 
62 Kon Tum 50.8 47.6 8.2 59.4 
64 Gia Lai 52.5 43.3 4.3 45.3 
66 Đắk Lắk 43.0 30.8 7.7 49.7 
68 Lâm Đồng 33.9 22.0 30.5 71.5 
70 Bình Phước 17.5 17.2 16.9 48.6 
72 Tây Ninh 13.2 11.8 17.2 78.1 
74 Bình Dương 7.6 7.8 65.9 91.7 
75 Đồng Nai 11.0 11.7 62.8 86.6 
77 
Bà Rịa - 
Vũng Tàu 
10.1 10.0 32.5 56.3 
79 
Hồ Chí 
Minh 
5.3 2.9 52.6 86.0 
80 Long An 29.2 11.0 60.4 87.9 
82 Tiền Giang 27.3 9.5 11.1 62.6 
83 Bến Tre 32.1 10.0 11.4 62.1 
84 Trà Vinh 43.1 22.3 4.3 74.6 
86 Vĩnh Long 32.7 11.8 20.8 72.2 
87 Đồng Tháp 38.7 15.6 17.6 71.7 
89 An Giang 40.2 18.2 14.0 67.0 
91 Kiên Giang 39.7 24.0 6.7 37.8 
92 Cần Thơ 34.1 14.8 17.0 73.6 
94 Sóc Trăng 43.1 27.3 21.7 67.9 
95 Bạc Liêu 35.7 23.3 7.7 41.2 
96 Cà Mau 34.4 26.4 8.9 69.3 
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Table 3.A.4 Robustness checks with proxies for pre-trends 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV 
∆Private employment share,  -0.303*** -0.286*** -0.223*** -0.160** -0.248*** -0.328** -0.325** -0.288** -0.258** -0.266** 
2000-2009 (0.073) (0.069) (0.068) (0.064) (0.065) (0.147) (0.138) (0.127) (0.121) (0.130) 
Log per capita expenditure,  7.471 10.653* 12.447** 4.864 5.107 7.413 10.299* 11.612** 4.841 5.077 
1999 (5.664) (5.862) (5.984) (5.623) (6.113) (5.367) (5.657) (5.923) (5.153) (5.706) 
Former South Vietnam -1.067     -1.342     
 (2.371)     (2.494)     
Total U.S. bombs per km²,   -0.008     -0.009    
1965–75  (0.015)     (0.015)    
∆Households (%) with access    -0.140***     -0.121**   
to  electricity, 1989-1999   (0.049)     (0.057)   
Net migration 1984-1999 as %     0.746***     0.642***  
of  population in 1999    (0.149)     (0.170)  
∆Urbanization, 1989-1999     0.556***     0.542*** 
     (0.187)     (0.198) 
Distance Hanoi/HCMC 0.003 0.012* 0.008 0.013** 0.007 0.003 0.012* 0.008 0.012** 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Major port in province -6.036 -7.195* -8.509** -6.016* -4.087 -6.273* -7.490** -8.718*** -6.749** -4.293 
 (3.668) (3.809) (3.195) (3.020) (3.749) (3.641) (3.635) (3.098) (2.984) (3.555) 
Macro region 2  -5.939** -5.135* -8.190** -5.115*  -5.904** -5.227** -7.843** -5.129** 
  (2.908) (2.791) (3.279) (2.754)  (2.706) (2.542) (3.087) (2.542) 
Macro region 3  -1.503 -4.385 -1.304 -0.871  -1.848 -4.505* -2.061 -1.044 
  (2.607) (2.762) (2.374) (2.242)  (2.514) (2.607) (2.265) (2.278) 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
R-squared 0.328 0.364 0.422 0.532 0.420      
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F      21.09 23.27 21.46 22.71 18.68 
Dependent variable: Change in poverty rate, 1999-2009. A constant is included but not reported. First-stage IV results are presented in Table 3.A.6 in the Appendix. Pairwise correlations 
corresponding to the variables included in this table are presented in Table 3.A.9 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.A.5 IV first-stage results corresponding to Table 3.3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Instrumental variable -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.075*** -0.078*** -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.072*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Log per capita expenditure,   -2.773 3.869      
1999  (7.213) (8.534)      
Poverty rate, 1999    -0.203     
    (0.129)     
Urbanization (%), 1999     -0.173    
     (0.112)    
Literacy (%), 1999      0.741***   
      (0.136)   
Kinh (%), 1999       0.165***  
       (0.046)  
Area (% of province) at         -0.347*** 
501-1000m altitude        (0.111) 
Area (% of province) at          -0.015 
>1000m  altitude        (0.139) 
Distance Hanoi/HCMC   -0.014 -0.007 -0.017* 0.009 -0.005 -0.003 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Major port in province   -4.506 -6.992 2.502 -7.776 -6.298 -6.683 
   (7.504) (7.334) (6.950) (6.893) (7.339) (7.289) 
Macro region 2   0.527 -2.886 3.287 -8.401* -5.642 0.929 
   (5.129) (5.168) (4.820) (4.509) (4.669) (3.120) 
Macro region 3   -8.489** -11.33*** -6.200* -8.898** -12.06*** -12.349*** 
   (3.628) (3.914) (3.367) (3.362) (3.619) (3.469) 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F 48.14 24.47 23.73 28.15 16.85 24.43 23.29 21.91 
A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.A.6 First-stage IV results corresponding to Table 3.A.4 
 (1) (2) (2) (3) (4) 
Instrumental variable -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.072*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) 
Log per capita expenditure,  9.266 3.608 -0.027 10.556 7.953 
1999 (9.075) (8.702) (8.150) (8.200) (9.263) 
Former South Vietnam -9.618***     
 (3.321)     
Total U.S. bombs per km²,   0.005    
1965–75  (0.020)    
∆Households (%) with access    0.247**   
to electricity, 1989-1999   (0.097)   
Net migration 1984-1999 as %     -0.904***  
of population in 1999    (0.173)  
∆Urbanization, 1989-1999     -0.487 
     (0.356) 
Distance Hanoi/HCMC 0.001 -0.014 -0.006 -0.014* -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) 
Major port in province -5.997 -4.382 -1.219 -4.822 -6.949 
 (7.528) (7.701) (8.067) (7.382) (7.867) 
Macro region 2  0.414 -1.293 2.932 -0.374 
  (5.262) (4.267) (3.751) (5.130) 
Macro region 3  -8.547** -2.626 -7.529** -8.852** 
  (3.674) (3.423) (3.590) (3.848) 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F 21.09 23.27 21.46 22.71 18.68 
A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.A.7 Pairwise correlation table corresponding to variables entered in regressions presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) ∆Poverty rate, '99-'09 1 
              (2) ∆Priv. empl. share, '00-'09 -0.533 1 
             
(3) 
Logarithm per cap. 
expenditure,'99 0.282 -0.344 1 
            (4) Distance HN/HCMC -0.014 -0.011 -0.259 1 
           (5) Major port -0.005 -0.213 0.387 0.117 1 
          (6) Macro region 1 -0.182 0.304 -0.411 -0.383 0 1 
         (7) Macro region 2 -0.11 0.033 -0.033 0.757 0.091 -0.492 1 
        (8) Macro region 3 0.292 -0.347 0.458 -0.312 -0.085 -0.577 -0.426 1 
       (9) Poverty,'99 0.052 0.094 -0.776 0.265 -0.271 0.343 0.024 -0.379 1 
      (10) Urbanization,'99 0.255 -0.4 0.706 0.087 0.637 -0.256 0.144 0.131 -0.389 1 
     (11) Literacy,'99 -0.344 0.233 0.566 -0.37 0.156 -0.078 0.028 0.055 -0.66 0.188 1 
    (12) Kinh,'99 -0.36 0.09 0.619 -0.097 0.139 -0.418 0.139 0.304 -0.751 0.204 0.695 1 
   (13) Area 501-1000m 0.238 -0.107 -0.514 0.547 -0.069 0.057 0.463 -0.494 0.61 -0.032 -0.648 -0.656 1 
  (14) Area >1000m 0.341 -0.15 -0.424 0.344 -0.133 0.14 0.194 -0.328 0.539 -0.018 -0.689 -0.563 0.782 1 
 (15) Instrumental variable 0.352 -0.575 0.533 -0.255 0.26 -0.139 -0.13 0.267 -0.336 0.38 0.187 0.171 -0.248 -0.109 1 
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Table 3.A.8 Pairwise correlation table corresponding to variables entered in regressions presented in Table 3.4 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) ∆Poverty rate, '99-'09 1 
          (2) ∆Priv. employment share, '00-'09 -0.533 1 
         (3) Logarithm per cap. expenditure,'99 0.282 -0.344 1 
        (4) Distance HN/HCMC -0.014 -0.011 -0.259 1 
       (5) Major port -0.005 -0.213 0.387 0.117 1 
      (6) Macro region 1 -0.182 0.304 -0.411 -0.383 0 1 
     (7) Macro region 2 -0.11 0.033 -0.033 0.757 0.091 -0.492 1 
    (8) Macro region 3 0.292 -0.347 0.458 -0.312 -0.085 -0.577 -0.426 1 
   (9) ∆Number firms/1,000 inhabitants, '00-'09 0.098 0.028 -0.045 0.296 0.162 0.201 0.374 -0.559 1 
  (10) ∆Priv.domestic employment share, '00-'09 -0.088 0.4 -0.358 0.299 -0.113 -0.001 0.252 -0.236 0.284 1 
 (11) ∆MNE employment share, '00-'09 -0.465 0.685 -0.06 -0.248 -0.124 0.306 -0.167 -0.161 -0.198 -0.394 1 
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Table 3.A.9 Pairwise correlation table corresponding to variables entered in regressions presented in Table 3.A.4 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) ∆Poverty rate, '99-'09 1 
             (2) ∆Priv. employment share, '00-'09 -0.533 1 
            
(3) 
Logarithm per cap. 
expenditure,'99 0.282 -0.344 1 
           (4) Distance HN/HCMC -0.014 -0.011 -0.259 1 
          (5) Major port -0.005 -0.213 0.387 0.117 1 
         (6) Macro region 1 -0.182 0.304 -0.411 -0.383 0 1 
        (7) Macro region 2 -0.11 0.033 -0.033 0.757 0.091 -0.492 1 
       (8) Macro region 3 0.292 -0.347 0.458 -0.312 -0.085 -0.577 -0.426 1 
      (9) South 0.269 -0.391 0.461 0.335 0.04 -0.873 0.262 0.661 1 
     (10) Bombs per square km 0.058 -0.128 0.213 0.331 0.031 -0.403 0.363 0.078 0.358 1 
    (11) ∆Access to electricity, '89-'99 -0.454 0.467 -0.112 -0.099 -0.122 0.338 0.147 -0.488 -0.467 0.089 1 
   (12) Migration'84'-'99/population 0.609 -0.494 0.45 -0.001 0.162 -0.319 0.14 0.2 0.424 0.009 -0.347 1 
  (13) ∆Urbanization '89-'99 0.454 -0.302 0.317 0.195 -0.044 -0.3 0.173 0.15 0.335 0.338 -0.067 0.498 1 
 (14) Instrumental variable 0.352 -0.575 0.533 -0.255 0.26 -0.139 -0.13 0.267 0.205 0.108 -0.14 0.314 0.242 1 
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4 THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? SINO-VIETNAMESE 
TRADE AND FIRM-LEVEL DYNAMICS IN 
VIETNAM 
4.1 Introduction 
 
China’s re-emergence as a major trading power has played a central role in the 
reshuffling of the global geography of trade in recent decades. Its share of global 
merchandise exports has grown from less than two percent in 1990 to nearly 14 percent 
in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2016). Particularly China’s rapid build-up of manufacturing 
capacities has inspired a debate about potential effects on firms and workers in other 
countries (Jenkins et al., 2008; Kemeny et al., 2015; Bloom et al., 2016).  
Improved access to micro data and new methods have facilitated recent progress of 
research into the effects of imports from China on firms and workers in advanced 
economies, such as the U.S. (Autor et al., 2013) or Denmark (Utar, 2014). Yet, there is 
a scarcity of micro-level investigations of the implications of China’s export growth for 
countries that are less developed than China. This paper addresses this gap by 
examining firm-level data from Vietnam, a fast-growing economy that has experienced 
a substantial increase in imports from its north-eastern neighbour, China. 
Vietnam and China resumed trade links in 1991 after a border conflict (1979-1990). 
Their bilateral trade has grown significantly in recent years. This study covers the years  
2000-2012, a period in which China’s share of Vietnamese imports rose from 5.7% in 
2000 to 24.3% in 2012 (UN Comtrade data). We employ firm-level data from the 
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annual Vietnamese enterprise survey covering virtually all formal medium-sized and 
large manufacturing firms and link firms to sector-level trade flows via four-digit 
sectoral identifiers. Adopting an instrumental variable approach that exploits exogenous 
intensification of Chinese imports in a basket of countries outside Asia and sector-level 
variation in exposure to Chinese imports, the empirical analysis asks: What is the 
association between Vietnam’s growing imports from China and Vietnamese 
manufacturing firms’ employment, sales, and sales per worker? Based on information 
on end-use categories of traded goods, we investigate whether this relationship might be 
conditioned by the share of intermediate inputs in sector-level imports from China. 
Recent findings from advanced economies suggest that imports from China reduce 
firms’ employment and sales and induce efforts to specialize in higher-value activities 
less exposed to Chinese competition (e.g. Mion and Zhu, 2013; Utar, 2014). Micro-level 
research on Latin American OECD members (Chile: Alvarez and Opazo, 2011; Mexico: 
Utar and Ruiz, 2013; Iacovone et al., 2013) identifies similar patterns. However, these 
insights might not equally apply to countries below China’s level of development. There 
are multi-faceted differences between the relatively advanced economies that provided 
the context for recent micro-level studies and less developed economies, e.g. regarding 
technological capabilities, factor endowments, and trade composition. 
While observers in advanced economies often perceive China’s rise as a threat to 
current standards of living, in developing countries China’s manufacturing exports are 
frequently considered as a potential obstacle to future income gains via manufacturing-
driven development. Developing countries typically export primary goods to China and 
import manufactures from China (Costa et al., 2016). Coxhead (2007) argues that 
China’s economies of scale in manufacturing, combined with its hunger for 
commodities, may cause countries like Indonesia to specialize in commodities at the 
expense of manufacturing.
116
  
                                                 
116
 Similar arguments have been raised by policy-makers. Ahead of her visit to China in 2011, Brazil’s 
president promised to address the risk of de-industrialization associated with overreliance on exports of 
commodities such as iron ore (Bevins, 2011). At the China-Africa Forum in Beijing in 2012, South 
Africa’s president warned that the current trade pattern was “not sustainable in the long run” (Hook, 
2012). 
 260 
 
In Vietnam’s case, statistics on manufacturing exports do not correspond to such a 
scenario: Accounting for 42.7% of all Vietnamese exports in 2000, the share of 
manufactures had climbed to 76.3% by 2014 (WDI, 2016). Yet, amid bilateral tensions 
over disputed territory, Vietnamese policy-makers have repeatedly highlighted concerns 
about the perceived one-sided nature of the two countries’ trade (Economist, 2012). 
China mainly imports commodities from Vietnam, while manufactured goods account 
for most of its exports to Vietnam. Although scholars have examined Vietnam’s WTO 
accession in 2007 (Baccini et al., 2015) and its growing trade with the U.S. (McCaig, 
2011; Fukase, 2013; McCaig and Pavcnik, 2014), the consequences of the rapid 
increase in imports from its largest trading partner, China, remain underexplored. 
Notwithstanding the debate within Vietnam, growing imports from China may not 
necessarily affect Vietnamese manufacturers negatively. Vietnamese wages are 
significantly lower than Chinese wages, which may reduce the likelihood of strong 
competitive effects associated with imports from China observed in advanced 
economies. As Vietnam’s integration into the global economy deepens, access to cheap 
Chinese inputs may benefit Vietnamese manufacturing activities.  
Our empirical results indicate that growing industry-level exposure to imports from 
China is positively associated with firm-level employment. The link with sales is 
positive but less precisely estimated, whereas the evidence is inconclusive regarding the 
association with labour productivity. A positive relationship between exposure to 
imports from China and firm-level employment and sales is particularly pronounced 
when more than 50% of the imports from China are intermediates. Conversely, tentative 
signs of competitive effects associated with lower firm-level employment are found for 
subsamples with imports from China predominantly consisting of non-intermediates.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related conceptual and 
empirical literature. Section 3 describes Vietnam’s trade profile and recent trends. 
Section 4 explains the data sources and empirical strategy. Results are interpreted in 
section 5; section 6 concludes. 
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4.2 Related literature 
 
The conceptual and empirical literature related to this paper can be subsumed into two 
broad categories: (i) the literature on trade’s effect on industrial evolution and firm-level 
outcomes and (ii) the debate about the consequences of China’s growing exports with 
respect to manufacturing activities in other countries. In addition, contributions 
conceptualizing industrialization in Asia as a process of diffusion are of relevance to the 
wider context of this study. 
The trade-related literature highlights two principal ways how increasing exposure to 
imports may affect firm-level outcomes, including employment and productivity: via 
intensified competition and technology diffusion. Increasing exposure to imports is 
assumed to increase competition, inducing reallocation processes at several levels. 
Within firms, resource allocation is assumed to change in a productivity-enhancing way 
in response to increasing competition. Within industries, less productive firms are 
expected to exit the market as a consequence of greater competition through trade, 
resulting in higher industry-wide productivity levels. Across industries, reallocations in 
line with the country’s comparative advantage are expected (e.g. Bernard et al., 2007; 
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Bloom et al., 2013).  
Several trade models suggest that technology embodied in imports helps to diffuse 
benefits of innovations across national borders (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Keller, 2000; Eaton and Kortum, 2002). The extent of R&D spillovers from country A 
to country B is often assumed to depend on the share of A’s products in B’s total 
imports (Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Coe and Helpman, 1995).
117
  
Especially imports used in domestic production processes are assumed to provide 
potential for technological spillovers (Xu and Wang, 1999; Acharya and Keller, 2009); 
explanations of their role concentrate on the quality and price of inputs (Goldberg et al., 
2009). Imported intermediates
118
 – i.e. non-final goods used in the production of other 
                                                 
117
 Technology diffusion via trade may also occur indirectly: Country C may benefit from R&D in 
country A without directly trading with A if there is an indirect link via trade with country B which, in 
turn, directly trades with A (Lumenga-Neso et al., 2005; Keller, 2010). 
118
 Deardorff (2014) defines an intermediate good as an input to the production process which has itself 
been produced and, unlike capital goods, is used up in production. In contrast to capital goods, 
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goods – embodying technologies new to the local context may enable firms to extend 
product portfolios and improve productivity (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Keller, 
2000; Mendoza, 2010). Via complementarities with the production of export-oriented 
goods, access to foreign-made inputs can influence export performance (Kasahara and 
Lapham, 2013). Regarding prices, if key inputs become available at lower prices, this 
should generally stimulate output and employment growth. Access to cheaper imported 
inputs may, however, also partially offset competition-enhancing effects associated with 
simultaneous imports of final goods (Corden, 1971).  
Moving from the wider trade-related literature to the debate about China’s rapid rise as 
an export-oriented manufacturing powerhouse, a distinction between competitive and 
complementary effects (Table 4.1) can be used to discuss implications for other 
countries. Direct effects operate via bilateral trade, while indirect effects result from 
China’s growing global market share. Imports from China which are potential 
substitutes for domestic products generate competitive effects, whereas complementary 
effects emerge when imports from China are complements to domestic production 
acitivites (Jenkins and Edwards, 2006; Kaplinsky et al., 2007). More specifically, 
competitive effects occur if imports from China crowd out domestic products and if a 
country’s share of the global market declines as a consequence of China’s exports to a 
third country. Conversely, complementary effects of imports from China occur if the 
latter are used in domestic production and therefore complement, rather than compete 
with, domestic production activities. Complementary effects also arise if trade with 
China contributes to a country’s integration in global production networks. In addition, 
complementary effects also encompass increasing opportunities to export to China.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
intermediate goods are incorporated in the final output, frequently after being transformed (Miroudot et 
al., 2009). 
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Table 4.1 Effects of trade with China on other countries (adapted from Edwards 
and Jenkins, 2013) 
 Competitive Complementary 
Direct Imports from China substituting 
domestic products 
Imports of inputs from China 
Exports to China 
Indirect Loss of market share in third markets 
due to China 
Integration in Global Production Networks 
involving China 
 
The literature on advanced economies’ trade with China mainly emphasizes its 
competition-enhancing effect, generally referring to Chinese import competition (e.g. 
Bloom et al., 2016). From this perspective, China’s opening to trade rearranged relative 
factor endowments. As Utar (2014) demonstrates for Danish textile producers, firms 
engaged in labour-intensive activities in high-wage countries saw their market position 
deteriorate due to competing Chinese-made products. Studies examining this shock in 
advanced economies (e.g. Federico, 2014; Utar, 2014; Bloom et al., 2016) highlight 
firm-level decreases in sales, employment, and greater technological efforts as part of a 
“defensive innovation” (Wood, 1995) strategy.  
The possibility that imports from China might displace domestic manufactures, both in 
the domestic market and export destinations, also figures prominently in the literature 
focused on developing countries (Zafar, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2008). The potential 
competitive “threat” resulting from China’s growing exports is generally attributed to its 
relative abundance of labour, economies of scale, and fast build-up of technological 
capabilities. Relatively low Chinese wages have been underlined as a reason for re-
locations of labour-intensive activities from Mexico to China (Sargent and Matthews, 
2006), for example. For countries with wages below China’s level, such as Vietnam, 
economies of scale often take centre stage in this debate. Thus, Ha (2011: 333) warns 
that “the Chinese economic scale overwhelms Vietnam with much faster growth”. It has 
been argued that China’s technological upgrading and automation of production may 
enable it to maintain or even expand its manufacturing market share despite growing 
wages (Arroba et al., 2009; Economist, 2015). 
The evidence regarding the way China’s growing exports affect other developing 
countries remains inconclusive. Firm-level studies focused on Mexico (Iacovone et al., 
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2013; Utar and Ruiz, 2013) and Chile (Alvarez and Opazo, 2011) – two countries that 
are more developed than China – obtain results similar to those of studies concentrating 
on advanced economies. Moving beyond the firm-level, Costa et al. (2016) find that 
Brazilian local labour markets specialized in activities facing greater exposure to 
imports from China saw slower growth in manufacturing wages. Edwards and Jenkin’s 
(2015) industry-level analysis of South African manufacturing data attributes a 
reduction of output by 5% over the period from 1992 to 2010 to imports from China. 
Yet, gravity models and simulations mostly identify only small competition effects. 
Wood and Mayer (2011) find that China’s rise reduced the output of labour-intensive 
activities in developing countries by 1%-3.5%, whereas Hanson and Robertson (2010: 
158), concentrating on manufacturing, conclude that “even for the countries that would 
appear to be most adversely affected by China’s growth it is difficult to find evidence 
that the demand for their exports has been significantly reduced by China’s expansion”. 
Similarly, Husted and Nishioka (2013) find that China’s growing exports did not crowd 
out other developing countries’ exports but did negatively affect advanced countries’ 
market shares. 
The way growing imports from China affect firm-level performance is likely to be 
shaped by the purpose of the imports. Consumer goods appear particularly likely to 
displace domestic production. However, a growing share of trade flows is accounted for 
by trade in intermediate goods (Baldwin and Lopez‐Gonzalez, 2015). Questioning 
descriptions of firms as “import-competing” on the basis of total imports in the 
respective industry, Amiti and Konings (2007: 1613) stress that “firms within these 
categories may actually be importing their inputs rather than competing with imports”. 
From this perspective, increasing imports from China can also imply improved access to 
inputs which possibly were not available at similar prices or in similar quantities from 
domestic sources. Discussing the industrialization of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, 
Ernst et al. (1998) stress that changes in trade restrictions were particularly effective 
when they altered the cost of inputs used in export-oriented manufacturing. Imports 
from China that are not final consumer goods may therefore complement domestic 
production, potentially facilitating output growth. 
Notwithstanding the strong growth of trade in intermediates in recent years, the 
empirical literature examining its implications for industrial evolution is still in its 
infancy (Feenstra and Hanson, 2003; Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015). Goldberg et 
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al. (2010) investigate consequences of India’s trade liberalization in 1991 and identify 
improved access to imported intermediates as a driver of firm-level output growth. 
Focusing on Indonesian manufacturing firms during 1991-2001, Amiti and Konings 
(2007) show that access to cheaper imported inputs raised firm-level productivity. 
Conversely, Muendler (2004) finds that foreign inputs are a relatively unimportant 
channel for Brazilian manufacturing firms’ productivity.119  
In the Indian case explored by Goldberg et al. (2010), the growth in imported inputs was 
largely driven by imports from advanced economies. One may wonder whether the 
above-mentioned arguments related to technological content and variety could apply to 
Vietnam’s imports from China. While technologically still lagging behind the frontier in 
most areas, China has rapidly extended its R&D efforts since 2000, increased its 
embeddedness in global production and innovation networks, and leapfrogged in a set 
of industries (e.g. solar PV) (Fu, 2015).
120
 In contrast, Vietnam’s innovation system is 
still in a nascent state. Innovative capabilities are very low in the public as well as the 
private sector (OECD, 2014). Despite parallels in both countries’ recent political and 
economic trajectories (Malesky and London, 2014), China is substantially more 
advanced than Vietnam in terms of technology. 
Beyond short-term effects of imports from China on firm-level outcomes in Vietnam, 
growing Sino-Vietnamese trade may also have implications for Vietnam’s integration 
into East Asian production networks. China now plays a central role in cross-border 
supply chains linking multiple industrialized Asian economies. In electronics, elements 
of production networks driven by MNEs increasingly moved from ASEAN countries 
(especially Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) to China from 1992 onwards (Ernst and 
Ravenhill, 2000; Ernst, 2004). Growing Sino-Vietnamese trade may therefore reflect 
and contribute to Vietnam’s integration in what is often called “Factory Asia” (Baldwin 
and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015). With electronics MNEs such as Samsung rapidly 
expanding their manufacturing activities in Vietnam (OECD, 2014), there are signs that 
                                                 
119
 In a related country-level study analysing data on trade composition and economic growth, 
Estevadeordal and Taylor (2013) find that improved access to intermediate inputs is associated with 
country-level income growth.  
120
 Moreover, several large Chinese enterprises, such as Huawei, have extended their global market share 
in technology-intensive sectors and China is a growing source of foreign direct investment in advanced 
economies (Cozza et al., 2015). 
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Vietnam is becoming an important destination for labour-intensive manufacturing 
activities of the type that were re-located from newly industrialized Asian economies to 
China from the early 1990s onwards. 
Imports from China might facilitate Vietnam’s journey towards greater embeddedness 
in global and regional production networks. Several export-intensive manufacturing 
activities (especially electronics) that grew substantially in Vietnam in the 2000s were 
largely non-existent in the country before their introduction via MNEs (Nguyen and 
Revilla Diez, 2016). Accordingly, sourcing inputs from domestic sources might be a 
challenge in these sectors. Against this backdrop, manufacturing activities in Vietnam 
may benefit from geographical proximity to China, a technologically more advanced 
economy specialized in the large-scale production of intermediate manufacturing inputs 
(Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015). 
Vietnam’s gradual integration in “Factory Asia” can be seen as the continuation of 
earlier waves of the expansion of production networks in Asia. According to the “flying 
geese” model of Asian economic development (Akamatsu, 1961; Kojima, 2000), 
industrialization spreads within Asia as advanced countries (starting from the “lead 
goose” Japan) respond to wage increases by re-locating labour-intensive activities to 
less developed neighbouring countries and increasingly specialize in capital-intensive 
production. Although criticized for its focus on Japan as the starting point and the 
neglect of non-Asian MNEs as well as sectoral specificities (Guerrieri, 2000), the intra-
Asian division of labour described by this model remains an insightful way of 
conceptualising industrial diffusion across East Asia.
121
 Yet, with MNEs increasingly 
slicing up production processes (Baldwin, 2011), the diffusion may involve the 
relocation of production stages rather than the relocation of entire industries. Adopting 
the lens of this model, Vietnam might be part of a new group of “follower geese” that 
attract labour-intensive activities from more advanced Asian economies including China 
(see Figure 4.1). 
                                                 
121
 In the new economic geography literature, Puga and Venables (1996) propose a model describing how 
industrialization may diffuse in a series of waves from country to country. Providing a discussion of 
different scenarios characterized by imperfect competition, the authors repeatedly refer to the example of 
East Asia. Their model shares several characteristics with the flying geese model, e.g. the central role of 
labour costs.  
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Figure 4.1 The “Flying geese” model of Asian economic development 
 
 
NOTES: This figure (own adaptation from Kojima, 2000) illustrates the way industrialization might spread in a series 
of waves from a “lead goose” (generally assumed to be Japan) to less advanced Asian economies. The Y-axis shows 
the countries in the order of level of development. The X-axis represents periods of time and different industrial 
activities. The “lead goose” moves from labour-intensive to more capital-intensive and eventually to knowledge-
intensive activities. As a more advanced economy “graduates” from an activity, it offshores the corresponding tasks 
via FDI to a less advanced economy. Note that Kojima (2000) refers to industries rather than activities. In view of the 
growing international fragmentation of production and trade in tasks (Baldwin, 2011), it appears more appropriate to 
refer to activities. 
 
4.3 Context 
 
Since its gradual opening to the global economy was initiated as part of an ambitious 
reform package (DoiMoi, renovation) in 1986, Vietnam has experienced rapid growth in 
trade. Relative to GDP, trade increased from 19% in 1988 to 179% in 2015 (WDI, 
2016). Vietnam exports a combination of labour-intensive manufactures (footwear, 
furniture, electronics) and primary products (rice, coffee, rubber, oil). China is 
Vietnam’s largest trading partner, although the U.S. is a more important export 
destination.
122
 Vietnam predominantly imports manufactures from China; in 2012 the 
                                                 
122
 In 2012, 24.3% of all of Vietnam’s imports came from China, followed by South Korea (12.6%) and 
Japan (10.2%). The U.S. received 17.9% of all Vietnamese exports in 2012, followed by China (11.3%) 
and Japan (11.2%) (UN Comtrade data). 
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three two-digit sectors with the largest imports from China were “radio, television and 
communication equipment”, “manufacture of textiles”, and “chemicals and chemical 
products”. In turn, the three Vietnamese sectors with the largest exports to China were 
“agricultural products”, “manufacture of food products and beverages”, and “extraction 
of crude petroleum and natural gas”. 
The share of manufacturing in Vietnam’s exports has increased significantly in recent 
years and reached 76.3% in 2014 (WDI, 2016). While labour-intensive sectors with a 
relatively long history in Vietnam, such as apparel and textiles
123
, furniture, and 
processed foods, continue to play a major role, electronics-related activities have gained 
importance since the mid-2000s. The recent increase in electronics exports is related to 
growing involvement of large MNEs (Nguyen and Revilla Diez, 2016). While foreign 
involvement in Vietnam’s economy was mostly shaped by small and medium-sized 
Taiwanese and South Korean firms in the early 2000s, particularly after Vietnam’s 
WTO accession in 2007 several major electronics MNEs (e.g. Intel, Samsung) have 
opened large production facilities in Vietnam (Athukorala and Tien, 2012; OECD, 
2014). As carriers of advanced technology and central nodes in cross-border production 
networks, MNEs can often jump-start manufacturing activities in developing countries, 
especially regarding assembly tasks, “in little more than the time it takes to build the 
factory” (Baldwin, 2011: 26). 
An ASEAN member since 1995, Vietnam’s government took major steps towards 
greater openness to trade in the 2000s. Via bilateral talks between Vietnamese and 
Chinese policy-makers as well as negotiations between ASEAN and China, barriers to 
Sino-Vietnamese trade were gradually reduced.
124
 The U.S.-Vietnamese trade 
agreement (2001) opened a large export market and contributed to wage increases and 
growing formal employment (McCaig, 2011; McCaig and Pavcnik, 2014). The 
                                                 
123
 Vietnam’s textiles-related industries were already exporting before the launch of DoiMoi in 1986. 
Reflecting international division of labour amongst socialist countries, Vietnamese companies exported 
fabrics in subcontracting relationships with economically more developed socialist countries in the 1970s 
(Ca and Anh, 1998). 
124
 There was not a specific date marking a clear-cut discontinuity regarding tariff levels applied to trade 
flows between Vietnam and China. Instead, tariffs gradually “melted”, particularly in the second half of 
the 2000s  (see appendix, Figure 4.A.1). While this pattern clearly appears related to Vietnam’s WTO 
accession, the rapid increase in Vietnam’s imports from China predates Vietnam’s WTO accession in 
2007 (see Figure 4.2). 
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country’s WTO accession (2007) further facilitated trade and, according to Baccini et al. 
(2015), led to productivity gains. The evolution of Vietnam’s trade relations in the last 
decade were characterized by substantial growth in trade with the world’s two largest 
economies: the U.S. market gained quickly in importance as an export destination after 
2001, while China’s share of Vietnam’s imports was growing continuously in the same 
period (see Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.2 Vietnam’s trade with China and the U.S. 
 
(Source: UN Comtrade) 
 
Exposure to imports from China increased in most sectors, including the sectors 
accounting for large shares of Vietnam’s total exports and imports. Table 4.2 lists the 
three Vietnamese two-digit industries with the largest imports (from all countries of 
origin) and the three industries with the largest exports (to all export destinations). The 
table suggests that the trend of increasing imports from China was particularly 
pronounced in export-oriented manufacturing industries. Relative to domestic 
production
125
 (right-hand side of the table) imports from China even decreased in two 
                                                 
125
 In the absence of precise data on actual production, we use total sales of all formal Vietnamese firms 
in the respective industry as the best proxy for domestic production. 
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major importing sectors – “Basic metals” (from 0.08 in 2000 to 0.07 in 2012) and 
“Coke, refined petroleum, nuclear fuel” (from 0.86 in 2000 to 0.08 in 2012). In contrast, 
the three largest exporting industries’ exposure to imports from China sharply increased 
relative to total imports as well as relative to domestic production. 
Table 4.2 Top 3 total manufacturing imports and exports of Vietnam in 2012 
  
Imports from China 
relative to total Vietnamese 
imports (ratio) 
Imports from China 
relative to Vietn. formal 
production (ratio) 
1. Top 3 importing industries in 2012 
Code Description 2000 2012 2000 2012 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.09 0.19 0.28 0.50 
27 Basic metals 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.07 
23 Coke, refined petroleum, nuclear fuel 0.07 0.15 0.86 0.08 
2. Top 3 exporting industries in 2012 
Code Description 2000 2012 2000 2012 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 0.02 0.05 0.004 0.02 
18 Wearing apparel, dressing, dyeing of fur 0.03 0.53 0.004 0.008 
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 0.02 0.38 0.03 0.19 
NOTES: The upper part of this table lists the three manufacturing industries (at the two-digit level) with the largest total imports 
registered by Vietnam (including all countries of origin) in 2012 and displays, on the right hand side, two measures of exposure to 
imports from China in those industries in 2000 and 2012. The second panel shows the same measures of exposure to imports from 
China in 2000 and 2012 for the three Vietnamese manufacturing industries with the largest exports (considering all export 
destinations) in 2012.  
 
Importantly for the empirical part of this paper, the change in the share of imports from 
China between 2000 and 2012 was not homogenous across sectors, as illustrated by 
Figure 4.2. While some sectors saw large increases in the share of imports coming from 
China, in a limited number of sectors that share decreased in this period. The same 
graph also displays the sector-level growth in the value of total Vietnamese exports in 
the same period. Nearly all manufacturing sectors
126
 in our dataset registered export 
                                                 
126
 Among the 117 four-digit manufacturing sectors in our dataset, only three experienced a reduction in 
total exports between 2000 and 2012. For these three (1911: tanning of leather, 3120: electricity 
distribution apparatus, 3313: industrial process control equipment) we observe after 2010 no sales in the 
GSO data and no exports in the UN comtrade data. We observe 280 firms in these sectors during 2000-
2009. In 2000, these three sectors accounted for 0.16% of all Vietnamese exports. Two of these three 
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growth. While this preliminary look at the data does not allow for profound conclusions, 
Figure 4.2 does not reveal any pronounced patterns that would support fears that 
imports from China harm developing countries’ manufactured exports (Coxhead, 2007; 
Zafar, 2007). Several of Vietnam’s main export industries saw large increases in the 
share of imports coming from China, including “manufacture of footwear” (from 5% to 
58.3%), “wearing apparel” (from 2.6% to 60.4%), and “television, radio and telephone 
apparatus” (from 2.4% to 67%), and simultaneously increased their total exports.  
Figure 4.3 Changes in industry log exports against changes in % share of imports 
from China 
 
NOTES: Figure plots changes in exports (to all destinations) against changes in share of imports coming from China at the 4-digit ISIC3 
industry level between 2000 and 2012. The size of the points is weighted by industry employment size in 2012. Labels refer to the largest 
point in immediate proximity. The labelled sectors are 1512 (Processed fish), 1810 (Wearing apparel), 1920 (Footwear), 2102 (Corrugated 
paper and paperboard), 2693 (Clay and ceramic products), 2694 (Cement and plaster), 2695 (Concrete and cement), 2813 (Steam 
generators), 3220 (TV, radio, telephone apparatus), 3591 (Motorcycles), 3610 (Furniture).This figure excludes three sectors with zero sales 
and zero exports in 2012 (see footnote 119).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
sectors (1911 and 3120) saw sizeable increases in the share of imports coming from China between 2000 
and 2010 (from 2.3% to 9.6% and from 0.9% to 21.8% respectively). The third sector (3313) saw a small 
reduction in the share of imports coming from China (from 11.5% to 8.7%) between 2000 and 2010. 
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The simultaneous occurrence of growing imports from China and increases in sector-
level exports points to the potential role of trade in intermediate – or semi-manufactured 
– goods. Trade in intermediates has expanded substantially in the last decades and 
China is now an important node in intermediate trade flows (Amador et al., 2015). In 
2000, 41.3% of Vietnam’s imports from China were intermediate inputs, by 2012 this 
percentage had increased to 67.7 (OECD BTDIxE database).
127
 Figure 4.A.2 
(Appendix) plots export growth at the two-digit level in Vietnam during 2000-2012 and 
the average share of imports from China composed of intermediates in 2012. The 
resulting picture is consistent with a situation where Vietnam’s recent export growth 
might be partly supported by inputs imported from China – which, in turn, are likely to 
embody a significant element of non-Chinese-made content, especially in electronics 
(Baldwin, 2011). We will return to these questions in the discussion of our empirical 
results.  
4.4 Data and empirical strategy 
 
4.4.1 Data 
The empirical analysis draws on three data sources. Firstly, the Vietnamese Enterprise 
Survey (VES) provides detailed firm-level information including four-digit sectoral 
identifiers (ISIC3) for the years 2000-2012. Secondly, sector-level data on trade flows 
come from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade) 
database. Thirdly, the OECD’s Bilateral Trade in Goods by Industry and End-use 
(BTDIxE) database allows for the categorization of sectors according to the share of 
Vietnam’s imports from China accounted for by intermediate inputs/goods.  
The VES is an annual survey mandatory for all registered (i.e. formal) firms with at 
least 30
128
 employees (Howard et al., 2015).
129
 Administered by Vietnam’s General 
Statistical Office via its provincial subsidiaries, the VES collects comprehensive 
                                                 
127
 At the same time, intermediates also accounted for 61% of China’s imports from Vietnam in 2012. 
128
 The dataset also includes a random subsample of 15% of registered firms with less than 30 employees.  
129
 The registration of a manufacturing firm is not linked to any requirements regarding minimum capital 
or proof of managerial or professional ability (Ha and Kiyota, 2014).  
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information on firms’ finances and employment. 130  The VES data also encompass 
variables regarding firms’ ownership and location. A unique tax code allows us to create 
an unbalanced firm-level panel dataset.
131
 After excluding firms that only appear once 
in our dataset, we observe a firm on average in four years. Our analysis is restricted to 
the manufacturing sector.  
The VES data are “as complete a record as possible on the economic activities of firms 
in Vietnam” (Howard et al., 2015: 7) and have been used in several recent studies 
related to trade and economic geography (Baccini et al., 2015; Ha and Kiyota, 2014, 
2015; Howard et al., 2015). Yet, this dataset is not without limitations. Most 
importantly, it does not cover the informal sector. There is a general scarcity of 
information on Vietnam’s informal sector. Cling et al. (2011) draw on labour force and 
household surveys and estimate that informal activities account for 20 percent of GDP. 
While small firms account for a large share of total employment, they are generally 
assumed to account for a small proportion of Vietnam’s manufacturing output (Howard 
et al., 2015). Representing a further limitation of this dataset, the VES does not 
incorporate annual data on the skill composition of firms’ personnel. Notwithstanding 
these shortcomings, the VES is “by far the most comprehensive dataset available on 
Vietnamese firms” (Doan and Kiyota, 2014: 197). 
The VES’ firm-level four-digit sectoral identifiers enable us to link individual firms 
with sector-level trade flows. We rely on the UN Comtrade dataset, which contains 
annual international trade statistics of over 170 countries. After merging the firm-level 
data with the sector-level trade data and restricting our dataset to firms observed more 
than once, we are left with information on 20,924 firms (across all years) in 117 four-
digit manufacturing sectors.
132
  
                                                 
130
 The GSO sends the VES questionnaire to firms which return the completed questionnaire by post to 
the provincial GSO subsidiary. The Law on Statistics compels all registered firms to complete the survey. 
Firms that fail to respond are contacted by province-level GSO representatives via mail, by phone, or 
through direct personal visits (Howard et al., 2015).  
131
 Mergers and acquisitions are not captured by this dataset. If two firms merge to form a newly 
registered, new firm, those two firms will no longer be in the VES. In the case of an acquisition, the 
acquirer’s tax code remains unchanged, whereas the acquired firm needs to be newly registered and 
receives a new tax code (Doan and Kiyota, 2014). 
132
 This number of four-digit sectors is nearly identical to the number of sectors successfully matched in a 
trade-focused analysis by Baccini et al. (2015) that matches information on tariffs (rather than imports) 
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In order to distinguish between imports in general and imported intermediate goods, we 
make use of the OECD’s BTDIxE database. Released in 2011 to facilitate global 
production network analyses (Zhu et al., 2011), this dataset provides information on 
imports and exports divided into end-use categories, including “intermediate inputs”.133 
While BTDIxE relies on the same industrial classification (ISIC3) as our firm-level and 
UN Comtrade data, it is only available at the two-digit level. When merging our firm-
level dataset with the information on trade in intermediates, we therefore subsume all 4-
digit sectors into 22 two-digit manufacturing sectors.
134
  
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables computed based on the three 
above-mentioned data sources.
135
 State-owned firms and those with foreign capital
136
 
account for a relatively large share of our observations. In addition to the fact that we 
focus on registered firms with a minimum employment of 30 workers, higher longevity 
of firms in those two ownership categories in comparison to domestically-owned private 
firms explains this pattern. In the empirical analysis we control for ownership and 
present results for different subsamples defined by ownership. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
for 118 Vietnamese manufacturing sectors. As these authors do not provide a list of the sectors, we are 
not able to explain the small difference.  
133
 The BTDIxE database covers approximately 99% of global reported trade flows. It relies on 6-digit 
categorizations of traded goods according to the Harmonised System of the World Customs Organisation. 
Traded products are assigned to end-use categories (including the main categories “capital goods”, 
“intermediate inputs” and “consumption”); the resulting information is then converted to ISIC industry 
codes. For example, high-voltage fuses (ISIC3 3120) are categorized as intermediate goods, while trucks 
are classified as capital goods. Products that cannot unequivocally be assigned to one single end-use 
category are assigned to special mixed-purpose categories. This applies, for example, to personal 
computers and phones which could be consumed by households, private industries or the public sector 
(OECD, 2015). 
134
 This means that our data do not capture any heterogeneity in the intermediate content of imports from 
China within a two-digit industry. Compared to the level of aggregation used for our main variable of 
interest (exposure to imports from China at the 4-digit level) our information on the intermediate content 
of imports from China is therefore less fine-grained.   
135
 Table 4.A.1 in the appendix also provides an overview of descriptive statistics and data sources, while 
Table 4.A.2 lists pairwise correlations. 
136
 The definition of SOEs used in the analysis encompasses central SOEs, local SOEs, and Joint 
Ventures with at least 50% state ownership. The dummy “FDI” is assigned to firms that are either joint 
ventures with some level of foreign capital or firms with 100% foreign ownership. 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
Firm-level variables 
 
 
  Age group 1 (2-4 years) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Age group 2 (5-9 years) 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age group 3 (10-13 years) 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Private domestic 0.52 0.50 0 1 
State-owned 0.12 0.32 0 1 
FDI/Joint venture 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Employment (head count) 313.24 839.67 30 28140 
Sales 150,000 1,200,000 0 270,000,000 
Sales per worker 532.89 1475.60 0 96108.02 
Industry-level variables 
 
 
  SOE sales share 16.98 18.45 0 100 
FDI sales share 30.29 22.06 0 100 
Herfindahl index sales 0.06 0.08 0 1 
Imports from China (normalized by sector's total sales)  0.08 0.14 0 1.1 
Imports excl. China (normalized by sector's total sales) 0.36 0.62 0 5.32 
Intermediates ( % of imports from China) 67.85 29.37 0 100 
Note: These descriptive statistics are based on the firm-level dataset used in the analysis. In this table sales and sales 
per worker are expressed in million Vietnamese Dong. In the regression analysis employment, sales, and sales per 
worker are entered after a log transformation.   
 
4.4.2 Empirical strategy 
The empirical analysis aims to explain firm-level outcomes over time by means of 
exposure to imports from China which varies over time at the sectoral level, plus a 
number of control variables at the firm-level and sectoral level. Relying on the data 
sources described above, we estimate specifications of the following form: 
 
(1) ijtYln ijtitjtijt
nonCN
jt
CN
jt ZXIMPIMP    2432221 ''     
 
where ijtYln refers to the dependent variable of interest – logarithm of total employment 
as measured by head count, logarithm of total sales, or logarithm of sales per worker – 
of firm i in industry j in year t.  
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Our key variable of interest, CHjtIMP 2 , is a measure of sector-level exposure to imports 
from China and is constructed as the ratio of imports from China to the total sales of all 
firms in Vietnam in our dataset in the same sector and year:  
VN
jt
CN
jtCH
jt
Q
M
IMP  where CNjtM  denotes the total value of imports of sector j coming from 
China in year t, while VNjtQ  represents the total sales of all formal firms in sector j in t.
137
 
As customary in similar studies (Iacovone et al., 2013; Utar and Ruiz, 2013), we also 
control for the sector’s general exposure to imports from the rest of the world, i.e. all 
countries but China. Exposure to imports from countries other than China is also 
normalized by the sector’s total sales. Assuming that firms in Vietnam are likely to 
respond to exposure to Chinese imports with a certain delay, we lag the two variables 
capturing import exposure by two years.
138
 ijtX ' represents a vector of firm-level 
controls. Following Utar and Ruiz (2013) we compute three firm age dummies (2-4 
years, 5-9 years, 10-13 years). To take into account insights from the literature on 
differential business conditions faced by private domestic firms, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and MNEs in Vietnam (Tran et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2014), we also include 
firm-level ownership dummies. 
At the sectoral level we also control for the share of total sector-level sales accounted 
for by SOEs and MNEs, as recent research suggests that a sector’s ownership structure 
may influence firms’ responses to Vietnam’s growing trade (Baccini et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, we add a sector-level Herfindahl index of market concentration as a proxy 
for the sector-level competition (Roberts and Tybout, 1991). Exploiting our dataset’s 
                                                 
137
 This way of normalizing Chinese imports corresponds to the way import exposure is measured by 
Roberts and Tybout (1991). Bernard et al. (2006) normalize Chinese imports by apparent domestic 
consumption, i.e. domestic production plus all imports minus all exports in a given industry and period. 
We computed a Chinese import measure inspired by Bernard et al. (2006), but we obtain negative ratios 
in several industries, suggesting that Vietnam’s exports are larger than the sum of its imports and 
domestic production in the respective industry. Mion and Zhu (2013) encounter the same difficulty in 
their analysis of Belgian data; it seems to be related to the high trade-to-GDP ratios of both countries. 
Since this concerns several sectors of significant importance to the Vietnamese economy (incl. several 
textiles-related activities), we prefer to deviate from Bernard et al.’s (2006) approach and normalize, 
following Tybout (1991), only by the total sales of all formal firms in the same industry and year.  
138 
This lag structure corresponds to the one chosen by Federico (2014) and Bugamelli and Rosolia 
(2006). Kemeny et al. (2015) allow for a 5-year lag. 
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panel dimension, we add firm-level fixed effects ( i ) to control for time-invariant firm-
specific unobservables, such as managerial ability. Year fixed effects ( t ) enable us to 
control for time-varying unobservables affecting all firms in a given year (e.g. economic 
crisis). To account for serial and spatial autocorrelation, standard errors are clustered at 
the sector-by-province level (there are 63 provinces).
139
  
The main challenge for this exercise is the endogeneity of import exposure, i.e. the 
potential presence of unobserved shocks that simultaneously affect import exposure and 
firm-performance. A large body of literature attributes China’s rise as a global exporter 
primarily to productivity-enhancing measures implemented in China, such as high 
investment rates, infrastructure improvements, and re-allocation of agricultural workers 
to manufacturing (Keefer, 2007; Autor et al., 2013; Molnar and Chalaux, 2015). 
However, we cannot rule out that some part of the sector-level variation in CHjtIMP is 
influenced by Vietnamese firms’ behaviour or by third variables that affect both imports 
from China and firm-level outcomes in Vietnam.  
To address this concern, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) strategy inspired by 
Dauth et al.’s (2014) adaptation of the shift-share instrument popularized by Autor et al. 
(2013). To instrument the exposure to imports in a given industry j in year t, we 
compute the following variable for every sector j and all years t covered by our analysis: 
CNOther
tj
CN
j
CN
jt MIMPIMPIV
 2000,,2000*_  , where 
CN
jIMP 2000is the initial exposure to imports 
from China of sector j in Vietnam in the year 2000 (constructed as the ratio of imports 
from China to total sales, as explained above). This initial level of import exposure is 
multiplied by the change in the total value of imports (in the same industry j) from 
China during the period between 2000 and t registered by a group of 12 countries with 
trade profiles that are similar to Vietnam’s. We rely on the Finger-Kreinin index of 
similarity between trade distributions (Finger and Kreinin, 1979) to identify 12 
countries that, compared to Vietnam, have similar trade profiles.
140
 After ranking all 
countries based on the Finger-Kreinin index, the basket encompasses emerging 
                                                 
139
 Previous research has highlighted the economic importance of the province-level in Vietnam, e.g. 
regarding business regulation (Schmitz et al., 2015) and migration patterns (McCaig, 2011). 
140
 The Finger-Kreinin index is a way of comparing the similarity of the sectoral trade profiles of two or 
more countries. The Appendix provides a brief explanation.  
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economies from Latin America (Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala), Europe/Eurasia 
(Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Turkey), and Africa (Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia).
141
 Given these countries’ similarity to Vietnam with respect to their 
distribution of imports and exports across sectors, it appears plausible to assume that the 
comparative advantage of Chinese industries relative to those 12 countries will be 
similar to the one they have relative to Vietnam. This instrument should therefore have 
explanatory power. It is important to stress that CNjIMP 2000is measured in the year 2000. 
Due to the two-year lag structure chosen for the sectoral variables in specification (1), 
our analysis will not cover any firm-level outcomes prior to 2002. The exclusion of 
Asian economies and the fact that the 12 “other” countries represent three different 
continents should reduce the risk that unobservable demand and supply shocks in those 
countries are correlated with those in Vietnam.
142
 This instrument should hence be 
correlated with Vietnam’s imports from China but uncorrelated to unobserved domestic 
supply and demand shocks in Vietnam.
143
  
 
 
                                                 
141
 The calculation of the IV relies on the UN Comtrade dataset. We exclude all Asian countries in order 
to reduce the risk of violating the exclusion restriction. In addition, we computed a second group of 
countries based on a set of indicators taken from the World Bank’s world development indicators 
(including GDP per capita, manufacturing share of GDP, trade as share of GDP, level of education, 
natural resource rents, imports from high-income countries). The resulting group encompasses less 
countries from Europe/Eurasia (only Romania and Turkey) and more African (Cameroon, Madagascar, 
Cote d’Ivoire) countries. This alternative IV is highly correlated with the main IV calculated based on the 
Finger-Kreinin Index and used in the main analysis; this alternative IV provides similar results. 
142
 Note that the exclusion of all Asian economies is relatively restrictive in comparison to similar studies. 
For example, Dauth et al. (2014) explain that their shift-share IV for an analysis focused on Germany 
excludes direct neighbours and euro zone members to ensure exogeneity – but their basket of countries 
still includes the UK, Norway, and Sweden.  
143 
Although this instrument should be relatively free of most endogeneity concerns, there is still a 
possibility that sector-year specific global technological trends might affect both Vietnam’s imports from 
China and firm-level outcomes in Vietnam. To the extent that such technological trends also affect the 12 
countries in our basket, this is a potential threat to the instrument’s exogeneity. The continued relative 
technological backwardness of China, and even more so, of Vietnam and most of the countries in our 
basket seems to mitigate this concern. In addition, we follow Iacovone et al. (2013) and Federico (2014) 
and use two-digit sector-year trends in the most restrictive specifications; which should capture sector-
speciﬁc global technological trends. 
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4.5 Results  
 
The econometric analysis estimates regressions corresponding to equation (1). It 
explores three dependent variables at the firm-level: logarithm of employment, 
logarithm of sales, and logarithm of sales per worker. For every dependent variable, the 
discussion starts from the OLS results and then turns to the IV estimations.  
4.5.1 Employment 
Table 4.4 presents estimates of the relationship between firm-level employment and 
industry-level exposure to Chinese imports. The first column shows the most 
parsimonious specification. In addition to firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects, 
this specification only controls for the firm’s age. The coefficient of our key variable of 
interest, CHjtIMP  (exposure to imports from China), is positive and significant at the 5% 
level.  
Columns 2-4 add further controls in a stepwise manner. When controlling for exposure 
to imports from other countries of origin (column 2), the size of the coefficient of 
CH
jtIMP increases.
144
 The coefficient of exposure to imports from other countries is 
negative and statistically significant.
145
 In column 3 additional controls for firm 
ownership are included; the coefficient of CHjtIMP remains significant (1% level). In the 
most restrictive OLS specification (column 4), we add controls for the ownership 
structure and concentration of the industry. Moreover, we add industry-specific (at 2-
digit level) time trends which should capture industry-specific global supply and 
demand shocks. The coefficient decreases slightly in magnitude but remains highly 
significant. The magnitude of the coefficient of CHjtIMP  in column 4 indicates that a one 
                                                 
144
 Utar and Ruiz (2013), who find a negative link between firm-level employment and exposure to 
Chinese imports (on the U.S. market) in the Mexican case, also report an increase in the absolute size of 
the coefficient of exposure to Chinese imports after controlling for general import exposure of the 
industry.  
145
 The link between imports from other countries and firms’ employment is not the focus of this paper 
and its investigation would require adjustments of the empirical framework. Nevertheless, this pattern – a 
positive coefficient of CH
jtIMP
and a negative coefficient of exposure to imports from other countries – 
would be consistent with a situation where imports from China have a complementary effect, whereas 
imports from other countries have a competitive effect. 
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standard deviation increase in exposure to imports from China (an increase of Chinese 
imports relative to domestic production by 14 percentage points) is associated with a 1.7 
percentage point increase in log employment (equivalent to a 0.02 standard deviation in 
log employment).  
The OLS results therefore point to a positive link between CHjtIMP and firm-level 
employment. The direction of this association is at odds with conceptual (Coxhead, 
2007; Zafar, 2007) and empirical contributions, e.g. for Mexico (Utar and Ruiz, 2014), 
that suggest imports from China may harm manufacturing activities in other developing 
countries. Yet, these OLS results might be biased if CHjtIMP is correlated with domestic 
supply or demand shocks within Vietnam. Given Vietnam’s rapid economic growth in 
the 2000s, there is a risk that changes in Sino-Vietnamese trade patterns might pick up 
industry-specific productivity growth in Vietnam or Engel effects in Vietnam.  
Columns 5-8 report the results of estimations relying on the IV method discussed in 
section 4. The selection of controls mirrors the OLS regressions in columns 1-4. The 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic indicates that the instrument has predictive power. The 
coefficient is roughly four times larger than in column 4. Several related studies (Autor 
et al., 2013; Dauth et al., 2014; Pessoa, 2016) similarly find larger absolute coefficients 
in IV estimations compared to the OLS results. The IV strategy appears to have 
corrected for a downward bias in the OLS regressions that could stem from several 
sources. The OLS estimates might be afflicted by measurement error. At the same time, 
CH
jtIMP might be correlated with supply shocks on the Vietnamese side: if imports from 
China grow particularly strongly in Vietnamese industries that, for reasons unrelated to 
China, experience declining employment, one would expect the OLS to be downward 
biased.  
Based on our preferred estimates in column 8, a one standard deviation increase in 
exposure to imports from China (an increase of Chinese imports relative to domestic 
production by 14 percentage points) is associated with a 6.7 percentage point increase in 
log employment (corresponding to a 0.08 standard deviation in log employment).
146
 
                                                 
146
 In absolute terms, these magnitudes are similar but somewhat smaller than the ones identified in 
related studies. For example, Utar and Ruiz (2013) find that a one standard deviation increase in Chinese 
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Importantly the direction of the association is the opposite of what previous studies have 
found regarding significantly more advanced economies, where growing imports from 
China are generally associated with decreasing firm-level employment. Countries such 
as Belgium (Mion and Zhou, 2013) or Denmark (Utar, 2014) have substantially higher 
wages than China. They also generally have access to technology and capital that may 
enable firms to respond to trade-induced competition through technological upgrading, 
some of which may reduce employment (Mion and Zhu, 2013; Utar, 2014; Bloom et al., 
2016). As manufacturing wages in Vietnam are significantly lower than in China, a 
similar type of low-wage competitive effect on Vietnamese industries appears 
unlikely.
147
 There are reports that MNEs are re-locating some production activities from 
China to Vietnam in response to rising wages in China (Kynge, 2015). However, the 
competitiveness of China’s manufacturing cannot be reduced to low Chinese wages 
(Arroba et al., 2009) and Edwards’ and Jenkins’ (2015) industry-level analysis identifies 
sizeable manufacturing employment losses due to Chinese imports in South Africa, a 
country whose level of development – at least in terms of GDP per capita148 – is much 
closer to Vietnam than most of the other countries examined in related contributions.  
Recent work on heterogeneous firms and relative factor endowments (e.g. Bernard et 
al., 2010) allows for another way of reading our results: Faced with growing 
competition from China, firms in Vietnam might respond by making greater use of the 
factor that is abundant in Vietnam: labour. While particularly private domestic firms are 
capital constrained (Tran et al., 2008), Vietnam’s population of working-age adults 
grew rapidly in the 2000s (Minh, 2009). Conversely, the positive association between 
CH
jtIMP and firm-level employment identified in this analysis might reflect 
complementary effects associated with growing imports from China. As outlined in 
                                                                                                                                               
import penetration (on the U.S. market) is associated with a 0.07 standard deviation decrease in the 
logarithm of employment of Mexican maquiladoras. At the industry-level, Federico (2014) finds that an 
increase of 7 percentage points in low-wage import penetration with a 4 percent reduction in the 
employment of the same industry. However, differences regarding research question and level of analysis 
limit the comparability of those results with our findings.  
147
 According to ILO estimates, in 2013 average nominal monthly wages in garments, textiles and 
footwear amounted to US$ 491 in China and US$ 182 in Vietnam (Huynh, 2015: 11). 
148
 According to the World Bank, South Africa’s GDP per capita amounted to $ (PPP) 13,165 in 2015, the 
corresponding value was $ 6,022 for Vietnam and $14,238 for China (WDI, 2016). However, South 
Africa is significantly more advanced than Vietnam in terms of technological capabilities, higher 
education system, and innovation policies (Kruss and Lorentzen, 2009; OECD, 2014). 
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section 3, the increase in Vietnam’s imports from China coincided with a period of 
rapidly growing exports. If a considerable share of Vietnam’s imports from China is 
used as inputs in export-oriented manufacturing activities, it would be plausible to find 
a positive link between CHjtIMP and firms’ employment.  
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Table 4.4 Dependent variable: logarithm of employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV 
CN
jtIMP 2  
0.059** 0.141*** 0.137*** 0.118*** 0.447*** 0.529*** 0.514*** 0.481*** 
(0.027) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.159) (0.178) (0.177) (0.172) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
 -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.030***  -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.074*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Age Dummy 1 (2-4 years) 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age Dummy 2 (5-9 years) 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
SOE   0.146*** 0.139***   0.142*** 0.136*** 
   (0.036) (0.036)   (0.036) (0.036) 
MNE   0.023 0.024   0.023 0.024 
   (0.030) (0.030)   (0.030) (0.030) 
SOE sales share    0.001***    0.001*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
MNE sales share    0.0006**    0.0002 
    (0.0003)    (0.0003) 
Herfindahl index of sales     -0.082**    -0.063 
concentration    (0.038)    (0.041) 
Observations 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 
Number of firms 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 
Adjusted R-squared 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.020     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit sector trends No       No No Yes No No No Yes 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F     42.83 55.79 55.68 65.02 
A constant is included but not reported. 1st-stage results (corresponding to the IV regression presented in column 8) are listed in Table 4.A.6 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at 4-digit sector X province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5 Dependent variable: logarithm of sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV 
CN
jtIMP 2  
0.058 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.121** 0.072 0.097 0.080 0.129 
(0.036) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.250) (0.286) (0.286) (0.279) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
 -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029***  -0.025 -0.023 -0.030 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Age Dummy 1 (2-4 years) -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age Dummy 2 (5-9 years) 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
SOE   0.239*** 0.237***   0.240*** 0.237*** 
   (0.050) (0.050)   (0.050) (0.050) 
MNE   0.156*** 0.157***   0.156*** 0.157*** 
   (0.039) (0.039)   (0.039) (0.039) 
SOE sales share    0.002***    0.002*** 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
MNE sales share    -0.0001    -0.0001 
    (0.0004)    (0.0004) 
Herfindahl index of sales     -0.154**    -0.153** 
concentration    (0.068)    (0.070) 
Observations 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 
Number of firms 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 
Adjusted R-squared 0.221 0.222 0.222 0.223     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit sector trends No No No Yes No No No Yes 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F     42.83 55.79 55.68 65.02 
A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 4-digit sector X province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6 Dependent variable: logarithm of sales per worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV 
CN
jtIMP 2  
0.007 -0.003 -0.002 0.013 -0.332 -0.383 -0.385 -0.302 
(0.029) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.210) (0.241) (0.241) (0.232) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
 0.004 0.004 0.0004  0.050 0.050 0.039 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.0084)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Age Dummy 1 (2-4 years) -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age Dummy 2 (5-9 years) 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
SOE   0.086** 0.092**   0.090** 0.094** 
   (0.039) (0.039)   (0.040) (0.039) 
MNE   0.130*** 0.130***   0.129*** 0.130*** 
   (0.031) (0.031)   (0.031) (0.031) 
SOE sales share    0.0003    0.0004 
    (0.0004)    (0.0004) 
MNE sales share    -0.0007**    -0.0005 
    (0.0002)    (0.0003) 
Herfindahl index of sales     -0.073    -0.089 
concentration    (0.059)    (0.060) 
Observations 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 82,439 
Number of firms 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 20,924 
Adjusted R-squared 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.323     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit sector trends No No No Yes No No No Yes 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F     42.83 55.79 55.68 65.02 
A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 4-digit sector X province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.5.2 Sales 
Table 4.5 reports the results of regressions examining the relationship between the 
logarithm of firm-level sales and CHjtIMP . All regressors included in these estimations 
correspond to the specifications listed in Table 4.4. In the parsimonious model 
presented in column 1, the coefficient is positive and of a similar magnitude compared 
to the one identified in the same regression using log employment as the dependent 
variable (Table 4.4). However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. It turns 
strongly significant when we control for exposure to imports from other destinations. In 
the most restrictive OLS specification (column 4), the coefficient is of a similar size as 
in the corresponding regression using log employment as the dependent variable and is 
statistically significant (5%-level). This indicates that a one standard deviation increase 
in exposure to imports from China (an increase of Chinese imports relative to domestic 
production by 14 percentage points) is associated with a 1.8 percentage point increase in 
log sales (equivalent to a 0.04 standard deviation in log sales).  
However, the picture changes in the IV regressions (columns 5-8). The coefficient is 
still of a similar magnitude, but far from statistical significance. This finding is not 
straightforward to explain. It appears plausible to assume that employment and sales 
move in the same direction, as suggested by the OLS results. The inconclusive results 
for the relationship between CHjtIMP and firm-level sales might reflect measurement 
error in the dependent variable. While IV approaches can mitigate classical 
measurement error in the endogenous independent variable, this does not apply to 
measurement error in the dependent variable. The existing literature on Vietnamese 
firms provides hints that reported levels of sales might be inaccurate. Several authors 
identify signs of Vietnamese firms underreporting sales to lower their tax burden (Zhou, 
2014; Pham, 2015; Tran and Nguyen, 2015).
149
 At the same time, the observation of a 
non-significant association with sales, combined with a significant positive link with 
                                                 
149
 Baccini et al. (2014: 28) argue that in Vietnam “private and foreign ﬁrms have an enormous incentive 
to lower their tax liability, using both legal means (i.e. hiring lawyers, requesting tax incentives, such as 
holidays or abatements, for investment) and illicit means. By contrast, SOEs have both constraints and 
incentives that encourage greater tax reporting.”  
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employment, might correspond to a situation where imports from China generate 
competitive effects to which firms respond with greater use of labour. 
4.5.3 Sales per worker 
Since our dataset does not include the detailed data required to measure firm-level total 
factor productivity, we follow Baccini et al. (2015) in using the GSO enterprise survey 
to calculate sales per worker as a measure of labour productivity. We take the logarithm 
of this ratio to mitigate the impact of outliers. As outlined in section 2, competitive 
effects associated with growing exposure to imports may induce multi-level reallocation 
processes that lead to productivity improvements (e.g. Bloom et al., 2013). 
Complementary effects of imports of inputs may affect productivity in two ways: on the 
on hand, access to cheaper inputs may partially off-set competitive effects resulting 
from imports of finished goods, potentially slowing down the above-mentioned 
reallocation processes (Corden, 1971). On the other hand, imported inputs’ quality and 
technological content may enhance productivity (Keller, 2010).   
In the OLS results for employment (Table 4.4) and sales (Table 4.5), the coefficients of 
CH
jtIMP are of similar magnitudes. One would therefore not expect to find a large 
positive link between CHjtIMP and sales per worker.
150
 Conversely, the IV regressions 
identify a statistically significant, positive link between CHjtIMP  and employment, while 
the corresponding coefficients for the link with sales are positive but not statistically 
significant from zero. Based on these findings, a negative link between CHjtIMP  and 
sales per worker appears plausible. 
Table 4.6 shows the results of the regressions using log sales per worker as the 
dependent variable. In both the OLS (columns 1-4) and IV specifications (columns 5-8), 
the coefficient of CHjtIMP is not statistically different from zero. The coefficient of 
CH
jtIMP  is positive in the most restrictive OLS specification (column 4), but it is 
negative in all IV regressions and also negative in two of the four OLS estimations. 
Comparing columns 4 and 8, the OLS appears to be biased upwards. This could, among 
                                                 
150
 Note that changes in the employment-intensity of production should be captured by our year fixed 
effects and sector-specific (at the two-digit level) trends. 
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other things, reflect a situation where imports from China grow particularly fast in 
Vietnamese industries experiencing productivity growth for reasons unrelated to China, 
such as greater integration in global production networks via MNEs
151
. 
Overall, the picture emerging from Table 4.6 remains inconclusive. We do not identify 
any evidence of productivity-enhancing effects of increases in CHjtIMP . There are several 
ways of interpreting this finding. If exposure to imports from China is mostly associated 
with complementary, rather than competitive, effects, firms might not experience the 
competitive pressure identified as a driver of productivity increases in response to 
Chinese imports in advanced economies (Bloom et al., 2016). In a different scenario, 
Vietnamese firms might experience competitive pressure associated with increases in 
CH
jtIMP but may lack the capital and technology required for productivity improvements. 
Private domestic firms are often credit constrained and R&D activities remain rare in 
Vietnam (Tran et al., 2008; OECD, 2014). Regarding channels for productivity 
increases via imports of intermediates (Amiti and Konings, 2007), our results may 
indicate that Vietnam’s intermediate imports from China may not contain technology of 
relevance to firms’ productivity. Conversely, firms in Vietnam may still lack the 
absorptive capacity required for productivity-enhancing effects from imported 
intermediates, e.g. in electronics.  
4.5.4 The role of intermediates and firm ownership 
We now dig deeper into the relevance of intermediate inputs and firm ownership. 
Drawing on the BTDIxE database, we create three subsamples based on the percentage 
of total imports from China in the corresponding two-digit industry and year that is 
accounted for by imports of intermediates: less than 50%, more than 50%, and more 
than 75%.
152
 Our data on intermediates are relatively coarse, i.e. they are at the 2-digit 
level. We therefore define the subsamples at the 2-digit level, whereas the key variable 
of interest, CHjtIMP , still varies at the 4-digit level. We also illuminate the extent to 
which firms of different ownership categories respond differently to growing imports 
                                                 
151
 However, several of the controls (FDI sales share, two-digit sector trends) should at least partly 
capture such developments. 
152
 In our sample, the average (across all firm-by-year observations) share of intermediates in the sector-
level imports from China is 67.85%, while the median is 77.54%. 
 289 
 
from China. For each of our three dependent variables, we run IV regressions 
corresponding to the specification in column 8 of Table 4.4: results are presented in 
Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. We start by exploring the heterogeneity across subsamples 
defined by the share of intermediates in total imports from China (columns 1-3). We 
then repeat the same steps but exclude SOEs (columns 4-6). In the last three columns of 
each table, we restrict the sample to privately owned domestic firms.   
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Table 4.7 IV regressions examining subsamples. Dependent variable: logarithm of employment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All ownership categories Excluding SOEs Excluding SOEs and foreign-owned 
 Intm.<50
% 
Intm.>50
% 
Intm.>75
%  
Intm.<50
% 
Intm.>50
% 
Intm.>75
%  
Intm.<50
% 
Intm.>50
% 
Intm.>75
%  
CN
jtIMP 2  
-0.060 0.669*** 0.850*** -0.142 0.745*** 0.922*** -0.004 0.391 0.513* 
(0.302) (0.200) (0.218) (0.303) (0.209) (0.230) (0.383) (0.259) (0.290) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
-0.025 -0.088*** -0.114*** -0.015 -0.100*** -0.126*** -0.035 -0.057* -0.075** 
(0.037) (0.027) (0.030) (0.036) (0.027) (0.031) (0.054) (0.032) (0.036) 
Observations 21,603 60,836 43,728 19,258 53,543 38,586 10,281 31,683 23,787 
No. of firms 8,008 17,194 13,152 7,260 15,929 12,154 4,431 10,216 8,004 
No. of 4-digit sectors 110 116 114 106 116 114 101 114 109 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit sector trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage F 19.16 53.53 54.09 19.47 74.31 75.62 8.672 40.28 37.80 
The controls are the same as in column 8 of Table 4.4. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 4-digit sector X province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.8 IV regressions examining subsamples. Dependent variable: logarithm of sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All ownership categories Excluding SOEs Excluding SOEs and foreign-owned 
 Intm.<50
% 
Intm.>50
% 
Intm.>75
%  
Intm.<50
% 
Intm.>50
% 
Intm.>75
%  
Intm.<50
% 
Intm.>50
% 
Intm.>75
%  
CN
jtIMP 2  
-0.655 0.445 0.531 -0.588 0.724** 0.868** 0.142 0.842* 1.008** 
(0.403) (0.374) (0.417) (0.411) (0.350) (0.389) (0.739) (0.475) (0.511) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
0.054 -0.064 -0.081 0.039 -0.090** -0.116** -0.056 -0.103* -0.129** 
(0.054) (0.045) (0.052) (0.055) (0.042) (0.049) (0.103) (0.059) (0.065) 
Observations 21,603 60,836 43,728 19,258 53,543 38,586 10,281 31,683 23,787 
No. of firms 8,008 17,194 13,152 7,260 15,929 12,154 4,431 10,216 8,004 
No. of 4-digit sectors 110 116 114 106 116 114 101 114 109 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit sector trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage F 19.16 53.53 54.09 19.47 74.31 75.62 8.672 40.28 37.80 
The controls are the same as in column 8 of Table 4.4. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 4-digit sector X province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.9 IV regressions examining subsamples. Dependent variable: logarithm of sales per worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All ownership categories Excluding SOEs Excluding SOEs and foreign-owned 
 Intm.<50
% 
Intm.>50
% 
Intm.>75
%  
Intm.<50
% 
Intm.>50
% 
Intm.>75
%  
Intm.<50
% 
Intm.>50
% 
Intm.>75
%  
CN
jtIMP 2  
-0.585 -0.142 -0.215 -0.435 0.060 0.045 0.141 0.440 0.479 
(0.361) (0.316) (0.350) (0.394) (0.280) (0.302) (0.659) (0.396) (0.401) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
0.079* 0.015 0.021 0.053 0.002 -0.001 -0.019 -0.043 -0.051 
(0.047) (0.038) (0.044) (0.050) (0.034) (0.038) (0.092) (0.048) (0.051) 
Observations 21,603 60,836 43,728 19,258 53,543 38,586 10,281 31,683 23,787 
No. of firms 8,008 17,194 13,152 7,260 15,929 12,154 4,431 10,216 8,004 
No. of 4-digit sectors 110 116 114 106 116 114 101 114 109 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit sector trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage F 19.16 53.53 54.09 19.47 74.31 75.62 8.672 40.28 37.80 
The controls are the same as in column 8 of Table 4.4. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 4-digit sector X province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7 shows the results for IV regressions using log employment as the dependent 
variable. For the subsample with an intermediate share in total Chinese imports in the 
corresponding two-digit industry of less than 50% (column 1), we do not identify a 
statistically significant link between CHjtIMP and employment. The coefficient is 
negative, indicating that imports from China that are not intermediates may exert 
competitive pressure on firms in Vietnam. We then restrict the sample to observations 
with an intermediate share in Chinese imports of more than 50% (column 2) and more 
than 75% (column 3). In both columns the coefficient of CHjtIMP is positive, statistically 
significant. In column 3, the subsample with an intermediate share in imports from 
China of more than 75%, the coefficient is more than 1.5 times the size of the 
coefficient based on the full sample (Table 4.4, column 8). This suggests that imports of 
intermediates from China are associated with complementary effects and linked to 
employment growth, while the opposite link – albeit not statistically significant – 
appears to apply to non-intermediate imports.  
In columns 4-6 we repeat the same regressions but exclude SOEs. Recent research 
suggests that SOEs may respond differently to Vietnam’s growing trade openness than 
private firms (Baccini et al., 2015).
153
 The coefficient based on the subsample with an 
intermediate share of less than 50% is negative but not statistically significant. SOEs 
enjoy preferential access to capital, potentially allowing them to operate at low levels of 
profitability (Smith et al., 2014). This may explain why, once we exclude SOEs from 
the sample, the negative coefficient becomes larger in absolute terms. Conversely, the 
coefficients remain positive and become marginally larger for the subsamples with high 
intermediate shares once we exclude SOEs (columns 5 and 6).  
Once we exclude SOEs as well as MNEs (columns 7-9), our sample size reduces 
substantially. This reflects both the shorter longevity of private domestic firms and the 
scarcity of medium-sized and large private domestic firms in Vietnam (Tran et al., 
2008). While the coefficients are less precisely estimated and the IV lacks power for the 
subsample with an intermediate share of less than 50%, the coefficients for the subset of 
                                                 
153
 Baccini et al. (2015) find that productivity gains associated with Vietnam’s WTO accession are largely 
limited to sectors dominated by private enterprises.  
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observations with higher shares of intermediates (columns 8 and 9) are positive and, in 
column 9, marginally statistically significant. The smaller coefficient sizes and lower 
significance levels resonate with Vu Thanh’s (2014) view that private domestic firms 
are less well-positioned than MNEs to take advantage of Vietnam’s increasing 
integration in the global economy.
154
  
Overall, two key insights emerge from Table 4.7: The share of intermediates seems 
highly relevant to the direction of the relationship between CHjtIMP  and firm-level 
employment. Complementary effects positively linked with firm-level employment 
appear to arise when intermediates account for more than 50% of imports from China, 
whereas this link is absent and may even be negative when imports from China mostly 
consist of non-intermediates. At the same time, MNEs appear to play a central role in 
the positive link between CHjtIMP  and firm-level employment observed for the 
subsamples with a high share of intermediates in total imports from China. This may 
correspond to a situation where MNEs import Chinese-made inputs and increase their 
employment. Although smaller and less precisely estimated, the coefficient remains 
positive for the high-intermediate-share subsample exclusively consisting of private 
domestic enterprises (columns 8 and 9).  
Table 4.8 presents regressions for the same subsamples as in Table 4.7 but uses log 
sales as the dependent variable. The overall picture is similar to the one emerging from 
Table 4.7. Interestingly, statistically significant associations are only identified once we 
exclude SOEs. This may relate to incorrect reporting of sales by SOEs or to SOEs’ 
tendency to seek protection from trade, rather than embrace it (Baccini et al., 2015).  
The coefficient size in the subsamples with purely domestic firms and high shares of 
intermediates (columns 8 and 9) is larger than in the corresponding regressions 
including private domestic firms as well as MNEs (columns 5 and 6). This is rather 
surprising and the opposite of what we found when using employment as the dependent 
variable (Table 4.7). Overall, the results shown in Table 4.8 can be interpreted as 
tentative evidence that, at least for MNEs and private domestic firms, there is a positive 
                                                 
154
 Private domestic firms are, on average, substantially smaller than MNEs and SOEs. Iacovone et al. 
(2013) find in the Mexican case that larger firms are better able to make use of cheap imported inputs. 
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link between CHjtIMP and sales when imports from China consist predominantly of 
intermediates. Conversely, there is no positive link – and possibly even a negative 
association – when imports from China are mostly composed on of non-intermediates.  
Table 4.9 follows the same way of proceeding as Tables 4.7 and 4.8 but uses log of 
sales per workers as the dependent variable. The lack of statistical significance of all 
coefficents in Table 4.9 prevents us from drawing any strong conclusions. The positive 
coefficients in columns 5-9 (contrasting with columns 1-4) may, however, indicate that 
private domestic firms and MNEs are more likely to reap productivity-enhancing 
benefits from Chinese-made imports. SOEs operate under soft budget constraints and 
might hence face fewer incentives to increase productivity (Vu Thanh, 2014).  
Moreover, we obtain the largest coefficient sizes for the subsample with purely 
domestic private firms (columns 7-9). This may indicate that the technological content 
of imported inputs from China is of greater novelty to private domestic firms than to 
MNEs (that would be expected to possess advanced technology) and SOEs. Yet, this 
way of reading the results in columns 7-9 is at odds with one of our interpretations of 
the absence of statistically significant results in the main regressions focused on log 
sales per worker (Table 4.6): In the discussion of Table 4.6, it was argued that 
Vietnamese firms might lack absorptive capacity, while, simultaneously, Chinese-made 
imports may not contain technological content with the potential to enhance 
productivity. Overall, our results regarding sales per worker remain inconclusive and 
require further investigation in future research.  
4.5.5 Robustness checks 
We conduct several robustness checks. First, we exclude firms located in the two main 
cities (Hanoi and HCMC) from the sample. Our results are robust to this change in the 
sample (see Table 4.A.3 in the Appendix). In a further test (see Table 4.A.4 in the 
Appendix) we exclude electronics (two-digit sector 32) and textiles (two-digit sectors 
17, 18 and 19). Somewhat surprisingly, the results remain similar after the exclusion of 
these sectors. We also use an alternative basket of 12 countries (based on five variables 
taken from the World Bank’s world development indicators, including GDP per capita, 
manufacturing share of GDP, level of education, natural resource rents, imports from 
high-income countries) for the calculation of the IV (see Table 4.A.5 in the Appendix). 
The results of these checks are very similar to the main results.  
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4.6 Conclusion  
 
China’s ascent as a manufacturing powerhouse has given rise to fears that its export 
success might negatively affect manufacturing activities in other developing countries. 
Despite a recent surge in the number of studies examining firm-level consequences of 
exposure to imports from China in advanced economies (e.g. Utar, 2014; Mion and 
Zhou, 2014; Bloom et al., 2016), there is a scarcity of firm-level analyses using data 
from countries that are less developed than China. This contribution focuses on 
manufacturing firms in Vietnam, a rapidly growing economy that saw a dramatic 
increase in imports from its north-eastern neighbour between 2000 and 2012.  
Our findings reveal a positive and statistically significant link between exposure to 
imports from China and firm-level employment. The estimates indicate that an increase 
of Chinese imports relative to domestic production in the same industry by 14 
percentage points is associated with an increase in firm-level employment by 1.7 (OLS) 
to 6.7 (IV) percentage points. The results provide only tentative evidence that increasing 
exposure to imports from China are also positively linked to firm-level sales. We do not 
find evidence of a significant relationship with firms’ labour productivity (as measured 
by sales per worker).  
A further dimension is added to the analysis through the distinction between subsamples 
defined by the share of imports from China that consist of intermediate inputs. When 
imports from China are predominantly non-intermediates, we observe a negative 
association between exposure to Chinese-made imports and firm-level employment. In 
sharp contrast, we observe a positive association and larger coefficient sizes when 
intermediates account for the majority of imports from China. Preliminary results 
regarding differences across firm ownership categories suggest that multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) play a key role in the observed positive link between intermediates. 
However, a positive association persists with respect to both employment and sales if 
we exclude MNEs from the analysis. 
These findings are consistent with a situation where Vietnam’s recent export growth is 
partly built on intermediates imported from its north-eastern neighbour. Imports of 
intermediates from China appear to be associated with complementary, rather than 
competitive, effects. MNEs are likely to act as key actors orchestrating the flow of 
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intermediates across borders, simultaneously advancing Vietnam’s integration in the 
international production network frequently called “Factory Asia”. Via their own trade 
activities and possibly supplier links to MNEs, private domestic firms do seem to 
benefit from these complementary effects. Conversely, we find signs that imports from 
China that do not consist of intermediates may have competitive effects, resonating with 
earlier literature that identified detrimental effects of Chinese-made manufacturing 
imports on manufacturing activities in developing countries (Utar and Ruiz, 2013; 
Edwards and Jenkins, 2015; Costa et al.; 2016). 
Exposure to manufacturing imports from China therefore appears to be a two-sided 
story in the Vietnamese case. Intermediate inputs are associated with complementary 
effects, potentially supporting the country’s export success and growing embeddedness 
in cross-border production networks. Imports of final consumer goods, however, seem 
to exert competitive pressure on Vietnamese firms and might crowd out domestic 
production. The results of this analysis suggest that the complementary effects 
dominate, though.  
Is this finding good news for policy-makers in developing countries worried about 
China’s trading power? Not necessarily. Vietnam’s wages are substantially lower than 
China’s. For countries with wages higher than China’s, competitive effects associated 
with exposure to Chinese-made imports may be more pronounced. In addition, Vietnam 
is located in relative geographical proximity to China and major industrialized Asian 
economies. With respect to its embeddedness in MNEs’ global supply chains, this 
arguably constitutes a strategic advantage. As highlighted by Baldwin (2011), 
remoteness from one of the main centres of global production networks can hamper a 
country’s chances of achieving manufacturing export growth via offshoring. 
Furthermore, Vietnam shares several institutional and political characteristics (Malesky 
and London, 2014) with China, which may facilitate its growing role as an alternative to 
China for the location of a subset of labour-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing 
activities. The results of this study are therefore of particular relevance to low-income 
Asian economies that could be considered as candidates for the next tier of “geese” in 
the diffusion of industrialization within Asia (Kojima, 2000). In particular, this group 
includes countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and possibly Myanmar and the Philippines.  
Regarding implications for Vietnam, our findings indicate that potential complementary 
effects may have received too little attention in the debate about Vietnam’s trade with 
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its large neighbour. In combination with growing integration into global production 
networks, trade with China appears to offer economic chances for Vietnam. However, 
despite the positive link between exposure to imports from China and firm-level 
employment identified here, one must bear in mind that export-oriented manufacturing 
cannot be regarded as a smooth “autopilot” journey to higher levels of technological 
capabilities and income (Ernst, 2004; Padilla-Pérez and Martínez-Piva, 2009; Wacker et 
al., 2016). The technology provided by MNEs allows developing countries to add new, 
seemingly sophisticated products to their export baskets in relatively short periods of 
time (Badwin, 2011; Baldwin and Lopez‐Gonzalez, 2015). Yet, indigenous efforts, 
especially regarding domestic firms’ absorptive capacity, are required to move beyond 
“hollow” assembly activities with limited connection to local firms’ capabilities (Ernst, 
2004; Iammarino and McCann, 2013). Vietnamese policy-makers should therefor adopt a 
proactive approach and facilitate the diffusion of new knowledge among domestically-
owned firms. 
This analysis is not without limitations. It focuses on the firm-level and the role of imports 
from China. It does not capture potential competition between Chinese and Vietnamese 
exporters in third markets and similarly does not allow for inferences regarding general 
equilibrium effects, e.g. in terms of re-allocation processes across industries. Importantly, 
this study excludes the informal sector and formal firms with less than 30 employees. While 
our analysis is representative of a large share of the firms producing manufacturing output 
in Vietnam during 2000-2012, future research could try to explore related questions with a 
greater consideration of smaller firms. In addition, our analysis does not capture firm-level 
exporting and importing decisions. It generally seems appropriate to assume that exposure 
to imports from China varies at the industry-level, since firms may compete with imported 
goods without being importers themselves and may, simultaneously, source imported inputs 
indirectly via domestic intermediaries. However, firm-level data on trade activities would 
allow for the exploration of more fine-grained questions related to underlying mechanisms, 
e.g. regarding intermediates.  
Besides, our data on intermediates are relatively coarse. Future research could try to use 
more detailed data, e.g. on imports’ technology content. Moreover, efforts to examine the 
links between firms’ sectoral specialization, export destinations, and intermediate imports 
could contribute to a better understanding of the relations between processes at the firm-
level, national level, within regional trading blocs, and at the global scale. In future work we 
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also intend to examine links between exposure to imports from China and changes in firms’ 
product portfolio. 
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Appendix 
 
Finger-Kreinin Index 
Originally proposed by Finger and Kreinin (1979) to measure the similarity of the 
sectoral export profiles of two or more countries, the Finger-Kreinin index has also been 
applied to imports and can be used to measure the similarity of the sectoral composition 
of trade flows of two or more countries (Ng, 2002; Lloyd, 2004).   
For the purpose of this analysis, we considered both exports and imports to identify a 
set of countries with trade profiles that are similar to Vietnam’s. 
FKij = ½ ((1 – [½ Σk |(xik / Σk xik) - (xjk / Σk xjk)|]) + (1 – [½ Σk |(yik / Σk yik) - (yjk / 
Σk yjk)|])) 
Where: 
xik = country i’s exports in the 4-digit ISIC industry k 
xjk = country j’s exports in the 4-digit ISIC industry k 
yik = country i’s imports in the 4-digit ISIC industry k 
yjk = country j’s imports in the 4-digit ISIC industry k 
 
The resulting index ranges between 0 (perfect dissimilarity) and 1 (perfect similarity). 
We calculate the FKI for all countries covered by UN Comtrade. After the exclusion of 
Asian countries, the 12 countries that are most similar to Vietnam are Tunisia (FK: 
0.655), Egypt (0.597), Morocco (0.596), Turkey (0.590), Colombia (0.586), Ecuador 
(0.578), Romania (0.567), Bulgaria (0.567), Guatemala (0.565), Serbia (0.555), Albania 
(0.549), Macedonia (0.528).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 312 
 
Figure 4.A.1 Average effectively applied ad valorem tariffs applied to Vietnam’s 
imports from China 
 
(Source: UN Comtrade) 
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Figure 4.A.2 Changes in industry log Exports against Mean intermediates as % of 
all imports from China 
 
NOTES: Figure plots changes in exports between 2000 and 2012 against the average of the percentage of 
imports from China that is accounted for by intermediate goods at the 2-digit ISIC3 industry level between 2000 
and 2012. The size of the points is weighted by industry employment size in 2012. Labels refer to the largest 
point in immediate proximity. The labelled sectors are 15 (Food products and beverages), 17 (Textiles), 18 
(Wearing apparel), 19 (Luggage and footwear), 27 (Basic metals), 32 (Radio, television, telephone apparatus), 
36 (Furniture). This figure excludes four sectors with very large increases in log exports but relatively small 
total employment in 2012 (16: Tobacco products, 22: Publishing and printing, 33: Medical, optimal 
instruments, watches, clocks, 34: Motor vehicles and trailers). For a scatter plot including all 22 sectors in our 
dataset, see Figure 4.A.3. 
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Figure 4.A.3 Changes in industry log Exports against Mean intermediates as % of 
all imports from China 
 
NOTES: This Figure corresponds to Figure 4.A.2 but adds four sectors with large increases in exports and 
relatively small total employment in 2012 (16: Tobacco products, 22: Publishing and printing, 33: Medical, 
optimal instruments, watches, clocks, 34: Motor vehicles and trailers).  
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Table 4.A.1 Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Source 
Log of employment (head count) 4.88 1.14 3.43 11.35 
Vietnamese 
Enterprise Survey 
(VES) 
Log of sales 10.14 1.83 0 19.42 VES 
Log of sales per worker 5.3 1.35 0 11.47 VES 
Imports from China, norm. by total 
sales in same sector 0.08 0.14 0 1.1 
UN Comtrade, VES 
Main instrumental variable 28419.39 106323.6 -105000 6550000 UN Comtrade, VES 
Alternative instrumental variable 23600.69 89892.09 
-
13013.38 1960000 
UN Comtrade, VES 
Imports from all countries exc. China, 
norm. by total sales in sector 0.36 0.62 0 5.32 
UN Comtrade, VES 
Age group 1 (2-4 years) 0.34 0.47 0 1 VES 
Age group 2 (5-9 years) 0.52 0.5 0 1 VES 
Age group 3 (10-13 years) 0.15 0.35 0 1 VES 
SOE 0.12 0.32 0 1 VES 
MNE 0.37 0.48 0 1 VES 
Herfindahl index of sales 
concentration 0.06 0.08 0 1 
VES 
MNE sales share 30.29 22.06 0 100 VES 
SOE sales share 16.98 18.45 0 100 VES 
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Table 4.A.2 Pairwise correlations 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Log of employment (head count) 1 
              
(2) Log of sales 0.64 1 
             
(3) Log of sales per worker 0.02 0.77 1 
            
(4) 
Imports from China, norm. by 
total sales in same sector -0.04 0.06 0.12 1 
           
(5) Main instrumental variable -0.02 0.09 0.14 0.39 1 
          
(6) Alternative instrumental variable -0.01 0.09 0.14 0.4 0.94 1 
         
(7) 
Imports from all countries exc. 
China, norm. by total sales in 
sector -0.05 0.03 0.08 0.67 0.24 0.23 1 
        
(8) Age group 1 (2-4 years) -0.12 -0.18 -0.14 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 1 
       
(9) Age group 2 (5-9 years) 0.04 0.04 0.02 0 -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.74 1 
      
(10) Age group 3 (10-13 years) 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.29 -0.43 1 
     
(11) SOE 0.24 0.19 0.06 0 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0 0.07 1 
    
(12) MNE 0.25 0.29 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0 0.04 -0.28 1 
   
(13) 
Herfindahl index of sales 
concentration -0.01 0.07 0.1 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.2 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.04 1 
  
(14) MNE sales share 0.15 0.06 -0.05 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.17 0.21 0.02 1 
 
(15) SOE sales share 0.03 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.09 -0.01 -0.11 0.32 -0.13 0.16 -0.47 1 
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Table 4.A.3 Robustness check: excluding firms based in Hanoi and HCMC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV 
CN
jtIMP 2  
0.094** 0.173*** 0.169*** 0.148*** 0.427** 0.478** 0.462** 0.458** 
(0.037) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.177) (0.192) (0.191) (0.189) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
 -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.033***  -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Age Dummy 1 (2-4 years) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age Dummy 2 (5-9 years) 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
SOE   0.107*** 0.102***   0.106*** 0.102*** 
   (0.038) (0.038)   (0.038) (0.038) 
MNE   -0.012 -0.009   -0.010 -0.007 
   (0.031) (0.031)   (0.031) (0.031) 
SOE sales share    0.001***    0.001** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
MNE sales share    0.001**    0.001 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Herfindahl index of sales     -0.089*    -0.073 
concentration    (0.047)    (0.049) 
Observations 55,415 55,415 55,415 55,415 55,415 55,415 55,415 55,415 
Number of iddn 13,663 13,663 13,663 13,663 13,663 13,663 13,663 13,663 
Adjusted R-squared 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.020     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit sector trends No No No Yes No No No Yes 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F     51.41 64.92 64.79 75.97 
Dependent variable: logarithm of employment. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses; clustered at 4-
digit sector X province level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.A.4 Robustness check: excluding textiles and electronics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV 
CN
jtIMP 2  
0.047 0.162*** 0.158*** 0.134*** 0.637*** 0.772*** 0.751*** 0.720*** 
(0.030) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.215) (0.230) (0.229) (0.221) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
 -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.047***  -0.123*** -0.120*** -0.116*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Age Dummy 1 (2-4 years) 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age Dummy 2 (5-9 years) 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
SOE   0.168*** 0.161***   0.162*** 0.156*** 
   (0.038) (0.038)   (0.038) (0.038) 
MNE   0.042 0.045   0.043 0.045 
   (0.032) (0.031)   (0.031) (0.031) 
SOE sales share    0.002***    0.001*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
MNE sales share    0.001**    0.001 
    (0.000)    (0.001) 
Herfindahl index of sales     -0.064*    -0.023 
concentration    (0.038)    (0.044) 
Observations 65,751 65,751 65,751 65,751 65,751 65,751 65,751 65,751 
Number of iddn 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 
Adjusted R-squared 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.017     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit sector trends No No No Yes No No No No 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F     33.42 54.03 53.87 65.18 
Dependent variable: logarithm of employment. A constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses.; clustered at 4-digit sector X province level *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.A.5 Robustness check: alternative instrumental variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IV IV IV IV 
CN
jtIMP 2  
0.582*** 0.639*** 0.624*** 0.607*** 
(0.210) (0.215) (0.213) (0.205) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
 -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.091*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) 
Age Dummy 1 (2-4 years) 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age Dummy 2 (5-9 years) 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
SOE   0.129*** 0.123*** 
   (0.036) (0.036) 
MNE   0.016 0.017 
   (0.029) (0.029) 
SOE sales share    0.001*** 
    (0.000) 
MNE sales share    0.001 
    (0.001) 
Herfindahl index of sales     -0.057 
concentration    (0.042) 
Observations 81,252 81,252 81,252 81,252 
Number of iddn 20,659 20,659 20,659 20,659 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit sector trend No No No Yes 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F 26.87 44.69 44.57 53.64 
Dependent variable: logarithm of employment. The basket of countries used to calculate 
this IV encompasses Morocco, Egypt, Madagascar, Honduras, Colombia, Tunisia, 
Cameroon, Peru, Ecuador, Turkey, Cote d’Ivoire, Romania. These countries were 
chosen after a comparison with Vietnam based on five indicators (GDP per capita, 
manufacturing share of GDP, level of education, natural resource rents, imports from 
high-income countries) taken from the World Bank Development indicators (WDI, 
2016). Robust standard errors in parentheses; clustered at 4-digit sector X province 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.A.6 First stage results corresponding to column 8 of Table 4.4 
 (1) 
Instrumental variable 0.0000002*** 
 (0.0000000) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
0.1195768*** 
(0.0049272) 
Age Dummy 1 (2-4 years) -0.0018473 
 (0.0020059) 
Age Dummy 2 (5-9 years) -0.0034870** 
 (0.0016409) 
SOE 0.0053040 
 (0.0055848) 
MNE -0.0019045 
 (0.0041580) 
SOE sales share 0.0004470*** 
 (0.0000948) 
FDI sales share 0.0007439*** 
 (0.0001137) 
Herfindahl index of sales  -0.0709155*** 
concentration (0.0207953) 
Year 4 -0.0058276 
 (0.0036956) 
Year 5 0.0086226* 
 (0.0046056) 
Year 6 0.0166157** 
 (0.0070166) 
Year 7 0.0276700*** 
 (0.0085276) 
Year 8 0.0350291*** 
 (0.0096717) 
Year 9 0.0397330*** 
 (0.0104863) 
Year 10 0.0540318*** 
 (0.0122165) 
Year 11 0.0453844*** 
 (0.0130121) 
Year 12 0.0488982*** 
 (0.0139554) 
Year 13 0.0536975*** 
 (0.0149680) 
Two-digit sector trend 0.0000392 
 (0.0000527) 
Constant -0.0396072*** 
 (0.0086828) 
Observations 82,439 
Number of iddn 20,924 
R-squared 0.3474132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; , clustered at 4-digit sector X province level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.A.7 First stage results corresponding to column 4 of Table 4.A.5 
 (1) 
Alternative instrumental variable 0.0000002*** 
 (0.0000000) 
nonCN
jtIMP 2  
0.1219323*** 
(0.0053090) 
Age Dummy 1 (2-4 years) -0.0015917 
 (0.0019962) 
Age Dummy 2 (5-9 years) -0.0034078** 
 (0.0016467) 
SOE 0.0072960 
 (0.0054151) 
MNE -0.0001808 
 (0.0041173) 
SOE sales share 0.0004575*** 
 (0.0000941) 
FDI sales share 0.0007519*** 
 (0.0001151) 
Herfindahl index of sales  -0.0671498*** 
concentration (0.0218484) 
Year 4 -0.0035600 
 (0.0034201) 
Year 5 0.0064683 
 (0.0045587) 
Year 6 0.0160056** 
 (0.0072399) 
Year 7 0.0265809*** 
 (0.0087749) 
Year 8 0.0340770*** 
 (0.0099925) 
Year 9 0.0393155*** 
 (0.0108461) 
Year 10 0.0534009*** 
 (0.0125991) 
Year 11 0.0448568*** 
 (0.0134108) 
Year 12 0.0472500*** 
 (0.0143713) 
Year 13 0.0527247*** 
 (0.0153766) 
Two-digit sector trend 0.0000506 
 (0.0000542) 
Constant -0.0431234*** 
 (0.0088843) 
Observations 81,252 
Number of iddn 20,659 
R-squared 0.3420376 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; , clustered at 4-digit sector X province level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
